Stochastic games with finite state and action spaces by Vrieze, O.J.

CWI Tracts 
Maru:1glng Editors 
J.W. de Bakker (CWI, Amsterdam) 
M. Hazewinkel (CWI, Amsterdam) 
J.K. Lenstra (CWI, Amsterdam) 
Editorial Board 
W. Albers (Maastricht) 
P.C. Baayen (Amsterdam) 
R.T. Boute (Nijmegen) 
E.M. de Jager (Amsterdam) 
M.A. Kaashoek (Amsterdam) 
M.S. Keane (Delft) 
J.P.C. Kleijnen (Tilburg) 
H. Kwakernaak (Enschede) 
J. van Leeuwen (Utrecht) 
P.W.H. Lemmens (Utrecht) 
M. van der Put (Groningen) 
M. Rem (Eindhoven) 
A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan (Rotterdam) 
M.N. Spijker (Leiden) 
Centrum voor Wlskunde en !nformatlca 
Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science 
P.O. Box 4079, 1009 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
The CWI is a research institute of the Stichting Mathematisch Centrum, which was founded 
on February 11. 1946, as a nonprofit institution aiming at the promotion of mathematics, 
computer science, and their applications. It is sponsored by the Dutch Government through 
the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.). 
CWI Tract 33 
Stochastic games with finite 
state and action spaces 
O.J. Vrieze 
Centrum voor Wiskunde en lnformatica 
Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science 
1980 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90005, 90015, 93E05, 93E20. 
ISBN 90 6196 313 3 
Copyright© 1987, Stichting Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam 
Printed in the Netherlands 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This tract is a slightly revised version of my thesis which was written under the 
supervision of professor Henk Tijms and professor Stef Tijs. I am very grateful 
to both of them. With Henk Tijms I had very stimulating discussions during 
the realization of my thesis. Several chapters of this tract evolved from joint 
work with Stef Tijs. His never ceasing stream of inspiring fresh impulses al-
ways guarantees further investigations. 
Also, I am indebted to professor dr. G. de Leve for having given me the 
splendid opportunity to start my research at the Mathematical Centre. 
I thank the Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science for the oppor-
tunity to publish this tract in their series CWI Tracts and all those who have 
contributed to its technical realization. 
O.J. Vrieze 

CONTENTS 
Part I. Introduction and description of the model. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. 3 
CHAPTER 2. STOCHASTIC GAMES; THE MODEL. 7 
2.1 The model of the two-person zerosum stochastic game. 7 
2.2 Strategies in stochastic games. 9 
2.3 Criteria functions for stochastic games. 10 
CHAPTER 3. PLAYING AGAINST A FIXED STRATEGY. 15 
Part II. Discounted stochastic games. 23 
CHAPTER 4. REVIEW OF DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES. 25 
4.1 Introduction. 25 
4.2 Existence of value and optimal stationary strategies. 26 
4.3 Generalizations. 31 
4~4 An alternative proof of the existence of the value. 32 
CHAPTER 5. STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES. 39 
5.1 Relations between the game parameters and the solution of 
the game. 39 
5.2 Characterizing properties of the value function. 47 
5.3 Perturbation theory for discounted stochastic games. 56 
5.4 Unique optimal strategies. 64 
CHAPTER 6. ALGORITHMS FOR DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES. 71 
6.1 Some algorithms. 71 
6.2 Fictitious play as an iterative model for solving discounted 
stochastic games. 75 
6.3 A finite algorithm for the discounted switching control 
stochastic game. 90 
Part III. Average reward stochastic games. 
CHAPTER 7. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES. 
7.1 Historical review. 
7.2 The limit discount equation. 
97 
99 
99 
103 
CHAPTER 8. STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF UNDISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES. 107 
8.1 Stochastic games and optimal stationary strategies. 
8.2 The asymptotic behaviour of JJFV(<)-<gll. 
8.3 Games with a value independent of the initial state. 
8.4 On the existence of easy initial states. 
CHAPTER 9. ALGORITHHS FOR UNDISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES. 
9.1 Some known algorithms. 
107 
121 
131 
138 
149 
149 
9.2 Stochastic games where one player controls the transitions. 153 
9.3 A finite algorithm for the switching control stochastic 
game 
APPENDIX 
A.1 Matrix games. 
A.2 Markov decision problems. 
A.3 Recent literature on structured stochastic games 
REFERENCES 
AUTHOR INDEX 
SUBJECT INDEX 
SYMBOL INDEX 
NOTATIONS 
169 
181 
183 
191 
195 
199 
209 
213 
217 
221 
Part I. Introduction and description of the model. 

1. Introduction. 
In this monograph two-person zerosum stochastic games are considered. 
With the exception of sections 5.3 and 5.4 both the state space and the 
spaces of pure actions of the players are assumed to be finite sets. 
This monograph consists of three parts, supplemented by an appendix. 
In part I the model is described. Further, the different types of 
strategies and evaluation functions are introduced. Analysed subsequently 
is what happens when a player fixes his strategy in advance of the play. 
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In part II we study discounted stochastic games. The theory of 
stochastic games originated in 1953 with the fundamental paper of Shapley 
(1953). He considered stopping stochastic games, i.e. games for which, in 
each state and for each pair of actions of the players, the game stops with 
a positive probability. Discounted stochastic games can be regarded as 
special cases of stopping stochastic games. Shapley proved that a stopping 
game has a value and that both players possess optimal stationary 
strategies. 
In the introductory section of part II we give an alternative proof of 
Shapley's result, using non-linear programming techniques. Further, in part 
II the emphasis lies on two subjects. Firstly we investigate structural 
properties of the class of discounted stochastic games, and secondly we 
consider algorithms. 
Given the value of a discounted stochastic game, optimal stationary 
strategies can be constructed by taking optimal actions in certain matrix 
games. This fact enables us to extend the structural properties for matrix 
games and games in normal form to stochastic games. Particularly, the 
results of Bohnenblust, Karlin & Shapley (1950), Shapley & Snow (1950), 
Vilkas (1963) and Tijs (1976b, 1981) are enlarged to stochastic games. 
For computational reasons special attention is paid to the relations 
between the game parameters and the solution of the game, and to the 
influence of small perturbations of the game parameters on the solution 
of the game. 
Algorithms for discounted stochastic games are mainly based on 
successive approximation methods (e.g. Van der Wal (1977)). Other iterative 
procedures that can be mentioned are the algorithms of Hoffman & Karp 
4 
(1966) and Pollatschek & Avi-Itzhak (1969). Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981) 
studied one-player-control stochastic games. For the discounted case they 
gave a linear programming problem, the solution of which corresponds to the 
solution of the associated game. 
In chapter 6, after a short review of existing solution methods for 
discounted stochastic games, we present two algorithms. One can be 
characterized by the term fictitious play for discounted stochastic games. 
This algorithm can be seen as the extension to stochastic games of the 
fictitious play scheme which Brown (1949, 1951) suggested as a solution 
concept for matrix games. The other algorithm of chapter 6 can be applied 
to the subclass of discounted switching control stochastic games, giving a 
finite procedure for deriving the solutions of these games. The class of 
switching control stochastic games was introduced by Filar (1981). 
In part III we consider undiscounted stochastic games. This part is 
also built up of a chapter on structural properties and a chapter on 
algorithms. 
The theory of undiscounted zerosum stochastic games began with 
Gillette (1957). For a long time it was an open question whether 
undiscounted stochastic games possess a value. This question was recently 
answered in the affirmative by Mertens & Neyman (1981). Independently 
a weaker version of their result was elaborated by Monash (1979). 
In a valuable paper Blackwell & Ferguson (1968) studied an example of 
an undiscounted stochastic game (the big match) and showed that no optimal 
strategy exists for one of the players. Even if one wishes to play 
e-optimal, e>O, in general one has to use complicated history dependent 
:;trategies. Hence it is natural to examine subclasses of stochastic games 
for which e-optimal or optimal stationary strategies exist and where these 
strategies can easily be calculated. 
With respect to the structural properties, we characterize games 
having, for e~O, e-optimal stationary strategies for one or both players. 
Further it appears that for each of the players there is at least one state 
which is easy for him. Here, easy for a player means that, starting in such 
a state, he can guarantee himself the value of the game with a stationary 
strategy. Also studied in detail is the subclass of s~ochastic games for 
which the value does not depend on the initial state. Next relations between 
the solution of the limit discount equation and the asymptotic behaviour of 
the value of the T-step game are investigated. 
In deriving our results we make use of the field of real Puiseux 
series. Bewley & Kohlberg (1976a, 1976b, 1978) have elegantly introduced 
this field of real Puiseux series in stochastic games. Their results 
enclose nearly all earlier results on stochastic games. 
Concerning algorithms for undiscounted stochastic games, the afore-
mentioned result of Blackwell & Ferguson (1968) showed that it is very 
hard to find s-optimal strategies in general. The algorithms of Hoffman 
& Karp (1966), Federgruen (1978) and Van der Wal (1980) approximate 
the value and give s-optimal stationary strategies for special subclasses 
of stochastic games. Also for undiscounted stochastic games, Parthasarathy 
& Raghavan introduced the one-player-control stochastic game and Filar 
(1981) introduced the switching control stochastic game. 
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In chapter 9 we examine the above mentioned two subclasses of 
stochastic games, which can be solved relatively easily. The one-player-
control stochastic game can be solved by a linear programming problem. The 
switching control stochastic game can be solved by a finite sequence of 
linear programming problems. For both classes the orderfield property arises 
in a natural way from the algorithms. 
In the appendix we give the necessary concepts and well-known facts 
for matrix games (section A.1) and Markov decision problems (section A.2) 
that will be used in this monograph. In section A.3 recent literature on 
structured stochastic games is outlined. 

2. Stochastic games; the model. 
2.1. THE MODEL OF THE TWO-PERSON ZEROSUM STOCHASTIC GAME. 
In this monograph we study two-person zerosum stochastic games with 
finite state space and finite action spaces for both players. We begin by 
defining a stochastic game situation, which will serve as the framework of 
a particular stochastic game. 
2.1.1. DEFINITION. A finite two-person zerosum stochastic game situation 
is an ordered quintuple< S, {A lsEs}, {B lsES}, r,p >, where s, A and 
s s s 
Bs are finite non-empty sets, r is a real-valued function on the set 
H := {(s,i,j) lsES, iEA, jEB} and where p is a map p: H+P(s) with P(S) 
s s 
the family of probability distributions on the space S. 
The game parameters have the following meaning. 
S = {1,2, ... ,z} is called the state space. 
A 
s 
B 
s 
r : 
{1,2, ... ,ms} is called the action set of player in state s. 
{1,2, ... ,ns} is called the action set of player 2 in state s. 
H+JR is called the payof f function; if in state s player 1 chooses 
action iEAs and player 2 chooses jEBs' then player 2 pays player 1 the 
amount r(s,i,j) (if r(s,i,j)<O, then player 2 receives -r(s,i,j) from 
player 1). 
p : H+P(S) is called the transition map. P(S) can be identified with the set 
{w!wEJR2 , w ~O, each sES and l: 2 1w =1}. Therefore, for each (s,i,j)EH, s s= s 
we identify p(s,i,j) with the vector (p(lls,i,j), p(2ls,i,j), .... 
... , p(zls,i,j)). Here p(t\s,i,j) represents the probability that the 
system jumps to state t if in state s player 1 chooses action iEAs and 
player 2 action jEBs. Hence p(tls,i,j)~O and l:~=lp(tls,i,j)=l. 
We usually omit the adjective finite for a stochastic game, since with the 
exception of the sections 5.3 and 5.4 we only consider finite stochastic 
games. 
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Such a stochastic game corresponds to a dynamic system which can be 
in different states and where at certain decision epochs the players can 
influence the course of the play. We consider the infinite horizon model 
and the set of decision epochs is assumed to be identical with the set 
JN={0,1,2, ••• }. 
The game runs as follows. we assume that the initial state s 0 at 
decision epoch 0 is known to the players. The players select simultaneously 
and independently of one another (possibly by a chance experiment) an action 
i 0€A and j 0€B respectively. Now two things happen, both depending on so so 
the current state s 0 and the subsequently chosen actions i 0 and j 0 • 
(a) player 2 pays player 1 the amount r(s0 ,i0 ,j0). 
(b) the system jumps to the next state s 1 according to the outcome of 
a chance experiment. The probability that the next state will be 
state t equals p(tls0 ,i0 ,j 0). 
Subsequently, prior to the next decision epoch 1, both players are 
informed of the previous actions chosen by the players and of the new state 
s 1 • At decision epoch 1, the above procedure repeats itself, etc. 
We assume that the game is of perfect recall, i.e. at each decision 
epoch each player remembers all past actions chosen by all players and all 
past states that have occurred. 
Note that for finite two-person zerosum stochastic games, we have for 
each state a similarity with matrix games, in the sense that r(s,i,j) 
denotes the (possibly negative) amount which player 2 pays player 1 if in 
state s the players select actions i and j respectively. However, contrary 
to the situation with matrix games, the game does not exist of a single 
play, but jumps according to the probability measure p(.js,i,j) to the 
next state and continues dynamically. So in choosing an action in a certain 
state a player not only takes into account the immediate reward, but also 
his possibilities in the future states. 
Also like in matrix games, when selecting an action, the players are 
allowed to randomize their pure actions. At the different decision epochs 
this randomization may depend on the history of the game up to that epoch. 
In the next section we discuss the types of strategies that a player may 
use. 
2.2. STRATEGIES IN STOCHASTIC GAMES. 
2.2.1. DEFINITION. The set of possible histories up to a decision epoch T 
consists of all sequences hT=(s0 ,i0 ,j 0 ,s 1 ,i 1 ,j 1 , ... ,sT-l'iT-l'jT-l) 
9 
that could have actually occurred up to time T, T~l. Here sk represents 
the state and ik and jk the action of player 1 and player 2 respectively 
at time k, k=0,1, ... ,T-1. 
Obviously the set of histories up to time T equals HT, i.e. the 
T-fold Cartesian product of H. 
First we shall describe the different types of strategies that a 
player may use and next give a formal definition. A behaviour strategy µ 
of player 1 specifies for each decision epoch T, each state sT on time T 
and each history hT a probability distribution µT(hT,s 1 ) on the action 
space A of player in states . Thenµ (ilh ,s) is the probability ST T T T T 
with which player chooses action iEA at time T if state sT and history ST 
h have occurred. 
T 
A semi-Markov strategy for player 1 is a behaviour strategy for which 
µT(hT,sT) only depends on hT through s 0 ; so µT(h 1 ,sT) is of the form 
]JT (sO,sT). 
A Markov strategy for player 1 is a semi-Markov strategy for which 
µT(s 0 ,sT) does not depend on s 0 ; so µT(s 0 ,sT) is of the form µ1 (sT). 
A stationary strategy for player 1 is a Markov strategy for which 
µT(sT) does not depend on T; so µT(sT) is of the form µ(sT). In the 
sequel a stationary strategy for player 1 shall be denoted by the symbol 
p. Then p=(p 1 , ... ,p 2 ), where ps is a probability measure on the action 
space As for each sEs. So psEP(As). If player 1 decides to play the 
stationary strategy p, then every time that the system is in state s, 
player 1 selects his pure action according to ps. A stationary strategy p 
is called pure if ps is pure for each sEs, i.e. ps(is)=l for some isEAs. 
Strategies for player 2 are defined analogously. For player 2 a 
behaviour strategy is denoted by v and a stationary strategy by cr. 
Formally the above concepts lead to the following definition. 
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2.2.2. DEFINITION. A behaviour strategy µ for player 1 is a sequence 
µ0 , µ1 , µ2 , ••• , where µ0;~== 1 P(As) and µT: HT+x:=1P(As) for T~l. 
A semi-Markov strategy µ for player 1 is a sequence 
SM SM SM . SM z SM z µ0 , µ1 , µ2 , ••• , where µ0 Exs=lP(As) and µT : s+xs=lP(As) for T~l. 
M M M M A Markov strategyµ for player 1 is a sequence µ0 , µ1 , µ2 , •.• , where 
µM€xz P(A ) for T~O. 
T s=l S 
z A stationary strategy p for player 1 is an element of X 1P(A ). s= s 
A pure stationary strategy pp for player 1 is an element of xz A 
s=l s 
Strategies for player 2 are defined analogously. 
For player 1, 1=1,2 we denote by STt' SMSTi' MST£' SST£ and PSST£ 
respectively the classes of behaviour strategies, ~emi-~rkov strategies, 
Markov strategies, ~tationary strategies and E_Ure ~tationary strategies. 
2.2.3. REMARK. It should be noted, that the set ST1 is not the most general 
class of strategies. If we were to represent a stochastic game in the so-
called extensive form (see e.g. Von Neuman & Morgenstern (1944)), then 
this would yield a tree of infinite depth for the infinite horizon game. 
On this tree pure and mixed strategies could be defined in the sense of 
Kuhn (1953) and Aumann (1964). This procedure would lead to a class of 
strategies for which the set ST£ is a proper subset. However, Aumann (1964) 
has proved for a certain class of games with perfect recall, including 
stochastic games with finite state space and finite action spaces as a 
special case, that every mixed strategy defined for the game in extensive 
form has an equivalent behaviour strategy. Here two strategies of a player 
are called equivalent if, for all strategies of the other players and for 
all starting states, both strategies yield on each decision epoch the same 
expected payoff for that player. 
2.3. CRITERIA FUNCTIONS FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES. 
A pair of strategies (µ,v) induces for fixed starting state s and each 
time epoch T a probability measure lP (T) on the finite product space 
sµv 
HT. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem (Kolmogorov (1933)) the sequence 
P (0), lP (1), ..• can be extended in the classical way to a unique 
sµv sµv 
11 
00 
probability measure lP on the inifinite product space H . 
sµv 
Given that player 1 and 2 choose strategy µ and strategy v 
respectively, we define the following stochastic variables: 
x:v' representing the action of player 1 at epoch T. 
Y~v' representing the action of player 2 at epoch T. 
z:v' representing the state at epoch T. 
Obviously the marginal distributions of XT , YT and ZT , for each TEW, µv µv µv 
are determined bylP . For initial states the expected payoff at decision 
sµv 
epoch T is given by 
(2. 3.1) 
L r(t,i,j).JP {ZT =t; XT =i· YT =j}. 
(t,i,j)EH sµv µv µv ' µv 
The way in which the stream of payoffs is evaluated specifies a 
particular game. 
2.3.1. DEFINITION. A discounted two-person zerosum stochastic game with 
interest rate aE(O,oo) is a two-person zerosum stochastic game situation 
for which the stream of expected payoffs is evaluated by 
v 
sµv 
L (-1-)T .VT 
T=O l+a sµv 
Note in definition 2.3.1 that V equals the total discounted 
sµv _ 1 
expected payoff when the discount factor equals (l+a) , the starting state 
is s and the players choose µ and v respectively as their strategies. Since 
the state and action spaces are assumed to be finite, Vsµvexistsfor all 
(µ,v). 
2.3.2. DEFINITION. An average reward two-person zerosum stochastic game is 
a stochastic game situation for which the stream of payoffs is evaluated 
by 
w 
sµv 
k 
lim inf -- L VT . 
k->oo k+1 T=O sµv 
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Note in definition 2.3.2 that W equals the average expected payoff 
sµv 
per unit time when the starting state is s and the players choose µ and v 
respectively as their strategies. Obviously W exists for all (µ,v). In 
sµv 
chapter III of this monograph we mention some other possibilities of 
averaging the stream of immediate payoffs. 
The two types of games defined in definitions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 will be 
studied in the chapters II and III respectively. 
Other evaluation functions are possible. For example Groenewegen (1981) 
analysed the total expected payoff without discounting, where the expected 
immediate payoffs are simply added up (i.e. interest rate a=O). 
Whatever the evaluation function, player 1 clearly wishes to maximize 
this function and player 2 wishes to minimize it. The following definition 
applies to both discounted and average reward games. Compare the similarity 
of definition 2.3.3 with definition A.1.3. Note that, given the evaluation 
function and the initial state, the stochastic game can be identified with 
a game in normal form, namely< ST1 , sT2 , Gsµv > , where G represents 
the evaluation function. 
2.3.3. DEFINITION. Let G represent the evaluation function for a two-person 
zerosum stochastic game. The game is said to have a value if for each 
initial state sES: 
sup inf 
µEST 1 vEsT2 
G 
sµv inf sup 
vEsT2 µEST 1 
G 
sµv 
For games which have a value, say G* E :JRz, for given £ 2 0, a strategy 
µ£ of player 1 and a strategy v£ of player 2 are called £-optimal respective-
ly if for each s E S respectively: 
* 2 G -E 
s 
sup 
µ E ST 1 
Zero-optimal strategies are called optimal. 
The next theorem follows at once from theorem A.1.4. 
2.3.4. THEOREM. Let G be the evaluation function. If there exist a vector 
vEIRz and strategies ii and v such that G -sv sG - for all µ, v and s, 
sµv s sµv 
then v equals the value of the game and µ and v are optimal strategies 
for player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
Also theorem A.1.5 can be extended to stochastic games (see Hordijk, 
Vrieze & Wanrooij (1976, 1983) for a proof). 
2.3.5. THEOREM. Let G be the evaluation function. If, for each r>O, there 
exists µE and vE such that for each µ, v and s: 
then the value of the game exists and for the specific game with 
starting state sES this value equals lim G 
r+O sµEvE 
13 

3. Playing against a fixed strategy 
In this section, we consider how player 1 can profit from the 
announcement by player 2 of the strategy he intends to play. 
15 
When in a finite two-person zerosum stochastic game player 2 plays a 
behaviour strategy, then Monash (1979; theorem 1, page 6) has proved that 
player 1 can suffice with non-randomized strategies. Actually, Monash 
proved this fact for the average reward case, but in a similar way it can 
be shown for the discounted case. Below we examine what happens when player 
2 fixes a semi-Markov strategy or a stationary strategy. 
The theorems of this section have been extracted from Hordijk, Vrieze 
& Wanrooij (1976, 1983). The statements of that paper are extensions to 
stochastic game situations of results of Derman & Strauch (1966) for Markov 
decision situations. A version of this extension, which is similar to 
theorem 3.1, is also indicated in Groenewegen & Wessels (1976). As shown in 
Hordijk, Vrieze & Wanrooij (1976), the results of this section hold for 
N-person games with countable state space and countable action spaces. But 
since this thesis is mainly concerned with finite two-person zerosum 
stochastic games, we have projected these results on this last model. 
Theorem 3.3 states that, if one player plays a stationary strategy, 
then the other player can restrict himself to solving a Markov decision 
problem associated to that stationary strategy. 
3.1. THEOREM. For a two-person zerosum stochastic game situation, let v be 
a semi-Markov strategy for player 2. Then for each behaviour strategy µ 
of player 1, there exists a semi-Markov strategy µSM such that 
for each sES and T=0,1, .... 
PROOF. Fix a starting state sES and fix a strategyµ of player 1. We will 
abbreviate F- , XT YT and ZT to F- XT, YT and ZT respectively. (cf. 
sµv µv' µv µv s' 
section 2.3 for the meaning of these variables). 
For all T=0,1,2, ... and each s, i and j: 
(3. 1) 
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Since vis a semi-Markov strategy, the random variables x' and Y', given s 
and s , are independent. Then 
So (3. 1) becomes 
(3 .2) JP- (Z'=s· x'=i; YT=j) = JP-(XT=i lz'=s) .lP-( z'=s; YT=j). 
s ' s s 
Now, define µSM as follows. If the initial state is s and the 
T is s, then choose action i with probability JP-(XT=ilzT=s). 
state at time 
* We will abbreviate JP- SM to JP-. 
sµ v s 
s 
By induction with respect to T, we first show that 
(3. 3) 
This equality is easily reached for T=O; suppose it holds for some T, then 
(3 .4) JP- (Z T+l=t) 
s 
L JP- (ZT=s; x'=i; YT=j) .p(tls,i,j) 
.. s 
s ,1.' J 
L JP~(Z'=s; x'=i; Y'=j) .p(tls,i,j) 
.. s 
s, l.' J 
* T+l JP- (Z =t) . 
s 
Since v is a semi-Markov strategy, (3.4) leads to 
(3.5) 
Now the definition of µSM, (3.2) for T+1 and (3.5) imply equality (3.3) for 
T+l. But then the theorem follows from the definitions of VT_ and VT 
sµv sµSMv 
(see (2.3.1) and (3.3)). 
D 
17 
3.2. THEOREM. Consider a two-person zerosum stochastic game with either the 
total discounted payoff or the average reward as criterion function. 
Suppose that for the game where the both players are restricted to 
playing semi-Markov strategies, the value exists. Then for the 
unrestricted game the value also exists and equals the value of the 
restricted game. Moreover an E-optimal strategy, for given E20, for a 
player in the restricted game is also E-optimal in the original game. 
* PROOF. Let G represent the evaluation function and let G be the value of 
the restricted game. Let VE be an E-optimal semi-Markov strategy for player 
2 in the restricted game, given E>O. Such a strategy exists since the value 
exists. By theorem 3.1 there exists for each behaviour strategyµ of player 
SM 
1 a semi-Markov strategy µ such that for each sES: 
(3 .6) 
On the other hand for each sES: 
(3. 7) 
so 
* (3. 8) <;; G +E for each µ and sES. 
s 
Similarly 
(3.9) for each v and sES, 
where µE is E-optimal for player 1 in the restricted game. Since E>O is 
arbitrary, we may apply theorem 2.3.5 to the combination of (3.8) and (3.9). 
* Hence the value of the unrestricted game exists and equals lim G =G , 
sµEvE s 
sES. Furthermore by (3.8) and (3.9) (which also hold in theE~~se E=O) it 
follows that µE and vE are also £-optimal in the original game. 
0 
The converse of this theorem is not true, i.e. the existence of the 
value of a game needs not imply the existence of the value of the restricted 
game. An example of such a game is the "big match" of Blackwell & Ferguson 
(1968) . 
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3.3. EXAMPLE. 
action action 2 
action 1 
action 2 
state state 2 state 3 
In this example there are three states, state 1, 2 and 3; in state 1 
both players have two actions while in the states 2 and 3 both players have 
1 action. In examples always player 1-th actions correspond with the rows 
and player 2-th actions with the columns of the matrices. An entry ~of 
a matrix means immediate payoff y and the next state will be state o with 
probability 1. So for this example 
s {1,2,3}, Al {1,2}, A2 { 1} 
and 
p(1j1,1,1) p(ljl,1,2) p(2jl,2,1) p(3j1,2,2) 
p(212,1,1) p(3[3,1,1) 1, 
while the other transition probabilities are zero. 
The average reward criterion is considered. Obviously, by the results 
of .Mertens & Neyman (1980) this game has a value. Here w*=(l:i,0,1). But if 
the players are restricted to semi-Markov strategies, then the value of the 
game does not exist. This can be shown as follows (cf. Hordijk, Vrieze & 
Wanrooij (1976)). 
In the big match the set of semi-Markov strategies for a player is the 
same as the set of Markov strategies, since the states 2 and 3 are absorbing. 
Let µM (µ~, µ~1 , ... ) be a Markov strategy for player l. Let pT (µM) be 
the probability that in state 1 player 1 chooses action 2 for the first 
time at epoch T. Let p(µM)=Z:=OpT(µM) and abbreviate pT(µM) and p(µM) to 
PT and p. 
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For each o>O there exists a T such that L-r=Op-r~p-o. We construct a Markov 
strategy v0 for player 2 as follows: 
choose in state action 1 at the epochs 0,1, ... ,T and action 2 
thereafter. 
M If player 1 plays µ and player 2 plays v0 , the game reduces to a 
stochastic process that realizes exactly one of the following events: 
uses action 2 before time T+l. (i) player 
(ii) player 
(iii) player 
uses action 2 for the first time at -r+l or thereafter. 
never uses action 2. 
The probability that (i) occurs is at least p-o and the average reward in 
that case is 0. Event (ii) has average return 1 but probability at most o. 
Event (iii) has probability 1-p and average return 0. Hence the overall 
average pa yo ff is at most 0, so inf w1µMv,:;o which by the arbitrariness 
o>O results in inf w1 Mv ,:;o. vEMST2 Hence sup inf wiµv ,:;o. 
vEMST2 µ µEMST 1 vEMST2 
The value of the restricted game, if it exists, equals the value of the 
* 
of 
original game by theorem 3.2. Since for the original game w 1 =~, we see that 
the restricted game has no value. 
Now we come to analyse what happens when a player fixes a stationary 
strategy. With a fixed stationary strategy oESST2 , we can associate a Markov 
decision situation MDS(o) in the following way: 
Let< S, {A lsES}, {B lsEs}, r, p > be the original stochastic game situation. 
s s 
Then MDS(o) :=<S, {A lsEs}, r, p > is defined as S:=S; A :=A for each sES; 
s s s 
r ( s , i ) : = L j EB r ( s I i I j ) . as ( j ) and p ( t I s I i ) = L j EB p ( t I s , i , j ) . as ( j ) . 
s s 
3.4. THEOREM. Suppose that in a two-person zerosum stochastic game player 2 
fixes a stationary strategy a. Then for as well the discounted as the 
average reward criterion player 1 cannot do better than solving the 
Markov decision problem corresponding to MDS(a). 
PROOF. We denote a strategy with respect to MDS(o} byµ. Let G be the 
evaluation function for the game and G for the Markov decision problem 
corresponding to MDS(o). From theorem 3.1 we derive, that for each strategy 
SM 
µ there exists a semi-Markov strategy µ such that for each starting state 
sES: 
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(3 .10) G 
Sj.!0 
Now observe that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of 
semi-Markov strategies in MDS(o) and the set of semi-Markov strategies for 
-SM -SM -SM ~~ 
player 1 in the original game. Simply by adding to aµ =(µ 0 ,µ 1 , ... )ESMST 
that µSM=(µ~M,µ~M, ... )ESMST1 for which J.l~M =µ~M for each T=0,1, ... . 
Note that such a one-to-one correspondence does not exist for the sets ST 
and ST 1 . 
SM -SM ~~ 
So if we can prove for corresponding.µ ESMST1 and µ ESMST that for each 
sES: 
(3. 11) 
then (3.11) combined with (3.10) will yield the theorem. 
Fix an initial state sES. We abbreviate lP- SM and P--sM to JPand JP 
sµ a sµ 
respectively. we first show by induction with respect to T that 
(3. 12) T - ~ JP (Z =s) = lP (Z =s) 
. SM -SM for corresponding µ and µ and each sES. 
Equality (3.12) is clearly true for T=O; suppose it holds for a certain T, 
then: 
s i 
l: lP(ZT=s) .JP (ZT+l=t[ZT=s) = 
s 
Now (3.11) follows from the fact, that for each T: 
E r(s,i,j).lP (ZT=s; XT=i, YT=j) = 
s,i,j 
E (Er(s,i,j).cr (j)).lP (ZT=s).lP (XT=iJzT=s) 
s,i j s 
- - ...Jt: - -:'r l...Jt: -T E r (s,i) .lP (Z =s) .lP (X =i z =s) = V5µSM· 
s,i 
The well-known results for Markov decision problems (see the theorems 
A.2.5 and A.2.6) lead to the following corollary of theorem 3.4. 
3.5. COROLLARY. For a two-person zerosum stochastic game with evaluation 
function G, which represents discounting or averaging, and a fixed 
stationary strategy a of player 2 we have for each sEs: 
sup 
µEsT1 
G 
S]JfJ max p€PSST1 
G 
spa 
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Part II. Discounted stochastic games. 
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4. Review of discounted stochastic games. 
4.1. INTRODUcrION. 
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953). He considered both 
finite and infinite horizon two-person zerosum stochastic games with finite 
state set and finite action sets. Shapley proved that such games have a 
value and that both players possess optimal stationary strategies with 
respect to the discounted payoff criterion. 
Extensions of Shapley's model with respect to the conditions on state 
space and action spaces are exposed by Kushner & Chamberlain (1969) (finite 
state space, compact action spaces), Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) (compact 
metric state space and compact action spaces plus continuity conditions on 
the payoff function and the transition map), Wessels (1977) (countable 
state space and finite action spaces) and Groenewegen & Wessels (1976) 
(countable state space and countable action spaces) . 
Rogers (1969) has extended Shapley's model to two-person non-zerosum 
games with finite state space and finite action spaces. He has proved the 
existence of equilibrium points of stationary strategies. Parthasarathy 
(1971) considered Roger's model with a countable state space. 
Sobel (1971) introduced N-person stochastic games. For the model with 
finite state space and finite action spaces he showed the existence of an 
equilibrium point of stationary strategies (cf. also Federgruen (1978)). 
Vrieze (1976) considered countable person games with a countable state 
space and compact action spaces. Under appropriate continuity assumptions 
he showed the existence of an equilibrium point of stationary strategies. 
Rieder (1979) also considered countable person games. Using a measurable 
selection theorem he showed the existence of a stationary equilibrium point 
for the model where the state and action spaces are Borelsets and the 
transition law is given by a bounded transition measure. Tijs (1980) 
treated N-person games with a finite state space and with metric action 
spaces. Under certain continuity assumptions he proved the existence of a 
stationary £-equilibrium point for the model where in each state at most 
one of the action spaces is topologically big, while the other action spaces 
are topologically small (finite, compact, precompact). 
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Finally we mention the work of Whitt (1977). He approximated games 
with uncountable state space and uncountable action spaces for the players 
by games with countable state space and countable action spaces. 
Subsequently he showed that under a number of conditions equilibrium points 
of the approximating game are £-equilibrium points of the original game. 
In the sequel SG(S,a) denotes the class of two-person zerosum 
stochastic games with finite state space S, finite action spaces for the 
both players and where the stream of payoffs are discounted according to an 
interest rate a. 
In section 4.2 some well-known facts are given concerning games 
belonging to the class SG(S,a). In section 4.3 some extensions of this 
model are considered. In section 4.4 an alternative proof of the existence 
of the value and of optimal stationary strategies is worked out, using the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for non-linear programs. 
In chapter 5 the emphasis lies on structural properties of the 
solutions of discounted stochastic games. In section 5.1 relations between 
the game parameters and the solutions are investigated, which smoothes the 
way for an analysis of the construction of games with given solution. In 
section 5.2 we give an axiomatic characterization of the value function 
on the class SG(S,a). In section 5.3 we treat to what extent small 
perturbations of the game parameters influence the solution of the game. 
In section 5.4 games with a unique pair of optimal stationary strategies 
stand central. 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 are the only sections of this monograph where we 
consider another model than the two-person zerosum stochastic game with 
finite state and finite actions spaces. In those sections the model has the 
following dimensions: countable state space, compact metric action spaces 
and measurable payoff and transition functions. 
4.2. EXISTENCE OF VALUE AND OPTIMAL STRATIONARY STRATEGIES. 
In discounted stochastic games as treated by Shapley (1953), a 
discount factor SE[0,1) is specified. Then a reward r earned on decision 
epoch T is discounted by the factor ST, T=0,1, .... The idea is that, when 
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looking ahead at time zero, a payoff r on decision epoch T is worth at 
decision epoch 0 only a'.r, this because of e.g. inflation. One can also 
use the concept of interest rate. Say aE(0, 00 ) is the interest rate per unit 
time. Then an amount r on decision epoch 0 has grown to an amount (l+a) '.r 
at decision epoch a. This is the same as saying that in order to have an 
amount r on epoch<, one should start with an amount (l+a)-'.r at time O. 
So an interest rate a corresponds to a discount factor (l+a)-1 . This 
equivalence will be used in the sequel. We consider only infinite horizon 
games. 
For the rest of this section we fix a game fESG(S,a). Let 
M:= max lr(s,i,j) I. Then it follows that for each pair of strategiesµ and 
s,i,j 
v the total discounted payoff is bounded by (1+a)a-1M. 
We now introduce a number of notations. For a pair of stationary 
strategies p and cr we denote by P(p,cr) a stochastic zxz-matrix whose 
(s,t)-th entry equals 
(4.2.1) p(tJs,p ,cr ) := 
s s 
l: l: p <tls,i,j) .p (i) .cr (j), 
iEA jEB s s 
s s 
i.e. if in state s the players play ps and crs respectively, then the 
probability that at the next decision epoch the system is in state t 
equals p(tls,p ,cr ). 
s s 
Further r(p,cr) will denote the z-vector with s-th coordinate: 
(4.2.2) l: l: 
iEA 'EB s J s 
r(s,i,j) .ps (i) .crs (j). 
we now define two maps, which play an essential role in the proof of 
the existence of the value and of optimal stationary strategies. 
L : :JRz +m.z is the map such that for each vE:JRz: 
apcr 
(4.2.3) L (v) 
apcr 
-1 
:= r(p,cr)+(l+a) .P~,cr).v 
U ::JRz+:JRz is the map such that for each vE:JRz and sES: 
a 
(4.2.4) u (v) := 
as 
1 z 
max min {r(s,p ,o )+(l+a)-. l: p(tls,p ,o ).vt} 
P cr s s t=l s s 
s s 
(L (v)) • 
apo s 
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Observe that Uo.s(v) is the value of the msxns-matrix game whose (i,j)-th 
entry equals r(s,i,j)+(l+o.J- 1 .Ez 1p(tls,i,j).v. This matrix game is denoted t= t 
by [G (v)]. 
so. 
Note that a stochastic game r in fact is a collection of games, namely 
{r lsEs}, where r refers to the specific stochastic game with initial state s s 
s. This collection of games is solved simultaneously. 
Let V(µ,v) be the z-vector whose s-th component equals V (cf. definition 
sµv 
2. 3 .1) . 
4.2.1. THEOREM. The maps L and UN are monotone contraction operators on a.pa u 
lR~ Hence both maps have a unique fixed point. The unique fixed point of 
L equals the discounted payoff vector V(p,a). 
a.pa 
PROOF. If v:Sw, then 
L (v) 
a.pa 
-1 -1 
r(p,a)+(l+o.J .P(p,a) .v:Sr(p,er)+(l+o.) .P(p,er) .w 
L (w). 
a.per 
By lemma A.1.7(c) for each sES: 
U (v) 
0.S 
Val (G (v)) :SVal (G (w)) u (w). 
as so. so. 
So L and U are monotone. 
aper z a 
For v, wElR we have 
d (L (v) ,L (w)) 
exp er aper llL (v)-L (w) II= (l+al- 1.llP(p,er) (v-wl II :S aper a.per 
(l+al-1IJv-wlJ = (1+a)-ld(v,w). 
Using lemma A.1.8: 
d(Uo.(v) ,uo.(w)) =Jiu (v)-U (w) II= max lval(G (v))-Val(G (w)) I a a. sex sex 
s 
-1 z 1 
$ (l+a) max E p(tjs,i,jl.I (v -w) l:S(l+al- llv-wll 
s,i,j t=l t t 
-1 (l+a) d(v,w). 
So both Laper and Ua are contraction operators. Then, by the Bana~h-Picar~ 
fixed point theorem it follows that there exist unique vectors vpo and V 
such that 
* 
* v per 
* and U (V ) 
a 
* v . 
To prove that v equals V(p,er) we first note, that the (s,t)-th per 
element of the matrix PT(p,er) gives the probability that at time T the 
system is in state t when the starting state is state s and the players 
choose the strategies p and er respectively. 
Then 
(4 .2 .5) V(p,er) t: (l+a)-TPT (p,er) .r(p,o) 
T=O 
-1 -T T 
r(p,er)+(i+a) .P(p,er). l: (1+a) P (p,er) .r(p,er) 
T=O 
-1 
r (p ,er)+ (l+a.) .P (p ,er). v (p ,er). 
Hence V(p,er) equals the unique fixed point of L aper 
4. 2. 2. REMARK. By the contraction property of L and U aper a 
V(p,er)=lim LT (x) and T->«> aper 
UT are the T-th iterates 
a 
v*=lim UT (x) for each xEJRz T->«> a 
of L and UN respectively. 
aper u 
it follows that 
, where LT and 
apcr 
4.2.3. LEMMA. If L (v)sv then V(p,cr)sv. If L (v)<v then V <v. The 
a.per apcr pcr 
assertions remain true when the inequality signs are reversed. 
PROOF. By the monotonicity property of L it follows by induction that a.pa 
LT (v)sv for each -r:2:1, when L (v)sv (<v). Hence V(p,cr)=lim LT (v)sv 
apcr aper T->«> apo 
(<v) in view of remark 4.2.2. 
Now we have enough tools to prove Shapley's theorem. 
* 
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4.2.4. THEOREM. The unique fixed point V of the map Va.equals the value of 
* * the game. Stationary strategies p and o are optimal for player 1 and 
player 2 respectively if, for all p and a: 
30 
(4.2.6) * L * (V ) a.p 0 
* * i.e. if ps and os are optimal actions for player 1 and player 2 
respectively in the matrix game [G (V*)], for each sES. 
SCI. 
* * * PROOF. Let V be the unique fixed point of Ua.. Let ps and os be optimal 
actions for player 1 and player 2 respectively in the matrix game [G (v*J], 
SCI. 
* * so that (4.2.6) holds for p and o • Then by lemma 4.2.3 we have for each 
p and o: 
* * * V(p,o ) '.S v '.S V(p ,o). 
But then by corollary 3.5 for each sES: 
sup 
µ€ST 1 
* v * '.S v sµo s 
* * Hence by theorem 2.3.4 we see that V is the value of the game and that p 
* and a are optimal stationary strategies for player 1 and player 2 
respectively. 
The equation v=Ua.(v) is often referred to as the optimality equation 
for discounted stochastic games. 
4.2.5. REMARK. A game belonging to SG(S,a) with rational parameters need 
not have a rational value, as can be seen from the following game: 
4 
2 
D 
Here an entry ~ means an immediate reward y and a 
probability o to state 1 and a jump with probability 1-o to 
interest rate equals a=lo, so the discount factor is 13 = - 1- = 1+lo 
* * Obviously v2=0 and then v 1 is the solution of the equation 
v 
4 Val ([ 2 
which results in v;=IS. 
4.3. GENERALIZATIONS. 
jump with 
state 2. The 
4/5. 
In this section we discuss some generalizations of the model treated 
in section 4.2. 
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(i) Shapley (1953) himself considered the so-called stopping game, 
i.e. a finite two-person zerosum stochastic game situation where p has the 
property Lz 1p(tls,i,j)=p .. <1 for each s, i and j while 1-p .. is the t= SlJ SlJ 
stopprobability. Subsequently the streng of immediate rewards is simply 
added up. 
Such a game is equivalent with a discounted game in our sense, where 
in addition the interest rate may depend on the state and the actions. Namely 
if in state s the players choose actions i and j respectively, then the 
temporary interest rate equals a .. defined by the equation (l+a .. ) -l=p ... 
SlJ -l Sl] Sl] 
The transition probabilities are given by p ... p(tl s,i,j) when p . ,>O and 
SlJ Sl] 
can be arbitrarily chosen when p .. =O. 
Sl] 
(ii) Van der Wal (1981) considered contracting games. He examined two-
person zerosum stochastic games with countable state space and finite action 
spaces with the additional assumption that there exists a non-negative vector 
i;;Enl' such that: 
(a) lr(p,a) l~Mi;; for some constant ~O and all p and a. 
(b) P(p,a).i;:~si;: for some SE[0,1) and all panda. 
Again, in Van der Wal' s model the rewards are added up. Indeed, concerning the 
finite state case, this model is a real generalization of Shapley's model. 
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Consider one of the most simple games imaginable, namely the game ~ . 
This game fits in Van der Wal's frame work (~=O, Mand S arbitrary) but 
not in Shapley' s. However the slightly more difficult game 1/<IZI cannot 
be embedded in Van der Wal's model, since this game fails to have the uniform 
tail condition on page 65 in Van der Wal (1981). (Here the entry~ means 
immediate reward 1, probability ~ to stay in the only state of the game and 
probability ~ that the game stops) . A next generalization on this subject 
should cover this last example. 
(iii) Another generalization is concerned with stochastic renewal games 
(see Denardo (1971), Sobel (1973) and Federgruen (1978)). In renewal games 
the time until the next decision epoch is a random variable whose 
probability distribution function only depends on the current state and the 
subsequently chosen actions of the players. The immediate payoffs are 
discounted. 
For the above mentioned three models the existence proof of the value 
and of optimal stationary strategies runs analogously to the proof of 
theorem 4.2.4. The only difference lies in finding a suitable Banach space 
and showing that Lapa and Ua are monotone contraction operators on that 
space. 
4.4. AN ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE VALUE. 
In this section we assume that each immediate payoff is positive. 
Observe that this restriction can be made without loss of generality, since 
adding a constant c to each immediate payoff changes, for each pair of 
strategies of the players, the total discounted payoff by -1 a (1+o)c1 • 
z 
-1 Hence the value changes by a (1+a)c1 2 , while all intrinsic game properties 
are remained. 
Consider the following non-linear programming problem associated 
with a stochastic game belonging to SG(S,a). 
4.4.1. NLP 
variables y = {y(s,j) lsES, jEB} and v=Cv1 , ••• ,v ). s z 
z 
min Es=lvs' subject to 
n 
s z 
(i) E y(s,j) [r(s,i,j)+(l+a)-l E p(tls,i,j)vt]-vs $ 0, 
j=l t=1 
n 
s 
(ii) E y(s,j)-1 
j=l 
n 
s 
(iii) - E y(s,j)+l 
j=l 
(iv) -y(s,j) $ O, 
$ O, 
$ 0, 
for all sES and iEA 
s 
for all sES 
for all sEs 
for all sES and jEBs 
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This NLP is suggested by Rothblum (1979) as a solution method for 
stochastic games, whereby the existence of such a solution is pre-
assumed. In this section we give a proof of the existence of the value and 
of optimal stationary strategies for both players with the aid of Kuhn-
Tucker conditions with respect to optimal solutions of NLP 4.4.1. 
First observe that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
set F:={y={y(s,j) lsEs, jEB }Jy satisfies (ii), (iii) and (iv) of NLP 4.4.1} 
s 
and the set Xz 1PCB ). This last set in turn corresponds to the set of s= s 
stationary strategies of player 2 (cf. definition 2.2.2). For an element 
yEF we denote by aY the corresponding stationary strategy of player 2. For 
a stationary strategy a we denote by ycr the corresponding element of F. 
. (ycr) (crY) z Obviously a=a andy=y for each crEX 1PCB ) and each yEF. 
In the following let M:= max r(s,i,j). 
s,i,j 
4.4.2. LEMMA. NLP 4.4.1 is feasible. 
s= s 
M M M M -1 M PROOF. Take yEF. Let v :=Cv1 , •.• ,vz) with v5 :=a (l+a)M. The pair (y,v) 
satisfies (i)-(iv). 
4.4.3. LEMMA. Let (y,v) be a local minimum, if it exists, of NLP 4.4.1. 
Then Ez v $za- 1 (1+a)M and v >O for alls S 
s=1 S S E • 
a 
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PROOF. For fixed y=j NLP 4.4.1 turns over into a linear programming 
problem, which we call LP(y). If (y,v) is some local minimum of NLP 4.4.1, 
- - M then v must be an optimal solution of LP{y). Let v be as in the proof of 
lemma 4.4.2. Then vM is a feasible solution of LP{y), which shows half of 
the lemma, namely 
z 
l: 
s=l 
v 
s 
-1 
za (l+a)M. 
On the other hand, let v be a feasible solution of LP{y). Let states be 
such that v,..,....--min v. Then by condition (i): 
s sES s 
n-s z 
i: y(;,j) [r(;,i,j)+(l+a>-1 i: p<tl';i,i,j)vtl 
j=l t=l 
n-s 
l: 
j=1 
- -1 ..... ] -1"' y(s,j)[ min r(s,i,j)+(l+a) v ..... = min r(s,i,j)+(l+a) V"'. 
. . s . . s 
s,i,J s,i,J 
- -1 Hence for all s e S: v~ ~ vf ~ a_ (l+a} ~~tj r{s,i,j} > 0 (all rewards are 
assumed to be positive}. Since vis assumed to be an arbitrary feasible 
solution of LP(y} we can conclude v > 0 for all s e s. 
s 
a 
4.4.4. LEMMA. NLP 4.4.1 has a bounded global minimum, which is attained for 
some pair (y* ,v*}. 
PROOF. Add to NLP 4.4.1 the following constraint: 
(v) for all sES. 
The resulting non-linear programming problem is called NLP+. From lemma 
4.4.3 it can be seen that NLP+ and NLP 4.4.1 have the same sets of local 
and global minima, if they exist. 
Now for NLP+ the feasible region is a non-empty compact set. Further the 
objective function is continuous on this feasible region, hence the 
minimum is attained for NLP+ by some pair (y*,v*> satisfying (i)-(v). Then 
also for NLP 4.4.1 the minimum is attained for this pair (y*,v*). 
Thus lemma 4.4.4 shows that NLP 4.4.1 has at least one local (or 
global) minimum point. 
a 
Observe that if (y,v) satisfies the constraints (i)-(iv), then, for each 
pure stationary strategy pp of player 1, constraint (i) leads to 
(4.4.1) 
4.4.5. LEMMA. If (y,v) satisfies the constraints (i)-(iv) then v~V(pP,crY) 
for each pure stationary strategy pp of player 1. Further 
v~sup €ST V(µ,crY). 
µ 1 
PROOF. The first assertion follows from relation (4.4.1). If for v in 
(4.4.1)we r.epecatedly substitute the right hand side of (4.4.1), then we 
obtain for all T~1: 
(4.4.2) v;:;:: 
Letting T-+<x> and using the boundedness of v and r and the fact that 
-T-1 p y li~(l+a) =Owe obtain v;:e:V(p ,cr ). 
The second assertion of the lemma follows from corollary 3.5. 
4.4.6. LEMMA. For each local or global minimum point of NLP 4.4.1 the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold. 
PROOF. We will show that the constraints (i)-(iv) satisfy the Arrow-
Hurwicz-Uzawa constraint qualification (cf. Mangasarian (1969), page 102). 
Let d=z+~:=lns. Let (y,v) be feasible for NLP 4.4.1. Then the 
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a 
constraints satisfy the Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa constraint qualification at the 
point (y,v) if the system 
(4.4.3) 
f vgKCy,v> .c > o} 
1 has 
l'VgL (y,v) .c..?_ 0 
a solution c€JRd. 
Here 'V represents the gradient symbol, 
K:={(s,i) lgsi(y,v)=O and gsi is not concave at (y,v)}, 
L:={Cs,i) lgsi (y,v)=O and gsi is concave at (y,v)}, 
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n 
s 
g . (y ,v) := 2: 
Sl. j=l 
z 
y(s,j)[r(s,i,j)+(l+a)-l 2: p(tjs,i,j)vt]-vs, 
t=1 
gK:={g . I (s,i)EK} and g :={g . I (s,i)EL} U {linear constraints (ii)-(iv)}. 
Sl. L Sl. 
In our case we have that in general gsi is not concave (nor convex). 
For cElRd denote the successive components by c 1 , ... ,cz, c 11 , ... ,c1n 1 ' 
c21'"""'c 1 , c 1•···•c . 
z- nz-l z znz 
From constraint (i) it can be deduced that for a feasible point (y,v) we 
have 
n 
(4.4.4) llgsi (y,v) .c 
s z 
(l+a)-l 2: y(s,j) 2: p(tls,i,j)ct + 
j=l t=l 
n 
s z 
2: [r(s,i,j)+(l+a)-l 2: p(tls,i,jlvt]c .-c 
j=l t=l SJ S 
Now let (y,v) be a local minimum of NLP 4.4.1. Put cs=-vs,sES and 
csj=o, SES and jEBs. Then we obtain from (4.4.4) that for all (s,i)EK we 
have 
(4.4.5) Ilg . ( y , ; ) • ; 
Sl 
n 
- -1 s 
v-(l+a) l 
s j=i 
z 
y(s,j) l pCtJs,i,jlvt > o, 
t=l 
(l.) ns -in view of constraint and the fact that 2:._ 1 y(s,j)r(s,i,j) > O. J-
C lear ly llgl (y,v).;=o for the linear constraints (ii)-(iv). Hence the 
Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa constraint qualification holds in the point (y,v). 
Since further the objective function and each constraint function of NLP 
4.4.1 is differentiable at (y,v) we can apply theorem 7.3.7 of Mangasarian 
(1969) in order to conclude that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold for (y,v). 
Fix for a moment a local minimum point (y,v) of NLP 4.4.1. Such a point 
exists by lemma 4.4.4. By lemma 4.4.5 the Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold for 
such a point, i.e. there exist, for each sES, iEAs and jEBs, numbers 
Asi' ~sl' ~s 2 ' wsj 2 0, such that 
(a) 
n 
s z 
2: y(s,jJ[r(s,i,j)+(l+aJ- 1 2: p(tls,i,j)v ]-v )A . 
j=l t=l t S Sl 
for all sES and iEA 
s 
0, 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
and 
(e) 
(f) 
n 
s 
( E y(s,j)-1)$ 1 0, j=l s 
ns 
(- E y(s,j)+1)$ 2 0, j=l s 
for all sES 
for all sEs 
-y(s,j)<I> . 
SJ 
O, for all sEs and all jEB5 
z 
1+ E 
s=1 
m 
m 
s 
E 
i=l 
n 
s 
E 
j=l 
mt 
(1+a)-1A. .y(s,j)p(tjs,i,j)- E A.ti 
51 i=l 
for all tEs 
O, 
s z 
E A. .[rCs,i,jl+Cl+al-1 E pCtls,i,j)vt]+$ 1-$ 2-<P . i=l 51 t=l S S SJ 
for all sEs and all jEB5 • 
0, 
Multiplying (f) by y(s,j), summing over jEBs, using (d), comparing that 
expression with the summation of (a) over iEAs leads to 
(4.4.6) 
m 
s 
v E A.si 
s i=l 
for all sEs. 
From (e) we obtain 
derive (remembering 
m 
Ei:1A.si~l, 
<I> .~0): 
all sES, and then from (f) and (4.4.6) we 
SJ 
m 
{4.4. 7) 
s m z 
E (A. ./Ek:1>- kl[r(s,i,jl+C1+al-l E pCtls,i,jlvt] i=l 51 s t=l 
2' v 
s 
for all sES and all jEBs. 
Define the stationary strategy p for player 1 as 
{4.4.8) 
m 
s 
p (i) := A. ./ E A.sk" 
S S1 k=l 
Then (4.4.7) is equivalent to 
(4.4.9) 
for each pure stationary strategy op of player 2. 
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Inequality (4.4.9) is the "player 2 version" of inequality (4.4.1). Then 
analogous to the proof of lemma 4.4.5 inequality (4.4.9) leads to 
(4.4.10) inf V(p,v) ~ v. 
vEsT2 
The above derivations have paved the way to the following existence 
theorem. 
4.4.7. THEOREM. Each local minimum of NLP 4.4.1 is also global. For each 
global minimum (y,v) the v-part is unique and say equals v* The value 
* of the corresponding stochastic game exists and equals v • Both players 
possess optimal stationary strategies. 
PROOF. Let (y,v) be a local minimum of NLP 4.4.1, which exists by lemma 
4.4.4. Let p be as defined in (4.4.8). 
Combining lemma 4.4.5 and inequality (4.4.10) yields 
sup V(µ,oy) ~ v ~ inf V(p,v) 
µ \) 
Applicationoftheorem_2.3.4 gives that v equals the value of the stochastic 
game and that p and oy are optimal stationary strategies for player 1 and 
player 2 respectively. Since a game has a unique value the uniqueness of 
the v-part of a local minimum (y,v) follows. 
0 
Summarizing, we have seen in this section that the existence of the 
value and of optimal stationary strategies for a discounted stochastic game 
can be shown by analysing the associated non-linear programming problem 
NLP 4.4.1. Moreover a solution method which gives a solution of NLP 4.4.1 
and the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker coefficients, provides the value and a 
pair of optimal stationary strategies for the players of the stochastic 
game. 
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5. structural properties of discounted stochastic games. 
5. 1. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GAME PARAMETERS AND THE SOLUTION OF THE GAME. 
we derive relations between, on the one hand, the game parameters and, 
on the other hand, the value and the set of optimal stationary strategies 
of that game. 
The results of this section, based mainly on Vrieze & Tijs (1980), 
can be seen as extensions of the work of Bohnenblust, Karlin & Shapley 
(1950) and Shapley & Snow (1950). 
For the moment we fix a game fESG(S,a). Let Oi denote the set of 
optimal stationary strat~gies for player i, i=l,2. 
The last assertion of the next lemma shows the dimension relations between 
the solution sets of discounted stochastic games (cf. definition A.1.10). 
5.1.1. THEOREM. For i=l,2 the set Oi can be identified with the Cartesian 
product x:=lOi(s), where Oi(s) is the set of optimal actions for player 
i in the matrix game [G (V*)], where v* is the value of the game. The 
sa 
pair (01 (s),02 (s)) has the (ms,ns)-BKS property for all sES. 
PROOF. In section 4.2, theorem 4.2.4 we have already proved that an 
element of x:=lOi(s) is optimal for player i. Now let p~X== 1 0 1 (s) and* * 
particularly let p 5~0 1 (s). Then there exists a crESST2 such thatLapa(V )<V 
(strict inequality at least in component §).But then, by lemma 4.2.3, 
V (p, cr) <v*. So p cannot be optimal, which proves 0 1=X==l01 (s) . Analogously one 
can show 02=x:=102 (s). That the pair (0 1 (sJ,02 (s)) has the (ms,ns)-BKS 
property follows at once from theorem A.1.11. 
Now we wish to present an extension of the results of Shapley & Snow 
(1950), concerning the characterization of extreme optimal mixed actions 
for matrix games (see theorem A.1.9). From theorem 5.1.1 it is evident 
that pE01 is an extreme point of 0 1 if and only if ps is an extreme point 
of 0 1 (s) for all sES. The subsequent theorem follows at once from 
theorem A.1. 9. 
fJ 
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5.1.2. THEOREM. Let p be an extreme point of 01 and cr be an extreme point 
of 02 . Then there exists a stochastic subgame situation 
<S, {A lsES}, {B lsES}, f:, p>, where 
s s 
(a) for all sES the sets A and B are subsets of A and B respectively 
s s s s 
with IA I = IB I and 
s s 
(b) f: and p are restrictions of the maps r and p to the set 
{(s,i,jJjsEs, iEA, jEB }, 
s s 
* such that the value of this subgame equals the value V of the original 
game and such that p and a can be calculated in the Shapley-Snow manner 
- * from the square matrix game [G (V l] (cf. theorem A.1.9). Here 
_ * sa * [G (V )] is the restriction of [G (V )] to the rows and columns 
sa sa 
corresponding to A 5 and B5 respectively. 
This theorem also suggests a method of finding the finite number of extreme 
optimal stationary strategies of 0 1 and 02 when the value of the game is 
known. This can be done by looking at the finite number of stochastic 
subgames in which both players have an equal number of pure actions at each 
state. 
Now we analyse two problems concerning the construction of games with 
prescribed solution. 
5.1.3. PROBLEM. Let S, (A ,B ), s(S, p, a, V and 0,(s), sES, £E{1,2} be 
s s )(, 
given, where 0 1 (s)cP(As) and 0 2 (s)cP(Bs) are convex polyhedra. The 
question is whether it is possible to construct a function r such that 
(P1) the value of the corresponding game equals v. 
z (P2 J Xs=l0,Q,(s) is the set of optimal stationary strategies for player£, 
£=1,2. 
5.1.4. PROBLEM. Let S, (A ,B ) , sES, r, a, V and 0, (s), s(S, ,Q,({ 1,2} be 
s s )(, 
given, where 0 1 (s)cP(As) and 0 2 (s)cP(Bs) are convex polyhedra. The 
question is whether it is possible to construct a map p such that 
(P 1 ) and (P2 ) hold. 
It will result that problem 5.1.4 is more difficult than problem 5.1.3. 
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5.1.5. THEOREM. Problem 5.1.3 can be solved if and only if for each sES the 
pair (0 1 (s),02 (s)) has the (ms,ns)-BKS property. 
PROOF. If there exists a function r with the desired properties then by 
theorem 5.1.1 (0 1 (s),02 (s)) must have the (ms,ns)-BKS property, sES. Now 
let (0 1 (s),02 (s)) have the (ms,ns)-BKS property for all sES. Then by 
theorem A.1.11, there exists a m ,n -matrix game [K ]=[k (i,j)] such that 
s s s s 
Val(K )=V and such that 01(s) and 02 (s) are exactly the optimal action s s 
sets for player 1 respectively player 2. Now put 
r(s,i,j) 
z 
k s ( i, j) - (1 +a) - l L p ( t \ s, i, j) . V t 
t=1 
Then theorem 4.2.4 and theorem 5.1.1 show that this function r has the 
desired properties. 
With regard to problem 5.1.4 it is clear that this problem can only 
have a solution when the pair (0 1 (s),02 (s)) has the (ms,ns)-BKS property 
for each sES. However r, a and V cannot be chosen independently, as the 
following theorem shows. 
5.1.6. THEOREM. Concerning problem 5.1.4, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a map p such that property (P 1) holds, 
are given by the following system of inequalities: 
(5 .1.1) 
where 
m s (l+a) (V -w ) s m 
s s 
, all sES, 
m := ruin V , m 
s 
s 
max Vs and ws :=Val (r(s,.,.)). 
s 
D 
PROOF. First suppose that there exists a map p such that property (P 1) 
holds. Let p be optimal for player 1 in the corresponding stochastic game 
and let cr be an optimal action for player 2 in the matrix game [r(s,.,.)]. 
s 
Then 
- ~ -1 z I -V s r ( s, p , cr ) + (1 +a) . L p ( t 1 s, p , o s) . V t 
s s s t=l s 
- ~ -1 - s 
s r(s,ps,crs)+(l+a) .m -1 -w + (1+a) .m. 
s 
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Analogously one can prove V ~ w +(l+aJ-1 .m, so (5.1.1) 
s s -
Now suppose that (5.1.1) holds. Take ~ES such that 
holds. 
V =m and sES such 
s-
that v5=m. In view of (5 .1.1), for each sES there exists an £~E[O, 1] such that 
(l+a) (V -w ) 
s s 
£ m+(l-£ Jiii 
s- s 
£ V +(1-£ )V-. 
s s s s 
Then choose the map p in such a way, that for all (i,j)EAsxBs: 
p(~ls,i,j) 
p<sls,i,jJ 
p(tls,i,j) 
Now 
Val (G (V)) 
sa 
£ 
s 
1-£ 
0, 
s 
if t;<~, s. 
v 
s 
for each sES. So using theorem 4.2.4 we see that property (P 1) holds. 
D 
5.1.7. THEOREM. Concerning problem 5.1.4, a necessary condition for the 
existence of a map p such that (P 1J and (P2 J hold, is that for each sES: 
(5 .1. 2) 
s (l+a) (V min min r(s,ps,os)) s m. 
s psE0 1 (s) osEP(Bs) 
* PROOF. Let a stochastic game have value V and let 6E02 . Then for each sES 
and each psEP(As): 
leads to 
So 
-1 z * * 
r ( s , p , 6 ) + ( 1 +a) . 2: p ( t I s , p , 6 ) . V s V 
s s t=l s s t s 
r(s,p ,6 )+(l+a)- 1 .m s 
s s -
* v. 
s 
-1 * max r(s,p ,o )+(l+a) ·ms V , 
P EP(A ) s s s 
s s 
which proves the first inequality of (5.1.2). Analogously the last 
inequality of (5.1.2) can be proved. 
However 
max max r(s,ps,os ) ;:: max max r(s,p ,o ) 
EP(A ) osE02 (s) psE0 1 (s) osE02 (s) 
s s 
PS s 
2 min min r(s,p ,o ) ;:: min min r (s,p ,o ) . 
psE0 1 (s) osE02 (s) 
s s 
psE0 1 (s) EP(B ) 
s s 
a 
s s 
This completes the theorem. 
Not only for actions belonging to 0 1 (s) and 0 2 (s) there is a 
restrictive relation, but also for actions belonging to P(As)'01 (s) and 
P(Bsl'°2 (s) there are conditions. 
5.1.8. THEOREM. Concerning problem 5.1.4, a necessary condition for the 
existence of a map p such that (P 1 ) and (P2 ) hold, is that for each 
p EP(A l'°l (s), 
s s 
m < (l+a) (V -
s 
min 
a EP(B ) 
s s 
and for each a EP(B >'°2 (s), s s 
r(s,p ,o ) ) , 
s s 
( 1 +a) ( V - max r ( s , p , o ) ) < m. 
s P EP(A J s s 
s s 
* PROOF. Suppose ps€0 1 (s) for a stochastic game with value V . Then by 
theorem 5.1.1: 
Or 
min 
a EP(B ) 
s s 
min 
a EP(B ) 
s s 
-1 z * { r ( s , p , a ) + ( 1 +a) . l: p ( t I s , p , a ) • V } 
s s t=l s s t 
{r(s,p ,o )+(l+a)- 1 .m} < v*. 
s s - s 
Analogously the second inequality can be shown. 
* < v . 
s 
It is not clear whether the conditions of theorem 5.1.7 and theorem 
5.1.8 are also sufficient for problem 5.1.4 to have a solution. Perhaps 
some condition which relates O'l(s), 'l=l,2 and the sets of optimal actions 
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0 
0 
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for the players in the matrix games [r(s,.,.)], should be formulated. The 
fact that such a relationship exists is shown in a convincing way by the 
following theorem. 
5.1.9. THEOREM. If for problem 5.1.4 the vector Vis such that V=v.lz with 
vEJR, then problem 5. 1. 4 can be solved if and only if the following 
three conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) (0 1 (s),02 (s)) has the (ms,ns)-BKS property, all sES. 
(b) Oi(s) is optimal for player i in the game [r(s,.,.)], i=l,2. 
(c) Val (r(s,.,.)) = et et --V =--v l+et · s l+et · , all sES. 
* PROOF. For a discounted stochastic game with value V =v.lz it follows that 
* ~tp(tls,p ,a ).V =v for alls, p and a. So 
s s t s s 
v * Val (G (V ) ) Set 
v Val (r (s, . , • l ) + 1 +et. 
Moreover the sets of optimal actions for * [G (V ) ] Set are the same as those 
for [r(s,.,.)]. Hence, if there exists a map p which solves a problem 
5.1.4 with V=v.lz' then (a), (b) and (c) hold. On the other hand, if (a), 
(b) and (c) hold, then every map p is a solution to problem 5.1.4 as can be 
easily verified. 
D 
In the next theorem we give a sufficient condition for problem 5.1.4 
to have a solution. This condition is rather strong. Note that under this 
condition we need no additional conditions on possible relations between 
the sets Oi(s) and the sets of optimal actions in the matrix games 
[r(s,.,.)]. This result suggests that such a relationship becomes effective 
in extreme cases as in theorem 5.1.9. 
5.1.10. THEOREM. If for problem 5.1.4 for each sES the pair (0 1 (s),02 (s)) 
has the (rns,ns)-BKS property, and if for each s(S and (i,j)EAsxBs 
1 -1 -
r(s,i,j)+(l+et)- ·~ < Vs < r(s,i,j)+(l+et) .m, 
then there exists a map p which solves problem 5.1.4. 
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PROOF. First, let the 
the properties: 
m ,n - matrix game [K ]=[k (i,j)], for each sES have 
s s s s 
(a) Val(K)=Vs; (b) 0 1 (s) and 0 2 (s) are the sets of optimal actions for 
player 1 and player 2 respectively, and (c) for each sES and (i,j)EAsxBs: 
(5.1. 3) ( . ·i (1 )-l < k (. ') < ( . ') (1 )-l -· r s, i, J + +et • !.'1. - s i, J - r s, l., J + +et • m. 
(This is possible because the pair (0 1 (s) ,02 (s)) has the (ms,ns)-BKS 
property and in view of corollary A.1.12). 
Lets, sES, such that V =m and V-=m. Then, by (5.1.3) there exists an 
- s- s 
e: .. E[0,1] for each s, i and j, such that 
Sl.J 
(l+et) (ks(i,j)-r(s,i,j)) 
Now define p as: 
P<~I s,i,j) 
p<sls,i,jl 
p(tls,i,j) 
E •• 
Sl.) 
l-e:sij 
o, if t;<~,5. 
Obviously p is a solution to problem 5.1.4. 
E .. V +(1-E .. )V-. 
Sl.J S Sl.) S 
D 
In the remainder of this section we restrict our attention to problem 
5.1.4 for the subclass of stochastic games for which in each state one of 
the players is a dummy. A player is called a dummy in a state if he has only 
one action available in this state. In A2 it is pointed out that r1arkov decision 
problems can be seen as games for which one of the players is a dummy at 
* each state. Now note that if for a stochastic game with value v one of the 
players is a dummy in state s, then the matrix game * (G (V ) ] 
Set 
is merely a 
row-vector game (in case player l is a dummy) or a column-vector game (in 
case player 2 is a dummy) . Obviously in such a case the extreme optimal 
actions of the sets 0 1 (s) and 0 2 (s) are pure actions. Let PO£(s) the set 
* of pure optimal actions for player£ in the matrix game [G (V )]. If in 
Set 
state s player 1 is a dummy then P0 1 (s)={l} and if player 2 is a dummy then 
P02 (s)={1}. Then we have 0£(s)=P(PO£(s)), £=1,2. 
Now fix a stochastic game r for which in each state either player 1 or 
* player 2 is a dummy. Let V * be the value of f. Let m=min V 
s 
s 
* and m=max V . 
s 
s 
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Suppose that player 2 is a dummy at state s. Then we may deduce from the 
theorems 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 that the following properties of P0 1 (s) must hold: 
OPTs(l). If iEPo 1 (s), then m :S (l+a) (Vs-r(s,i,1)) ~ m 
Likewise for a state s in which player 1 is a dummy, we have: 
For this class of games we have the following theorem, which shows that 
the conditions of the theorems 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 are also sufficient for 
problem 5.1.4 to have a solution in this case. 
5.1.11. THEOREM. Let a problem 5.1.4 be such that for each sES either ms=1 
or ns=l (one of the players is a dummy). Then this problem can be solved 
if and only if 
(a) 02 (s) is the convex hull of a non-empty set of pure actions of player 
2, 2=1,2. Denote this set by P02 (s). If player 2 is a dummy in state 
s, then P02 (s)={1}. 
(b) For each state sES, in which player 2 is not a dummy, the properties 
OPTS(2) and NOPTS(2) hold, 2=1,2. 
PROOF. The "only if" part of the theorem is already shown above. So it 
remains to prove the " if" part, i.e. to choose a suitable map p. Let~· 
sES be such that V =m and V-=m. Fix sES. Then from the properties OPT (1) and 
s - s s 
OPTs(2) (one of th;m holds) we see that for each (i,j)EPo1 (s)xPo2 (s) there 
exists an£ .. E[0,1] such that 
Sl.J 
(l+a) (V5 -r(s,i,j)) 
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For this (i,j) define p as: 
p(sls,i,j) 
p<sls,i,jl 
p(tls,i,j) 
e:sij 
l-e:sij 
o, if ti~,s. 
Now let (i,j)~Po1 (s)xPo2 (s) and suppose that player t, tE{l,2}, is a dummy 
in state s. Then take 
P<~I s,i,jl 'i' 2-t 
p<sls,i,jl = t-1 
p(tls,i,j) = 0, if ti~,s. 
It is easy to show (by theorem 4.2.4) that the map p defined in the above 
way, has the desired properties. 
5.2. CHARACTERIZING PROPERTIES OF THE VALUE FUNCTIONS. 
In this section we extend the axiomatic characterization of the value 
function of two-person zerosum games in normal form, presented by Vilkas 
(1963) and Tijs (1981), to the value function of discounted two-person 
zerosum stochastic games. This characterization can be indicated by the 
terms objectivity, monotonicity and sufficiency for the both players. The 
results of this section are outlined in Tijs & Vrieze (19!H). 
We wish to characterize the function f*: SG (S ,o.)-+lRz, where f* (r) 
equals the value of the gamer for each rEsG(S,o.). 
* 
[J 
5.2.1. DEFINITION. For a stochastic game r, with value V , wecall an action 
IEAs for a state sES superfluous if there exists a ~sEP(As) with 
p (i)=O such that for each jEBs: s , 
r(s,.i,j) + -1 z - * (1+o.) . E p(tls,i,j).Vt ~ 
t=l 
-1 z - * (l+o.) . E p(tls,ps 1 j) .vt. 
t=l 
An action jEBs is called superfluous in an analogous way. 
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We now state fourproperties that a function f: SG(S,cx)+lRz could have. 
It will appear that these properties are necessary and sufficient for a 
function f to be the value function. Furthermore we prove that these 
axioms are independent. 
5.2.2. AXIOM Al. (Objectivity). If rEsG(S,cx) is such that for state sES we 
I -1 have ms=ns=l and p(s s,1,1)=1, then (f(r))s=cx • (l+cx) .r(s,1,1). 
5.2.3. AXIOM A2. (Monotonicity). If for two games r• ,r"ESG(S,cx) the payoff 
functions r' and r" satisfy r':Sr", while the other game parameters are 
identical, then f (r I) $f (r") • 
5.2.4. AXIOMA3.t.(Sufficiency for player t, t=l,2). If r 1 ESG(S,cx) results 
from rEsG(S,cx) by deleting a superfluous action of player t, then 
f(r'J=f<rl. 
* 5.2.5. THEOREM. The value function f obeys the axioms Al, A2, A3.1 and 
A3.2. 
PROOF. If for a state sES of a game r we have m =n =1 and p(sls,1,1)=1, 
s s 
then for each pair of strategies (µ,v): 
v 
SjJV 
i:: (1 +ex) -T • r ( s , 1 , 1 ) 
T=O 
-1 
ex .(l+cx).r(s,1,1). 
* -1 Hence fs(r)=cx (l+cx).r(s,1,1) and so axiom Al holds. 
If for r• and r" the payoff functions r' and r" satisfy r':Sr", while 
the other parameters are the same, then obviously for each µ and v we have 
* * V'(µ,v):SV"(µ,v).Hencef (f')=supinfV'(µ,v):SsupinfV"(µ,v)=f (r"). so 
JJ v JJ v 
Axiom A2 holds. 
Now let for a state sES of a gaiue rEsG (S ,ex) an action iEA be 
s 
superfluous in view of action ps. Let r• be the game which results from r 
after deleting action i. 
* Let ps be optimal for player 
to r • So for all jEBs: 
in the matrix game [G (v*)] corresponding 
SCl 
(5.2 .1) * -1 z * * * r(s,ps,j) + (l+cx) • i:: p(tls,p ,j).Vt ~ V 
t=l s s 
Define the action Ps as: 
p (i) 
s 
p (.i) := 0 
s 
Now from (5.2.1) and definition 5.2.1 we see that for all jEBs: 
(5. 2 .2) -1 z ~ * r(s,p ,j) + (l+a) . l: p(tjs,ps,j) .vt 
s t=l 
* -1 z * * 
r(s,ps,j) + (l+a) . l: p(tls,p ,j) .vt -
t=l s 
* - - -1 z - * -p {i){r(s,i,j)+(l+a) . l: p(tls,i,j).Vt-r(s,p ,j) -
s t=l s 
-1 z - * (l+a) . l: p(tjs,p 5 ,j) .Vt} 
t=l 
* -1 z * 
:o: r(s,p ,j)+(l+a) . l: p(tjs,p ,j) .Vt :". 
s t=l s 
* * 
* v . 
s 
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Since Val(Gsa(V ))=Vs it follows that in (5.2.2) the equality sign holds for 
some jEB . This means that with respect to the game r• we have 
s* * 
Val(G' {V ))=V. Since in the other states nothing changes we also have 
sa * s * 
Val{Gta(V ))=V~, tES and tfs. Hence V is the fixed point of the map Ua, 
applied on game r• {cf. (4.2.4) and theorem 4.2.1). So by theorem 4.2.4 the 
* value of the stochastic game r• equals V . This shows that also axiom A3.1 
holds. Analogously one can show that the value function satisfies axiom 
A3.2. 
So we have seen that the axioms Al, A2, A3.1 and A3.2 are necessary 
properties of a function to be the value function. In the next theorem we 
show that they are also sufficient. 
D 
. z 
5.2.6. THEOREM. A function f: SG(S,a)-+JR satisfies the axioms Ai, A2, A3.1, 
A3.2 if and only if f equals the value function. 
PROOF. The "if" part is proved in theorem 5. 2. 5. Suppose that f obeys the 
axioms Al, A2, A3.1 and A3.2. The proof of the "only if" part proceeds in 
two steps. 
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(a) First let r be a game with a state s and actions (l, j) EA xB , such 
s s 
that 
(5. 2. 3) p(sls,i,j) 
and such that 
(5.2.4) inf r(s,l,j) 
jEBs 
if i=i or j=j 
r(s,i,j) 
* 
sup r (s ,i, j) 
iEA 
s 
We wish to show that (f(f)) =V for such a game r. Obviously 
* -1 - - s s ~s=~ . (1+a.):r(~ 1 i,j), since for the stationary strategies panda with 
ps(i)=l and crs(j)=l we have: 
inf V -
vEsT2 spv 
v --spa 
-1 - -
a. ( l+a.) . r ( s , i , j ) = sup V -
µESTl sµcr 
Take a large number Mand consider games f',f"ESG(S,a.), which differ from r 
only in the reward functions r' and r" in the following way 
r' (t,i,j) r"(t,i,j)=r(t,i,j) if t=s and i=i or j=j. 
r' (t,i,j) r(t,i,j)-M, r"(t,i,j) r(t,i,j)+M elsewhere. 
From the monotonicity property off we derive: 
(5 .2 .5) f (f I) :;'; f (f) :;'; f (f") • 
Now observe that in the game r• each action iEA '{i} is superfluous 
s 
in view of action i, when Mis taken large enough. Hence, by axiom A3.1, 
the actions ifl may successively be deleted without disturbing the f-value. 
Let f be the so obtained game, then f(f')=f(f). But in f each action 
jEBs'{j} is superfluous in view of action j (cf. (5 .. 2.4)). This means that 
in r the actions jfj may successively be deleted without disturbing the 
f-value. Let fbethe remaining game. Then f(f)=fff)=f(f'). Now for game f 
in state s for both players only one action is left, namely i and j 
respectively. Moreover p(sls,i,j)=l, so by axiom Al we get: 
-1 - -
a . (l+a.) .r (s,i,j) = (f (f)) s (fer· l > • 
s 
Analogously it can be shown that (f(f")) =a-1 (1+a) .r(s,.i,ji. Then by 
-1 - - s -1 - -(5.2.5) we have a (l+a) .r(s,i,j)$(f(f))s$a (l+a)r(s,i,j), which shows 
* that (f(f))s=Vs for such a states. 
(b) Now take an arbitrary game fESG(S,a). Let sEs. Consider the game 
r• (s)ESG(S,a), which is constructed from r by adding in states an 
(ms+l)-th action for player 1 and an (ns+1)-th action for player 2. 
r' and p' equal r and p respectively on AsxBs and for the extra entries 
we define: 
(5.2.6) 
and 
(5. 2. 7) 
r' (s,i,j) 
p' <sls,i,j) 
* * 
-1 * 
Cl (l+ct) . v 
s 
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Obviously V (f)=V (f' (s)). Moreover r• (s) is a game, with respect to state 
s, of the type treated in step (a) of this proof. Hence 
* (5 .2 .8) (f (f' (s))) 
s 
v (f). 
s 
If we could show that concerning game r• (s) the actions ms+1 for player 1 
and ns+l for player 2 in state s are superfluous, then by the axioms A3.1 
and A3.2 this would result in (f(f' (s))) =(f(f)) . Combined with (5.2.8) 
* s s 
this would give (f(f)) =V (f), as was to be proved. 
- s s 
Let ps be optimal for player 1 in the matrix game [G (V*)]; so for each Set 
jEBs: 
(5.2.9) -1 z - * * r(s,p ,j) + (l+a) . l: p(tls,p ,j) .V <o V . 
s t=l s t s 
From the definition of r' (cf. (5.2.6)) we see that (5. 2. 9) also holds for 
the game r•, not only for jEBs but also for j=ns+l. Then 
-1 z 
- * * (5 .2 .10) r' (s,ps 1 j) + (1+a) . i.: p' (tjs,ps,j) .vt <o v I jEBU{n+l}. 
t=l s s s 
By (5.2.6) and (5.2.7) we have: 
(5.2.11) -1 z * r' (s,ms+l,j) + (l+a) • l: p' (tJs,m +1,j) .V 
t=l s t 
jEB U{n +1}. 
s s 
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Combining (5.2.10) and (5.2.11) gives that action ms+l is superfluous in 
view of p in game r• (s). Likewise one can show that for the game remaining 
s 
after deletion of action ms+l in r• (s), the action ns+1 is superfluous. 
D 
Now we show that the four axioms Al, A2, A3.1 and A3.2 are independent. 
We do this as follows. For each triplet of them we give a function 
f: SG(S,a)->-lRz which satisfies these three axioms but not the fourth. 
(a) (Objectivity). Let f 1 : SG (S,a)->-lRz be the function with f 1 (f) :=Oz 
for all fESG(S,a). Obviously f 1 satisfies the axioms A2, A3.1 and A3.2 but 
not Al. 
(b) (Sufficiency for player 1). Let f 2 : SG(S,a)+lRz be the function 
defined as: 
(f2 (f)) s := min 
i,j 
z 
{r(s,i,j}+(l+aJ-1 • ~ p<tls,i,jJ.v*cn}. 
t=l t 
Then f 2 obeys the axioms Al, A2 and A3.2 but not A3.1. 
(c) (Sufficiency for player 2) . Let f 3 : SG (S, a) ->-JR2 be the function 
defined as: 
z 
(f3 (rJ)s := max hcs,i,j)+(l+a)-l. ~ p(tls,i,j).<(f')}. 
i,j t=l 
Then f 3 obeys the axioms Al, A2 and A3.1 but not A3.2. 
(d) (Monotonicity) . More work has to be done, to show that axiom A2 is 
independent of the other axioms. First we pay some attention to matrix 
games. For an m,n-matrix game [K] let Ns 1 (K) be the set of pure actions 
for player 1 which are ~ot ~uperfluous. Let NS2 (K) have the analogous 
meaning. Let N01 (K) :={iJiENs1 (K) and p(i)=O for each pE01 (K) }. Similarly 
N02 (K} is defined. 
Suppose that a superfluous action i of player 1 is deleted from [K], 
resulting in a matrix game [K']. Then it can be verified that 
(5.2.12) N0 1 (K') N01 (K) and N02 (K') c N02 (K). 
If a superfluous action of player 2 is deleted, resulting in [K"], then 
analogously: 
(5. 2 .13) N02 (K") = N02 (K) and NOl (K") c NOl (K). 
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Example 5.2.7 below shows that it may happen that N02 (K'lfN02 (K). Let 
ANO£ (K)CNOt(K) be such that kEANOt(K) if and only if kENOt (K) for each 
matrix game [K], which can be obtained from [K] by deleting superfluous 
rows and superfluous columns in any possible order. Note that for a matrix 
game [K] which results from [K] after deleting a superfluous row or column, 
we have ANO£(K)=ANO£ (K), £=1,2. In example 5.2.7 the sets ANOt(K) are empty. 
This is not the case in example 5.2.8. 
5.2.7. EXAMPLE. Let 
[K) [: : :J 
Then NOl (K)={2} and N02 (K)={l,2}. 
player 1, then we obtain [K']=[~ 
N02 (K' )={1 I }={1 }IN02 (K). 
If we delete the superfluous action 1 of 
~ ~].Now NOl (K')={1'}={2}=N01 (K) and 
Moreover for this example we have AN0 1 (K)=AN02 (K)=0. To see this, first 
delete the superfluous row 1. Then column 2 becomes superfluous and is 
deleted. Next the superfluous row 2 and the superfluous column 1 are 
successively deleted. By doing so both players have only left their third 
action, which yields the matrix game [K]=[3]. Obviously AN01 (K)=AN02 (KJ=0. 
5.2.8. EXAMPLE. Let 
[K] = [ ~ : : l 
Then AN0 1 (K)=AN02 (K)={l,2} and no row or column of [K] is superfluous. 
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* Now we return to stochastic games. For a game r with value v we 
* denote the (i,j)-th element of the matrix game [G (V )] by g(s,i,j). Then 
sa 
define f 4 : SG(S,a)+lRz as: 
* Cf4 Cf))s = V - E * . E * g(s,i,j) 
s i€ANo1 (G (V )) j€AN02 (G (V )) sa sa 
It can be checked that ~4 satisfies the axioms Al, A3.1 and A3.2. We show 
that f 4 
Suppose 
example 
does not satisfy axiom A2. 
* that r is such that [G (V )] is equal to the matrix game [K] of 
sa * 
5. 2. 8 (such a game exists) • Then V s (r) =3, hence (f 4 (r}) s =3-6-0-0-6=-9. 
Let r• be the stochastic game, which only differs from r in the fact that 
r' (s,1,1)=r(s,1,1)+1. Then r'~r and v:cr')=v:cr). But (f4 Cr'))s=3-7-0-0-6= 
-10<Cf4 Cr))s. So f 4 does not satisfy the monotonicity axiom A2. 
Now we wish to consider another interesting property of the value 
function, called symmetry. To that purpose we introduce the transpose of a 
stochastic game, which is the stochastic game that we obtain by interchanging 
the names of the players. 
5.2.9. DEFINITION. Let rEsG(S,a) correspond to the stochastic game 
situation < S, {A lsES}, {B ls€S},r,p >. The transpose rT of r is the 
s s 
discounted stochastic game associated with the stochastic game situation 
< s, {A lsEs}, {B lsEs}, r,p >, where: 
s s 
s := s, 
A := B and B := A for each s€S. 
s s s s 
r(s,i,j) := -r(s,j,i) and :P<tls,i,j) pCtls,j,i) for each 
s,t€s and each (i,j)€A XB . 
s s 
We call a function f: SG(S,a)+lRz symmetric if the following property 
holds. 
5.2.10. AXIOM A4. (Synmetry). f(fT)=-f(f) for all f€SG(S,a). 
It is straightforward to verify that the value function has the 
symmetry property. Furthermore it is simple to show that axiom A3.2 can be 
derived from the axioms A3.1 and A4. So we have the following alternative 
characterization of the value function. 
5.2.11. THEOREM. A function f: SG(S,a)+lRz equals the value function if 
and only if f satisfies the axioms Al, A2, A3.1 and A4. 
Evidently in theorem 5.2.11 axiom A3.1 may be replaced by axiom A3.2. 
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we now introduce the concept of weakly superfluous actions. It appears 
that if we use this concept in characterizing the value function, then we 
do not need the monotonicity axiom anymore. 
* 5.2.12. DEFINITION. For a stochastic game rEsG(S,a) with value V we call 
for a state sES an action iEA for player 1 weakly superfluous, if for 
s 
each p EP(A) there exists an action p EP(A) with p (i)=O and such that 
s s s s s 
A -1 z A * inf {r(s,p ,j)+(1+a) • E p(tls,p ,j)Vt} ~ 
jEB s t=1 s 
s 
z 
inf {r(s,p ,j)+(l+a)-1• E p(tls,p ,j)V:}. 
jEB s t=1 s 
s 
A weakly superfluous action of player 2 is defined similarly. 
It is obvious that a superfluous action is also weakly superfluous, 
but the converse does not necessarily hold. This implies that the next 
axiom with respect to a function f: SG(S,a)+lRz, is stronger than axiom 
A3.JI., Jl.=1,2. 
5.2.13. AXIOM A3.Jl.(w). (Weak sufficiency for player JI., Jl.=1,2). If 
r 1 €SG(S,a) results from rEsG(S,a) by deleting a weakly superfluous 
action, then f(f')=f(f). 
5.2.14. THEOREM. A function f: SG(S,a)+lRz equals the value function if and 
only if f satisfies the axioms Al, A3.1(w) and A3.2(w). 
PROOF. The "only if" part can easily be verified. Concerning the "if" part, 
in the proof of theorem 5.2.6 the monotonicity axiom is only used in the 
first step. There the game r was compared with the two games r• and r", 
which were monotonic with respect to r, i.e. r':>r:>r". Next from r• and f" 
superfluous actions could be deleted. However here we do not need games 
r' and f". Suppose for a state s of a game r we have a saddle point as 
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determined by (5.2.3) and (5.2.4). Then at once in the gamer all actions 
- -i#i and all actions j#j are weakly superfluous in view of action i and 
action j respectively. So they can successively be deleted. 
The remainder of the proof proceeds analogously to the proof of theorem 
5.2.6. 
a 
In Tijs & Vrieze (1979) the value function for more general classes of 
dynamic games is characterized in an axiomatic way. They showed that 
concerning the evaluation function a monotonicity assumption is the only 
essential condition to be able to give such a characterization. 
5.3. PERTURBATION THEORY FOR DISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES. 
In this section we study the effect on values and optimal stationary 
strategies of perturbations of the game parameters (payoff function, 
transition probabilities and the interest rate). Most of the results are 
first derived for two-person zerosum games in normal form and then 
transplanted to discounted stochastic games. 
In this section we enlarge our game model. The state space may be a 
countable set and the action spaces are assumed to be compact metric. This 
section and the next section 5.4 are the only places of this monograph, 
where we abandon the finite two-person zerosum stochastic game model. 
It should be noticed, that the question studied here is not only of 
theoretical importance, but also of practical value, because favourable 
answers to this question will give greater confidence in the use of game 
models in applications. Roughly speaking, "favourable" means here that sma11 · 
changes in the game parameters induce only small changes in the values, while 
good strategies in the original game are not too bad in a slightly 
perturbed game. 
The results of this section are special cases of more general 
statements in Tijs & Vrieze (1980). For papers in the same spirit, but in 
a different context, we refer to Krabs (1977), Schweitzer (1968), Tijs 
(1976) and Whitt (1975). 
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By CSG(S) we mean the class of two-person zerosum stochastic games with 
countable state space S, compact metric action spaces for the players, a 
uniform bounded measurable payoff function and a measurable transition map. 
In addition we assume that the players are not allowed to randomize between 
their pure actions. Furthermore the immediate rewards are discounted 
according to some interest rate aE(0, 00). The measurability of the maps 
r(s,.,.) and p(tjs,.,.) is taken with respect to the product a-algebra of 
A and B , where A and 
s s s 
B are the a-algebra's generated by the Borel sets 
s 
of the action spaces As forplayer 1 and Bs of player 2 respectively. 
Note that for a game rECSG(S) the uniform boundedness of rand the 
measurability conditions on r and p ensure that the total discounted 
expected payoff exists for each pair of strategies. 
5.3.1. REMARK. Let rEcsG(S). Suppose we would allow the players to randomize 
at each stage between their pure actions. Let P(A ) and P(B ) be the set 
s s 
of probability measures on the measure spaces <A ,A > and <B ,B > 
s s s s 
respectively, for each sES. Endow P(As) and P(Bs) with the weak topology, 
then it is known (e.g. Parthasarathy (1967), theorem 6.4, page 45), that 
P(A ) and P(B ) are compact and can be metrized. 
s s 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the extensions of the maps r(s,.,.) and 
p(tjs,.,.) to r(s,.,,) and p(tjs,.,.) on P(A )xP(B) are measurable maps, 
s s 
where 
and 
r (s,p ,a ) 
s s 
J J r(s,a,b)dp(a)da(b) 
A B 
s s 
p(tls,p ,a ) ·= J 
s s 
J p(tjs,a,b)dp(a)da(b). 
A B 
s s 
Hence, one sees that the mixed extension of I', i.e. the game f where 
S:=S, A :=P(A ) , B :=P(B ) and r and p are as defined above, is also a 
s s s s 
member of the class CSG(S) and even a member with a specific property, 
namely that for each fixed p EP(A) the maps r(s,p ,a ) and p(tls,p ,a ) 
s s s s s s 
are affine in the variable a . The same holds for a fixed cr EP(B ) . 
s s s 
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This reasoning implies that the class of games RCSG(S) :={rlrEcSG(S), while 
in addition randomized actions are allowed} is a subset of the class 
CSG(S). so assertions which hold for each member of CSG(S) or each member 
of a subset of CSG(S) enclosing RCSG(S), also hold for the class of 
games RCSG (S) . 
Now consider for a game rEcSG(S) for each sEs and vEJsl the game in 
a. 
normal form <A ,B ,G (v)> (cf. definition A.1.1), where for each 
a.s s s 1 (a,b)EA xB ,G (v) (a,b) :=r(s,a,b)+-1- E p(tjs,a,b) .vt. s s s a. +a. tES 
If the value of <A ,B ,G (v)> exists (see definition A.1.3), then this 
s s s 
value is denoted by pVal (Ga.(v)). 
Let VCSG(S) be the subset ~f CSG(S) for which for each sEs and vEJsl 
pVal(Ga.(v)) exists. Note that SG(S,a.)cVCSG(S) for each a.E(O,oo). 
N:w define for a game rEvcsG (S) the map PU : lR IS I +JR / s / as 
PU (v) ·= oval (Ga.(v)), 
s - s 
for each sES and each vEJRls/. 
5.3.2. THEOREM. If fEVCSG(S), then the value of r exists and equals the 
unique solution of the following set of functional equations in the 
. - Is I variable vt.JR : 
PU (v) ·= pVal (Ga(v)) 
s s 
or equivalently 
PU(v) v. 
* Let V be this solution. 
v 
s 
, sES 
If, for £~0, the stationary strategies pE and GE are such that for each 
sES, pEEA and GEEB respectively are £-optimal actions for player and 
s s s s 
player 2 respectively in the game <A ,B ,Ga(v*l >, then PE and GE are 
s s s 
( l+a) . . . ~.£-optimal in the stochastic gamer. 
PROOF. Concerning the first part of the theorem, quite similar to the 
proof of theorem 4.2.4 it can be shown for fixed fEVCSG(S), that the map PU 
* is a contraction map and therefore has a unique fixed point, say V . 
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Let for player 1 and E>O the stationary strategy pE be such that for 
E a * each state sEs psEAs is an E-optimal action in the game <As,Bs,Gs(V )>. 
Then for each stationary strategy a of player 2 we have (in vector notation) 
(5.3.1) E 1 E * r(p ,a) + l+a P(p ,a) .v +E.llsl ~ * v . 
By repeated application of this inequality, we get 
(5. 3.2) 1 T T E E * l+a E (l+a) P (p ,a) .r(p ,a) ~ v -<--a> .Elis I 
T=O 
As in part I, chapter 3, it can be shown that corollary 3.5 also holds for 
the class of games VCSG(S). Hence (5.3.2) gives: 
(5.3.3) inf 
a€PSST2 
E * V(p ,a) ~ V 
E E a * Analogously for a a with asEBs E-optimal for player 2 in <As,Bs,Gs(V) >for 
each sEs, we have 
(5.3.4) E * l+a sup V(p,a) $ V + <--a> .Ells I 
p€PSST1 
* Then, using theorem 2.3.5, (5.3.3) and (5.3.4) show that V is the value 
E E -1 
of the game. Further, for any E~O it follows that p and a are a (l+a) .E-
optimal. 
a 
From now on we fix a state space S and action spaces As and Bs' sEs. 
Let VCSG be the subset of VCSG(S) corresponding to these S, A and B , sES. 
s s 
A game rEVCSG is conpletely characterized by a triplet <r,p,a> and sometimes 
a game will be denoted by such a triplet. 
We provide VCSG with the metric d defined by 
d(r,f') := d(<r,p,a>,<r',p',a'>) := max{llr-r'li,llP-P'll,la-a'i}, 
where llp-p' II ·= sup E IP<tls,a,b)-p' (tls,a,b) I 
s,a,b tES 
and llr-r' II sup lr(s,a,b)-r'(s,a,b)I. 
s,a,b 
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5.3.3. THEOREM. The map v\vcsG+:Jsl, where v* (r) is the value of the game 
r, is a continuous map (even pointwise Lipschitz continuous). 
PROOF. Let M:= sup lr (s,a,bJI. Then 
s,a,b 
(5.3.5) Iv* (f) I ,; a+l .M 
s Cl 
Let <r,p,a> and <r' ,p' ,a'>EVCSG and M=max{M,M'}. 
First note that in view of lemma A.1.8and theorem 4.2.4 we have 
(5.3.6) * * a * a' * Iv (f)-V (f'll = lpVal(G (V {r)))-pVal(G (V (f')lll s:: 
s s s s 
i I * sup lr<s,a,b) + l+a E p(t s,a,b)Vt(f)-r' (s,a,b) -
s,a,b tEs 
l+a E p' <tls,a,b)v: (f') I. 
tEs 
We use the following inequalities, which can easily be verified (xElR, 
v, v I EJR Is I ) • 
(5. 3. 7) I x x' I lx-x' I la-a' I l+a - l+a' 5 ~ + (l+a) (l+a') lxl 5 kd+ ~ lxl 1+a l+a 
(5.3.8) I E p(tls,a,b)vt - E p' (t s,a,b)v' I 
tEs tES t 
s llv-v• 11 + llp-p' II · llvll 
Using (5.3.5), (5.3. 7) and (5.3.8) we derive from (5.3.6): 
(5.3.9) Iv* <n-v* (f') I ,; llr-r' II+ llv* m-v* (I'') II+ llp-p' II .M + la-a' j .M 
s s l+a a a 
Rewriting (5.3.9) yields 
(5.3.10) llv*m-v*cr•>lls:: l+a < llr-r•ll+ llp-p'll~+ la-a•l .'.i> 
a a a 
* From (5.3.10) it follows that the map V (.) is continuous. Putting 
-1 -1 C =a (l+a) (1+2M.a ) leads to 
r,a 
(5.3.11) llv*m-v*(r'l 11 s:: c d(r,r•i, 
r,a 
* which shows the pointwise Lipschitz continuity of V (.). 
D 
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~~ E E 
For a game f=<r,p,a>EVCSG let O!ls(f) :=O!ls(r,p,a) for E20 be the set of 
a * E-optimal actions for player !l, !lE{l,2} in the dummy game <As,Bs,Gs(V (f))>. 
Then for E>O,by theorem 5.3.2,the set X 0~ (r,p,a) is a subset of the set 
-1 sES s 
a (a+l).E-optimal stationary strategies for player !l. For E=O, the set 
x o!l (r,p,a) can be identified with the set of optimal stationary 
sEs s 
strategies (the "if" part is proved in theorem 5. 3. 2, the "only if" part 
can be proved along the same lines as the proof of theorem 5.1.1). 
5.3.4. THEOREM. Let E20 and r,r'EVCSG such that 
d(<r,p,a>,<r' ,p' ,a'>) s cS. 
Then for each sEs we have for !lE{l,2}: 
E+2C .o 
E ra 
o!ls(r,p,a) c o!ls (r',q',a'), 
with c as defined in (5.3.11). 
ra 
The proof of this theorem is postponed until after the proof of the next 
lemma. 
5.3.5. LEMMA. Let <A,B,K> and <A,B,K'> be two games in normal form, which 
both have a value. 
If d (K,K I) =sup I K (a,b) -K' (a,b) I So, then o~ (K)c0~+ 2 cS (K') I for each E20 
a b 
and !lE { 1 , 2 } . ' 
PROOF. we only show the inclusion for !l=l. 
~ E 
Let aE0 1 (K). The following three inequalities hold: 
K'(a,b) 2 K(';i',b)-o 
K(';i',b) 2pVal(K)-c 
pVal(K) 2 pVal(K')-8 
for all bEB 
for all bEB 
Combining these three inqualities yields: 
K'(';i',b) 2 pVal(K')-E-26, for all bEB. 
0 
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PROOF of theorem 5.3.4. 
E a * O. (r,p,a) is derived from the game in normal form <A ,B ,G (V (f))>. If x.S S S S 
d(<r,p,a>,<r',p',a'>)So, then from theorem 5.3.3 we get 
So inserting this result in lemma 5.3.5 yields the theorem. 
5.3.6. DEFINITION. We call a function K: AxB+JRsemi-continuous if for each 
bEB the function~: A+JR with ~(a) :=K(a,b) is upper semi-continuous 
and if for each aEA the function KA: B+JR with KA (b) :=K(a,b) is lower 
a a 
semi-continuous. In that case the corresponding game in normal form 
<A,B,K> is called semi-continuous. 
A stochastic game rEvcsG(S) is called semi-continuous if for each sEs 
the function r(s,.,.) is 
uniformly bounded vector 
continuous on A xB • 
s s 
semi-continuous on A xB and if for each 
vEJRlsl the functions l: 5 p{tjs,.,.)vt is semi-
tEs 
SVCSG(S) denotes the subset of semi-continuous stochastic games of 
VCSG(S). Note that SG(S,a)CSVCSG(S) for each finite set Sand each aE(0, 00 ). 
Now if <A,B,K> is a semi-continuous game, for which the value exists, 
then we have that O~(K) is a closed subset of A. Namely O~(K) := 
f-l ([pVal(K)-c, 00)), where f is the upper semi-continuous function on A 
defined by f(a):=infbK(a,b). Moreover, as A is compact, we have 0 1 (K)r~ 
since 01 (K)=nE>OO~(K).Analogously O~(K) is closed and 02 (K)F~ if Bis 
compact. 
For a stochastic game rEsvcsG(S) we clearly have that the dummy games 
a * <As,Bs,Gs(V (f))> are semi-continuous, so the above reasoning applies. 
We now devote some attention to multifunctions. Le~ X and Y be 
Hausdorffspaces andletYbe compact. Let f: X+Y be a wultifunction, 
assigning to each xEX a non-empty compact subset f(x) of Y. Following Berge 
((1959), pp. 114,115), w~ will call such a multifunction upper semi-
continuous if for each open set "Yr=Y., the set {xlxEX and f (x)cY} is an open 
subset of X. 
If X and Y are metric spaces, then it is well-known that the multifunction 
f: X+Y is upper semi-continuous if and only if for each (x,y)Exxy and each 
D 
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sequence (~,yk), k=0,1,2, ..• converging to (x,y), while ykEf(xk), we have 
yEf(x). Especially this last characterization of upper semi-continuity of 
multifunctions indicates the usefulness of this concept for the problems in 
which we are involved. Namely X represents a family of games, Y is the set 
of actions (strategies) or action pairs (strategy pairs) and f assigns to 
each xEX the compact metric set of £-optimal actions (strategies) of the 
game x. 
Now we are ready to state the final theorem of this section. Again fix 
S, A and B , sES and let SVCSG be the corresponding subset of SVCSG(S). 
s s 
5.3.7. THEOREM. For the class SVCSG the multifunctions 
and 
O~s(r,p,a): SVCSG + Bs 
are upper semi-continuous for all sES and all £20. 
PROOF. We prove the theorem for Ois(r,p,a). 
Let <rk,pk,ak>' k=0,1,2, ... be a sequence in SVCSG converging to 
<r,p,a>ESVCSG. Let akEOis(rk,pk,ak) and suppose limk+ooak=a. We need to 
E prove that aE0 1 (r,p,a). Let ok=d(<r,p,a>,<rk,pk,ak>) for each kElN. 
s . £+2C .o 
Then by theorem 5.3.4 we have akE0 1s ra k~i). 
Let k(h), with hElN, be such that 2Cra.okSh for each k2k(h). This implies 
that 
for all k 2 k(h), 
since o~s (r)c:O~s (f) if os~s;E:. 
-1 
But then aEO~:h (I') 
-1 
n oE+h <n . 
hElN ls 
-1 
as lim ak=a and O~:h (I') is closed. so also aEO~s(I')= 
k+oo 
Cl 
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In the next section the subclass of SVCSG(S) where both players have a 
unique optimal stationary strategy is considered. 
We will end this section with an example, which shows that O~s, e:2:0, 
is not necessarily a lower semi-continuous multifunction. 
5.3.8. EXAMPLE. Consider the mixed extension of the row game [K ], for 
e: 
given e:<::O, where A={l} and B=[0,1] (an interval) and K (a,b)=1+e:b for 
e: 
bE[0,1] and a=1. So in fact player 1 is a dummy player. Then for e:>O we 
have 02 (Ke:)={O} and for e:=O we have 02 (K0)=[0,1]. So for the sequence 
[~-1], k=1,2, ••• converging to [K0] there exists an element bE02 <K0) 
such that, it is not possible to construct a sequence bk with 
bkE02 (Kk_1l, such that li~-+«>bk=b. This is equivalent to the fact that 
02 (.) does not have the lower semi-continuity property in K0 • 
5.4. UNIQUE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES. 
This section is a continuation of the investigations of section 5.3. 
The notations introduced there are used again. 
Most of the results of this section can be found in Tijs & Vrieze 
(1980). Let USVCSG(S) be the subset of SVCSG(S) for which both players 
have a unique optimal stationary strategy. 
we remark that if a player has for some discounted stochastic game 
a unique optimal stationary strategy, then this strategy is his only optimal 
strategy, stationary or not. This observation does not hold for average 
reward games. 
For a pair of action sets (A,B) we associate with each (ii ,b) EAxB a map 
Kiib: AxB+lR, such that the game <A,B,Kaf»hasunique optimal actions, which 
are respectively ii and b. 
Take Kiib(a,b) := -1 if b=b and a~a 
·= if a=a and b~b 
:= 0 elsewhere. 
Clearly pVal(K--)=0 and ii and bare the unique optimal actions. 
ab 
5.4.1. REMARK. As the set of optimal stationary strategies of a game 
a * rEsVCSG(S) for player Jl equals X 0Jl(G (V (f))), we see that r 
sES s 
belongs to USVCSG(S) if and only if each game in normal form 
a * <As,Bs,Gs(V (f))>, has a pair of unique optimal actions. 
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5.4.2. THEOREM. Let rESVCSG(S) and let (p,o)E01 (f)x02(r) I with p=(al,a2, ..• ) 
and o=(b 1 ,b2 , •.. ). Then the game f, which results from r by replacing 
the payoff function r by r(s,.,.):=r(s,.,.)+£.K- b (.,.),for given £>0, 
_ _ as s 
belongs to USVCSG(S). Moreover p and a are the unique optimal stationary 
strategies for the respective players. 
PROOF. -a. * For the game <As,Bs,Gs(V (f))>, sES we have for (a,b)EA XB , in view 
s s 
optimality of a and b : 
s s 
of the 
(5.4.1) r (s,a,b ) + £Ka b (a,bs) + l+a. l: p (t I s,a,bs). < (f) $ 
s s s tEs 
r(s,a ,b) + £K- b (a ,b) + -- l: p(tjs,.;;_ ,b) .v:(r) $ 
s s as s s s l+a. tES s s 
r(s,as 1 b) + £K- b (a ,b) + l+a. l: p(tjs,.;;_ ,b) .V:(I'). 
as s s tES s 
- * Hence (as,bs) is a saddle point for the game <As,Bs,Gs(V (f))>. So by 
theorem A.1.4 the value of this game in normal form equals: 
r(s,a ,b) + £K- b (a ,b) + (l+a.)-l l: p(tjs,a ,b )V:(f)=V*(r). 
s s as s s s tEs s s s 
* But this means that for the gamer, V (f) is the unique solution of the 
* equation v=PU(v), which by theorem 5.3.2 shows, that V (f) equals the value 
of f. From the inequalities (5.4.1) we now deduce that p and a are optimal 
in the game r, since a E0 1 (f) and b E02 (r) for each sEs. s s s s 
Suppose pE0 1 cri and pip, say';;; ia. Then (using theorem 5.3.2) s s 
(5.4.2) 
EK- - (';;; ,b) + r(s,';; ,b) + l+a. l: p(tjs,';; ,b ).v:(r). 
a 5 b 5 s s s s tES s s 
On the other hand by definition of K.;;_b and the optimality of a in f: 
£K- - (~ ,b ) + r(s,~ ,b ) + l+a. l: p(tjs,i ,b ) .v* (f) < 
asbs s s s s tEs s s t 
r(s,; ,b ) + l+a. l: p(tjs,i ,b ) .vt*(r) 
s s tES s s 
* $ v (f) I 
s 
which in combination with (5.4.2) leads to a contradition. So fEUSVCSG(S). 
D 
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5.4.3. REMARK. If in theorem 5.4.2 we replace (p,oJE01 (f)x02 <rJ by 
(01 (r)x02 (r))c01 (r)x02 (r), and if Ko 0 on A xB is defined as 1 s 2s s s 
r ~ (a,b) -1 if bE02s and a!'Zql s 01s02s if aE0 1s and b\l02 s 
0 elsewhere, 
then a similar statement can be made. 
5.4.4. REMARK. Concerning m,n-matrix games it is not possible to construct 
for each element of P(JN ) xP(:N ) a matrix game, such that this element 
m n 
corresponds to the unique optimal actions. This follows at once from 
the dimension theorem for matrix games (see theorem A.1.11). If 
(p,a)EP(lNm) xP(lNn) is the unique saddle point for a matrix game, then p 
and a must have the same number of components unequal to zero. This 
means, that for action spaces A and B, where A=PONml and B=PONnl, m,nEJN, 
it is in general not possible to construct for each aEA and bEB a 
function K~b' where a and b are the unique optimal actions for the game 
<A,B, Ka:i/ and where additionally Kab has the affine property mentioned 
in remark 5.3.1. 
If and only if a and b, seen as elements of PONml and PONnl, have the 
same number of components unequal to zero, such a matrix game [K~b] 
exists. A procedure to carry out this construction can be found in 
Karlin (1959, p. 70). 
For fixed S, As and Bs, sES let USVCSG be the subset of SVCSG for which 
both players have a unique optimal stationary strategy. 
The next theorem is an immediate consequence of theorem 5.3.7 and the 
proof of it will be omitted. 
5.4.5. THEOREM. Let rkESVCSG, k=l,2, ... , such that li~--rk=r, with 
rEusvcsG. If p kEO 1 ( r k) and akEO 2 ( r k) I then li~-)<Ol =p and limk-+«> ak =a I 
where p and a respectively are the unique optimal stationary strategies 
of player 1 and player 2 in r. 
5.4.6. THEOREM (a). The restrictions of the maps 018 : SVCSG~A8 and 
02 : SVCSG""*B to the subset USVCSG are continuous maps for each sEs. s s 
(b) USVCSG is a dense subset of SVCSG. 
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PROOF. (a) follows from the fact that a single-valued map, which is upper 
semi-continuous in the multi-valued sense, is continuous. 
(b) Let rEsvcsG and E>O. we have to prove that there exists 
a fEusvcsG such that d(r,f"J<e:. Take (p,cr)E01 (r)x02 <r>. Then by theorem 
5.4.2 we can construct for any o>O a game rEUSVCSG which only differs from r 
in the payoff function: r(s,.,.) :=r(s,.,.)+OK· A (.,.).Obviously d(r,f)<E 
Ps0 s for ·o<o«E, which proves the theorem. 
Also for the next theorem the functions K· · are of valuable use. 
PsOs 
5.4.7. THEOREM. For fixed s, As and Bs, sEs the class of games USVCSG is 
connected if and only if As and Bs are connected for all sES. 
CJ 
PROOF. (a) First suppose that, say As is not connected. Then let Asl and As 2 
be two disjunct non-empty open subsets of As with As=As 1uAs2 . 
Let USk:={rlrEUSVCSG; 01s(r)CAsk} for k=l,2. It is obvious that USVCSG= 
us1uus2 and that us 1nus2=~. 
Further, us1 and us2 are open sets in USVCSG, because 0 1 and 02 are upper semi-
continuous multifunctions. 
If we can show that us 1 f~ and us2f~, then we have proved that USVCSG is not 
connected when As is not connected. This will prove the necessity part of 
the theorem. 
Take as1EAsl and as2EAs2 and bsEB. Let rk, k=l,2 be a stochastic game, 
which concerning states is defined as: rk(s,.,.) :=K. b. (.,.) and 
ask s 
pk(tls,a,b)=1 if t=s and pk(tls,a,b)=O if tfs. Define for the states 
unequal to s, rk in such a way that rkEUSVCSG. Then clearly rkEusk' k=1,2. 
So both us1 and us2 are non-empty. 
(b) Now, we suppose that the sets As and Bs, sES are .connected sets. 
Suppose that us 1 and us 2 are disjunct open subsets of USVCSG such that 
USVCSG=US1Uus2. 
If' we can show that us 1=~ or us2~, then this would imply that USVCSG is 
connected. First associate with each pair (p ,cr) €( X A ) x ( X B ) , where 
• • • . - • • sEs s sES s 
p=(a1,a2, ••• ) and O=(b1 ,b2 , ••• ), the game rpcr defined by 
r(s,a,b):=d(b,b )-d(a,a ), all (a,b)EA XB and p(tls,a,b) :=1 for t=s and 
s s s s 
p(tls,a,b)=O if tfs for all (a,b)EA xB and all s,tES. 
s s 
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It can be checked that rp0€USVCSG with value 0.11sl and that 01 (fp0)={p} 
and 02<r--)={o}. pCJ 
Let F: ( X A ) x ( X B ) +USVCSG be 
sEs s sEs s 
straightforward to show that 
II ,..., ,..., Rl Rl II F(p,CJ) - F(p,CJ) 
the map defined by F(p,CJ)=f • It is pCJ 
$ d<'P.~i + d(a,~i 
for all (p,cr) and (~ 1~) • Hence, F is a continuous map from the connected 
set (X €A )x(X ESB) into USVCSG. This implies that either r €us1 for s s s s s pCJ 
each p and CJ or r Eus2 for each p and CJ. PCJ 
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that 
Now take an arbitrary rEusvcsG. Let 01 (r)x02 Cr)={(p,cr)}. 
Define for each EE[0,1] the game r :=Ef+(l-E)r-- as r (s,a,b) :=E.r(s,a,b)+ 
E pCJ 
(1-E) (d(b,b )-d(a,a )) and p <tls,a,b) :=Ep(tJs,a,b)+(1-E)lit, where lit =1 
S S E S S 
if t=s and ots=O for t#s. 
Along the same lines as the proof of theorem 5.4.2 it now can be shown 
that 
* (i) fEEUSVCSG, (ii) pVal(fE)=E.V (r) and (iii) 01 (fE)x02 (fE)={(p,cr)}. 
Let FF: [0,1]+USVCSG be the map defined as FF(E) :=r , then FF(O)=f-- and E pCJ 
FF(l)=r. Furthermore 
llFF(E 1)-FF(E 2l II $ JE 1-E2 1 ( IJrll +1+sup ld(b,bs)-d(a,.is) 1+1) 
s,a,b 
for each E1 , E2E[0,1]. Hence Fis continuous. But since [0,1] is connected 
and F(O)Eus 1, it follows that F(1)Eus1• So rEus 1 . As rEusvcsG was arbitrary, 
this proves USVCSG=us 1• Hence us2=~, which completes the proof of the 
theorem. 
2.4.8. REMARK. The framework of the model, studied in this section is 
principally the stochastic game. However in the proofs of the theorems 
the dummy games stand central, i.e. two-person zerosum games in normal 
form. Clearly all the theorems of this section and those of the 
preceding one, also hold for the class of two-person zerosum games in 
normal form. So perhaps it would have been more logical if we had first 
[] 
deduced the results of these two sections for this class of games and 
next had extended them to stochastic games. Such an approach is chosen 
in Tijs & Vrieze (1980). However, since this monograph is concerned 
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primarily with stochastic games, we have chosen for the reverse approach. 
5.4.9. REMARK. The set USVCSG is not necessarily an open subset of SVCSG 
as the following example shows. Take a stochastic game with one state, 
with Al :=[0,1) and B1 :={1}. Then, for f defined by r(l,a,b)=a, 
p(111,a,b)=l, (a,b)EA1XB1 and aE(0, 00 ) Aarbitrarily we have rEUSVCSG. 
For each E>O, the E-neighbourhood of f contains the game f~E defined by 
r~E(l,a,b) :=min{a,1-~E}. Clearly f~E~USVCSG, hence USVCSG is not open. 
5.4.10. REMARK. Concerning matrix games, Bohnenblust, Karlin & Shapley 
(1950) proved, that the set Umn of those m,n-matrix games (m,nEJN), for 
which the mixed extension has a unique saddle point is an open and 
dense subset of the set Mmn of all m,n-matrix games. With some labour, 
one can prove that Umn is not connected for all (m,n)~(l,1). We will not 
do this here, but remark that for the case where (m,n)=(l,2) we have 
U 12 { [ r (1 , 1) r (1 , 2) ] I r (1 , 1 ) ~r (1 , 2) } 
= {[r(l,1) r(l,2)] !r(l,1)>r(l,2) }U 
{[r(l,1) r(l,2)] lr(l,l)<r(l,2) }. 
Note that this phenomenon is due to the fact mentioned in remark 5.4.4, 
namely the fact that not each point of the Cartesian product of the mixed 
action spaces can serve as a unique pair of optimal actions for some 
appropriate matrix game. 
Now consider the class of games SG(S,a) (i.e. finite state and action 
spaces). Let USG(S,a) be the subset of stochastic games, for which both 
players have a unique optimal stationary strategy. Now let fESG(S,a), 
with value v*(r). Then for each sES them ,n -matrix game [G (v*(r)J] has 
s s sa 
* value V (r). 
s 
By the above mentioned result (remark 5.4.10) of Bohnenblust, Karlin & 
Shapley, it follows that for each E>O, there exists a matrix game 
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[ ] * * . K EU n with value V (r), such that d {G {V (f)) ,K ) <£. Hence we may £ ms s s z sa £ 
write K (i,j)=r (s,i,j)+{l+a)-l i:: p(tls,i,j)vt*cn, where r (s,i,j), £ £ t=l £ (i,j)EA XB, can be chosen such that llr(s,.,.)-r {s,.,.) II<£. 
s s • £ 
But this means, that for the game r which follows from r by replacing r 
E: * by r(s,.,.) :=r£(s,.,.), it holds that v (f) is the solution of the set of 
. *· * • *· equations v =Val(G (v)), sES. So V {f )=V (f) and as [G (V (f ))]EU we 
• s sa • e: sa £ msns 
have r£EUSG{S,a). Moreover d(f,f£)<e:, which shows that the result of 
Bohnenblust, Karlin & Shapley can be extended to stochastic games. This 
fact is stated in the next theorem. 
5.4.11. THEOREM. The set USG{S,a) is an open and dense subset of SG(S,a). 
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6. Algorithms for discounted stochastic games. 
In this chapter some algorithms for solving finite two-person zerosum 
stochastic games are considered. In section 6.1 we give a brief survey of 
existing algorithms in this field. In section 6.2 we treat an extension 
to discounted stochastic games of the Brown-Robinson procedure of matrix 
games. Finally in section 6.3 an algorithm for a subclass of stochastic 
games is presented, namely the class of games for which in each state only 
one of the players governs the transitions, although not necessarily in 
each state the same player. 
6.1. SOME ALGORITHMS. 
In the first place we mention the algorithm which in a natural way 
arises from Shapley's proof of the existence of the value of a discounted 
stochastic game (cf. Shapley (1953)). This algorithm can be seen as the 
standard method of successive approximation. 
6.1.1. ALGORITHM (Shapley) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
and 
z Choose v0E:JR arbitrarily, T:=O 
v<+l (s) ·=Val(G(v)) SCI. T 
'( T T '( '( T Choose p =(p 1 , •.. ,pz) and o =(o 1 , ••• ,oz) such that for each sES: 
z 
v<+l (s) min {r(s,p',j) jr:B s 
+ ~- ~ p(tJs,p',j)v (t)} 
l+a t=l s < 
s 
vT+l (s) = max 
iE:A 
s 
T '( 
Hence P 5 and o 5 
z 
{ r ( s, i, o') + 1 +a ;;; p ( t J s, i, cr T) . v ( t) } . 
S t=l S T 
a.re optimal in [G (v )]. 
SCI. T 
(iv) T := <+1, go to step (ii). 
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From the contraction property of the value operator one can derive for this 
algorithm that 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
lim v T T->-00 
V (µ,OT) 
V(p T ,v) 
m 
-'[ 
v + 
T Cl 
* v 
s v 
:2: v 
. 1 
z 
(f) 
1 -
+ - m .1 T Cl T z 
+_!_m.1 
T Cl -T 
* s v (f) 
z 
s v 
T 
for all µEST l and all T 
for all vEsT 2 and all T 
m 
T 
+ a "1z' for all T, 
where m :=max {v (s)-v 1 (s)} and m :=min {v (s)-v 1 (s)}. T sES T T- -T sEs T T-
Hence v approximates the value of the game and for each £>0, pT and oT are 
T 
£-optimal stationary strategies for T large enough. The algorithm is 
stopped as soon as the bounds in (d) are tight enough. 
The second algorithm we describe, is the discounted version of the 
algorithm of Hoffman & Karp (1966). Originally they presented their 
algorithm for average reward stochastic games, but their procedure 
can also be applied to discounted stochastic games. 
6.1.2. ALGORITHM (Hoffman & Karp). 
(i) z Choose v 0EIR arbitrarily, T:=O. 
(ii) T Determine .for player 2 a stationary strategy o EssT2, such that 
OT is optimal in [G (v )] for each sES. 
S 00 T 
(iii) Solve for player 1 the Markov decision problem which results 
T 
when player 2 fixes o (see theorem 3. 4). 
Let vT+l be the optimal value of MDP(oT). 
(iv) T ·= T+1, go to step (ii). 
This algorithm is a generalization of Howard's policy iteration method 
(1960), combined however with successive approximation ideas. So it can be 
seen as value oriented policy iteration. The way in which this algorithm 
approximates the value of the game and produces £-optimal stationary 
strategies is given by the following properties (cf. Van der Wal (1977)). 
* (a) lim v = V (r) 
(b) 
(c) 
T 
m 
Val(G (v )) + -'l: .1 
sa T Cl z 
* m $ V (f) $ Val(G (v )) + __.!_, sES 
S SCI T Cl 
where m :=min {Val(G (v ))-v (s)} and m :=max {Val(G (v ))-v (s)}. 
-'[ sES SCI T T T sEs SCI T T 
-T -T -T -T If p and a are such that for each sEs, ps and as are optimal 
actions for player 1 and player 2 respectively in the matrix game 
(G (v )], then pTand GT are £-optimal stationary strategies if 
SCI T 
m -m $£.Cl. 
T -'T 
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We now mention the algorithm of Pollatschek & Avi-Itzhak (1969), which can 
be seen as a straightforward generalisation of Howard's policy iteration 
method. 
6.1.3. ALGORITHM (Pollatschek & Avi-Itzhak). 
(i) 
(1.·i·) . t . t t . T ( T T) d T ( T OT) Deterll!.1.ne s ationary s ra egies p = p 1 , •.. ,pz an a= 0 1 , ••. , z 
(iii) 
(iv) 
such that for each sES, PT and oT are optimal actions in the 
s s 
matrix game [G (v )]. 
SCI T 
T T Put VT+l :=V(p ,a). 
T := T+l and go to step (ii). 
Pollatschek & Avi-Itzhak have shown that their algorithm always converges 
to the solution of the game if the following condition holds: 
z 
max l: (max p(tls,i,j -min p(tjs,i,j)). <Cl, 
sEs t=l i,j a,b 
with Cl the interest rate. Further for C1>2 (or discount factor 13<1/3) the 
algorithm always converges for any transition map. 
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Pollatschek & Avi-Itzhak noticed in their paper that their algorithm may 
also converge under less restrictive conditions. Rao, Chandrasekaran & Nair 
(1973) claimed that the algorithm 6.1.3 always converges, but their proof 
is incorrect and an example provided by Van der Wal (1977) shows that the 
proof cannot be repaired. 
Van der Wal (1977) presented a set of algorithms depending on an 
integer :\EJNU{ 00 }. It turns out that for :\=1 the corresponding algorithm 
coincides with Shapley's algorithm and for ;\=00 the algorithm of Hoffman & 
Karp is obtained. 
6.1.4. ALGORITHM (;\) (Van der Wal). 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
z Choose v 0 EJR arbitrarily, T:=O. 
Determine for player 2 a stationary 
that oT is an optimal action in the 
s 
each sEs. 
T T T 
strategy o =(o 1 , ... ,oz) such 
matrix game [Gc,JvT)] for 
Put :\ vT+l :=ML T(vT), where ML;\ is the ;\th iterate of the map T 
ML 
T 
0 
z z 
:JR +JR 
T 
Ci 
(ML (v )) 
T T S 
0 
0 
defined by 
z 
·= max {r(s,i,oT) + l: p(tls,i,oT).v (t)} 
l+a t=l T iEA 
s 
T+l and go to step (ii). 
Van der Wal (1977) has shown that the properties (a)-(e) mentioned below 
algorithm 6.1.2, hold for every algorithm (;\), :\EJNU{ 00 }. 
Van der Wal extensively studied generalizations of the method of 
successive approximation. For that purpose he introduced the 
concept of stopping times in stochastic games. We refer for further details 
to Van der Wal (1981). 
Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981) considered the class of games for 
which one player governs the transitions. For this special case they 
proved the orderfield property, i.e. the property that the value of the 
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game and the extreme optimal stationary strategies of both players lie 
in the same Archimedean field as the game parameters. This result holds as 
well for discounted stochastic games as for average reward games. 
For discounted stochastic games they proposed the following linear 
programming algorithm, which is in fact a finite algorithm. It is assumed 
that in each state the transition probabilities are controlled by player 2. 
6.1.5. ALGORITHM (Parthasarathy & Raghavan). 
z 
max l: v 
s=1 s 
z 
subject to l: r(s,i,j).xs(i)+ l+c:t l: p(tls,j).vt2v, jEB, sES 
iEA t=1 s s 
s 
l: 
iEA 
s 
x (i)=l, 
s 
Note that the NLP 4.4.1 reduces to this LP problem when p(tls,i,j) is 
independent of i. 
sEs. 
Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981) proved that an optimal solution (v*,x*) 
to this LP corresponds to a solution of the stochastic game, in the sense 
* * * * that v is the value of the game and p defined as ps(i)=xs(i) proves to be 
an optimal stationary strategy for player 1. An optimal stationary strategy 
for player 2 can be obtained by solving the dual program of the above LP. 
6.2. FICTITIOUS PLAY AS AN ITERATIVE METHOD FOR SOLVING DISCOUNTED 
STOCHASTIC GAMES. 
Brown (1949;1951) suggested a method, called fictitious play, for 
solving a matrix game. Robinson (1950) proved the validity of that method, 
while Shapiro (1958) provided for the Brown-Robinson scheme an a priori 
estimate of the rate of convergence. 
Extensions of the Brown-Robinson method to infinite zerosum games 
are given in Danskin (1954) and Van den Akker (1976), while Miyasawa 
(1961) studied an extension to 2x2-bimatrix games. Shapley (1964) has given 
examples showing that the natural generalization of the Robinson theorem 
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to arbitrary bimatrix games is not valid. A systematic study of this 
phenomenon was done by Rosenmuller (1971) • 
The method of fictitious play of Brown and Robinson can be seen as 
an infinite stage learning process associated with a matrix game [K]. Here 
at each stage the players choose a pure action which, among the pure 
actions, is a best answer with respect to the collection of past choices 
of the other player. 
The purpose of this section is to extend the ideas of Brown and 
Robinson to discounted stochastic games. However before we can do so, we 
first study the consequences of fictitious play applied to a situation in 
which the matrix game [K] is not exactly known in advance, but where at 
each decision epoch T an aoproximation [K ] is given such that lim K =K. 
- T T._ T 
This investigation is of independent interest, as it will appear that 
fictitious play can be used for a converging sequence of matrix games. 
Next we describe an iterative method for solving a discounted stochastic 
game with finite state and action spaces. 
The results of this section are distilled from Vrieze & Tijs (1982). 
Now let us consider a converging sequence K1 ,K2 ,K3 , ••• of m,n-matrices 
with lim KT=K, i.e. lim rT(i,j)=r(i,j) for all (i,j)EJNmxJNn. In the 
T._ T._ 
following we denote by T(e), for any e>O, the smallest integer such that 
(6.2.1) lr (i,j)-r(i,j) I ~ e, 
T 
all (i,j) and all T~T(e) 
we also use the following notation. 
k . 
For a vector x=(x1 ,x2 , .•. ,~)ElR, max{x1 , ••• ,xk} is denoted by max(x) and 
min{x1 , •.• ,xk} by min(x). Note that in this setting for a matrix K the 
value of the matrix game [K] equals 
Val(K) max min(pT.K) 
pEP(JN l 
m 
min max (K.cr) • 
crEP (JN l 
n 
C~ and Cj denote the j-th column of KT and K respectively; similarly R~ and 
Ri denote the i-th row. 
Furthermore, let M:=sup{ lr (i,j) I I (i,j)EJN x:N , TEJN}. 
T m n 
6.2.1. DEFINITION. We call a pair of sequences 
x(O), x(l), x(2), 
y(O), y(l) I y(2), 
a vector system for the sequence K1 , K2 , K3 , ••. if 
(vl) min (x (0)) = max (y (0)) 
and if for each TEJN 
(v2) i (T) x(T) :=x(T-l)+RT , where i(T)EJNm satisfies yi(T) (T-1) 
max (y (T-1)) 
(v3) 
. (T) 
y(T) :=y(T-l)+C~ , where j (T)EJNn satisfies xj (T) (T-1) 
min(x(T-1)). 
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It will be obvious how such a vector system can be formed recursively 
from given x(O) and y(O) satisfying (vl). 
We wish to show that 
-1 lim T max(y(T)) 
T-+«> 
lim T-l min(x(T)) 
T-+«> 
Val(K). 
In proving this, we proceed as far as possible along the same lines as in 
Robinson (1950), who studied the situation in which K =K for each T. 
T 
6.2.2. LEMMA. 
lim sup T-l min(x(T)) s Val(K) 
T-7<0 
-1 
slim inf T max(y(T)). 
T-+<x> 
PROOF. Take £>0 and k>T(E). Then 
x(k) 
k 
x(T(E))+ l: i(T) k i(T) R Sx(T(E))+ l: R +£.(k-T(E)).1 
T=T(£)+1 T T=T (£)+1 n 
Let p (k,i) be the number of times that action iEJNm appears in the sequence 
i(T(E)+l), i(T(£)+2), ... ,i(k). 
-1 
Then p(k)=(k-T(E)) (p(k,1), ... ,p(k,m)) is a mixed action for player 1 in 
the matrix game [K] and furthermore 
(6.2.2) pT(k).K -1 k i(T) (k-T(E)) . L R . 
T=T(E)+l 
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Hence 
x(k) $ X(T(E))+(k-T(E)).pT(k).K+E(k-T(E)).1 1 
n 
which implies that: 
-1 -1 -1 T k min(x(k))$k max(x(T(E)))+k (k-T(E))min(p (k).K)+ 
-1 Ek (k-T (£)) 
-1 -1 -1 $k max(x(T(E)))+k (k-T(E)).Val(K)+Ek (k-T(E)). 
-1 Hence, lim supk->«>k min(x(k))SVal(K)+E for each E>O, from which the first 
inequality in the lemma follows. 
The second inequality can be proved analogously. 
0 
6.2.3. DEFINITION. If <x(T),y(T); TEJN0> is a vector system for the sequence 
of matrices K1 ,K2 ,K3 , •.. , then the i-th pure action of player 1 is said 
to be eligible for the vector system in the interval [T,T'] when there 
exists a T1E[T,T'] such that yi (T 1 )=rnax(y(T 1)). Eligibility of a pure 
action j for player 2 is defined analogously. 
6. 2. 4. LEMMA. If for k, TEJN all pure actions of both players are eligible 
in [k,k+T], then 
max(x(k+T))-min(x(k+T)) $ 2TM 
max(y(k+T))-min(y(k+T)) $ 2TM. 
PROOF. The lemma follows by modifying in an obvious way the proof of lemma 
2 in Robinson (1950), using the definition of M. 
6.2.5. LEMMA. If, for given k~T(E) all pure actions of both players are 
eligible in [k,k+T], then 
(6.2.3) max(y(k+T))-min(x(k+T)) $ 4TM+2E(k+T)+2MT(E). 
0 
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PROOF. In view Of lemma 6.2.4. 
(6.2.4) max(y(k+T))-min(x(k+T)) s 4TM+min(y(k+T))-max(x(k+T)). 
Let p(k+T) be the mixed action for player 1, as defined in the proof of 
lemma 6.2.2. The inequality (cf. (6.2.2)) 
x(k+T) ~ x(T(e:))+(k+T-T(e:)) .pT(k+T) .K-e:(k+T-T(e:)) .1 
n 
then implies, 
(6.2.5) max(x(k+T)) ~ min(x(T(e:)))+(k+T-T(e:))Val(KT)-e:(k+T-T(e:)) 
where KT is the transpose of the matrix K. 
Similarly, one can show that 
(6.2.6) min(y(k+T)) $ max(y(T(e:)))+(k+T-T(e:))Val(KT)+e:(k+T-T(e:)). 
Note further, that by (v1) and the definition of M, 
(6.2. 7) max(y(T(e:)))-min(x(T(e:))) s 2MT(e:). 
Combining the inequalities (6.2.4)-(6.2.7) yields the assertion of the 
lemma. 
For a matrix K we denote by K-i the matrix, which is obtained from K 
by deleting the i-th row. K-j is the matrix obtained from K by deleting 
a 
the j-th column. When writing K-t it will be clear from the context whether 
t is an action of player 1 (delete row t) or an action of player 2 (delete 
column t). 
m -i For a vector y=Cy1,y2, ••• ,ym)ElR, let y be the vector 
(yl' ••• ,yi-1 'Yi+1' •.. ,ym). 
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6.2.6. LEMMA. Let <x(T) ,y(T); TEJN0 > be a vector system for the sequence 
K1 ,K2 ,K3 , ••. of m,n-matrices, converging to K. Suppose that, in the 
interval [k,k+T], pure action i of player 1 is not eligible for the 
vector system. For TE{0,1, ••• ,T}, let 
X 1 (T) -i ·= x(k+T)+(max(y(k))-min(x(k))).1n and y'(T)=y (k+T). 
Then <x'(T),y'(T); TE{0,1, ..• ,T}>is the first part of a vector sys-tem 
. -i -i -i for the converging sequence of m-1,n-matrices ~+l'~+2 '~+3 , ... · 
Furthermore 
- -max(y(k+T))-min(x(k+T)) (max(y' (rJJ-min(x' tTJ))+ 
(max (y (k)) -min (x (k))) • 
PROOF. Obviously, min(x' (O))=max(y' (0)), since pure action i is not eligible 
at k. Because <x(T),y(T) >is a vector system and i is not eligible in 
(k,k+T], we have for i'(T)=i(k+T)E{1, ••. ,i-1,i+1, ••• ,m} and j'(T)=j(k+T)E:Wn' 
and TE{1, •.. ,T}, that: 
i 1 (T) 
x(k+T)=x(k+T-l)+R , k+T yi' (T) (k+T-1)=max(y{k+T-1)) 
•I (T) 
y(k+T)=y(k+T-l)+C] , 
k+T xj' (T) (k+T-l)=min(x(k+T-1)) 
These inequalities imply for TE{l, •.• ,T}: 
i 1 (T) 
x' (T)=x' (T-l)+R-
k+T 1 
Y I {T) = y' (T-1) +Cj 1 (T) 
k+T 1 
Yj_, (T) (T-1)=max(y' (T-1)) 
xj I (T) (T-1)=min(x' (T-1)) 
Consequently the first assertion in the lemma is proved. 
Furthermore 
- -
max (y (k+T)) -min (x (k+T)) =max (y' (T)) - (min (x' (T)) - (max (y {k)) -
min (x (k)))) , 
which finishes the proof. 
D 
Analogously one can formulate ·a "player 2 version" of lemma 6.2.6, 
involving a non-eligible action j of player 2. Both versions will be used 
in the proof of the following lemma. 
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6.2.7. LEMMA. Let K1,K2 ,K3 , ••• be a converging sequence of matrices and let 
E>O. Then there exists a non-negative real number T(E) such that for each 
k€:JN0 and each vector system < x ( t) , y ( T) ; t€:JN0> of the sequence 
~+l'~+2 '~+3 , ••• we have: 
max(y(T))-min(x(T)) s ET for all t~T(E). 
PROOF. The lemma is proved by induction with respect to the size of the 
matrices (the number of rows plus the number of columns) under consideration. 
For sequences of 1,1-matrices (of size 2) we can take T(E)=O, since 
y(t)=x(t)€1R for all tElN0 • 
Now suppose that the statement is true for converging sequences of 
m,fi-matrices, with size m+il<m+n. 
Let K1,K2 ,K3 , ••• be a converging sequence of m,n-matrices and let E>O. 
By applying the induction hypothesis to the finite number of converging 
-i -i -i -j -j -j . . 
sequences K1 ,K2 ,K3 , ••• , iElNm and K1 ,K2 ,K3 , .•. , JElNn of size m+n-1, 
we may conclude that there exists a T(E) such that for ~ach ~EJN0 .and each 
-J. -J. -J. 
of the sequences ~+l'~+2 '~+3 , ••• vector system <x' (t) ,y' (T) > for any 
-j -j -j 
or ~+l'~+2 '~+3 we have 
(6.2.8) max y' (T)-min x' (T) S Et for all T~T (E). 
Take a k€JN0 and an arbitrary vector system <x(T) ,y(T); t€JN0 >for 
~+l'~+2 '~+3 , ...• Let t~t(E)+T(E). Then there is a hEJN and qE[0,1), 
such that T=T(E)+(h+q) .T(E). 
We distinguish two cases. 
Case 1. Suppose that there is an integer h€{1,2, ••• ,h} such that all 
actions of both players are eligible in the interval 
[T(E)+(q+h-l)T(E),T(E)+(q+h)T(E)]. Leth be the largest integer in 
{1,2, ••. ,h} with this property. 
Then in each interval [T(E)+(q+d-1)T(E),t(E)+(q+d)T(E)] with dE{h+1, ••• ,h} 
at least one action for one of the players is not eligible. Repeated 
application of lemma 6.2.6 with respect to these h-h intervals yields 
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in view of (6.2.8): 
(6.2.9) max(y(T))-min(x(T)) (max (y (T (E) + (q+h) .T (E)) )-
min(x(T (E)+ (q+h) .T(E))) )+ (h-h) .E.T(E). 
Since all actions are eligible in the interval [T(E)+(q+h-1)T(E),T(£)+ 
(q+h) .T(E)], the first term in the right hand side of (6.2.9) is by lemma 
6.2.5 at most 
4T (£) .M+2E (T (£) + (q+h) T (E)) +2MT (E) ~ 2ET+4T (E) .M+2MT (E). 
And the second term is at most ET. Hence 
max (y (T)) -min (x (T)) ~ 3ET+y 
where y=M(4T(e:)+2T(E)). Consequently 
(6. 2.10) max(y(T))-min(x(T)) ~ 4ET, if T ~ max{T(E)+T(E), s- 1y} 
Case 2. If there is no such an integer hwith the property described 
in case 1, then lemma 6.2.6 (and its player 2 version) can be applied h 
times, yielding in view of (6.2.8): 
- -max(y(T))-min(x(T)) ~ max(y(T(E)+qT(E))}-min(x(T(s)+qT(E)))+ 
h£T(£) ~ 2M(T(£)+T(E))+ET ~ ET+y. 
- 1 -1 This implies for T~max{T(E)+T(s), r y} that 
(6.2.11) max(y(T))-min(x(T)) ~ 4ET. 
Combining the two cases we have by (6.2.10) and (6.2.11): 
max(y(T))-min(x(T)) ~ 4ET for all T~T(4s), 
- -1 
when we take T(4£)=max{T(£)+T(£) ,£ y}. This completes the proof of the 
induction step, since T(4£) does not depend on k and on the vector system 
<x(T) ,y(T); TEJN0>. 
we now can state the main result of this section. 
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D 
6.2.8. THEOREM. Let K1 ,K2 ,K3 , ... be a sequence of matrices with limT __ KT=K. 
Then for each vector system <x (T) ,y(T); TEJN0> of this sequence, we have 
-1 lim T max(y(T)) 
T->= 
lim T-l min (x(T)) 
T->= 
Val(K). 
PROOF. The proof is a direct consequence of lemmas 6.2.2 and 6.2.7. 
For a vector system <x(T),y(T); TEJN0> of the sequence K1 ,K2 ,K3 , ••. 
converging to K, let for each TEJN p(T) and cr(T) be the mixed actions of 
players 1and2 respectively for which TP (T ,i) equals the number of times 
i appears in i(1),i(2), •.. ,i(T) and Tcr(T,j) equals the number of times 
j appears in j (1) ,j (2), ••. ,j {T). 
6.2.9. THEOREM. Each limit point of the sequence p(1),p(2),p(3), ... is an 
optimal mixed action of player in the matrix game [K]. Each limit 
point of 0(1),0(2),o(J), .•• is optimal for player 2 in [KL 
PROOF. We only prove the first assertion. Let p be a limit point of 
p(1),p(2),p(3), •... Without loss of generality, we suppose that 
lim p(T)=p. 
T->= 
(Otherwise consider a properly chosen subsequence). 
Let £>0 and let T>T{£). Then 
X(T) x (0) Ti£) i(k) T i (k) + 
k=l ~ + l: ~ k=T(£)+1 
T Ri(k) 5'. x (0) + l: + 2MT{£).1 + £ ( T -T ( £) ) . 1 
k=l n n 
-T 2MT {£) .1 + £ ( T-T ( £) ) . 1 . x(O) + T.P (T) .K + 
n n 
By taking limits we get 
1 ~T lim ,- min(x(T)) 5'. min(p .K)+£ for each £>0. 
T->= 
D 
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But then by theorem 6.2.8 
~T 
Val(K) ~ min(p .K) ~ Val(K) 
Consequently, p is optimal for player 1 in the matrix game [K]. 
0 
6.2.10. REMARK. If the sequence K1 ,K2 ,K3 , ... converges to a matrix K with 
[K]Eu (see remark 5.4.10), then the sequences p(l),p(2),p(3), ... and 
mn 
o(l),o(2),o(3), ... as defined above converge and the limits equal the 
unique optimal actions in the game [K]. 
Now we return to stochastic games. In the remainder of this section 
* a stochastic game fESG(S,a) is supposed to be fixed and let V be the 
value of this game. 
First we recall the notation [G v)] for vE1R2 , which has been defined as 
sa 
the matrix game, where the (i,j)-th entry is equal to 
r(s,i,j)+(1+a)-lLz 1p<t[s,i,j)vt. Then pT.G (v) for psEP(As) is defined t= s sa 
as the vector in JRn whose j-th coordinate equals 
z 
r(s,ps,j) + l+a L p(tJs,ps,j)vt. 
t=l 
Analogously for a mixed action a EP(B) of player 2 the vector G (v).o is 
s s sa s 
defined. 
For iEAs, ei denotes the element ps of P(As) with ps(i)=l and ps(i)=O, 
i~i. Similarly, e.EP(B ) is defined. As we always use the notation i for an 
J s 
action of player 1 and the notation j for an action of player 2, no 
confusion will arise. Then e~.G (v) 
i sa 
G (v).e. equals the j-th column of 
sa J 
we now describe the algorithm 
equals the i-th row of G (v) and 
sa 
G (v). 
sa 
for the discounted stochastic game. In 
the algorithm the following sequences are recursively defined. 
V(O), v (1), V (2) f ... E JRZ 
x(s,0), X (s, 1) I X (s,2) f ns ... E JR. , sES 
y(s,O), y (s, 1), y(s,2), ms ... E JR , sEs 
p s (0), p s (1), PS (2) I E P(As), sEs 
as (0), as ( 1), OS (2) 1 E P(Bs), sEs. 
6.2.11. ALGORITHM. 
(i) Choose x(s,0) and y(s,0) such that 
roin (x (s,0)) roax(y(s,0)) and roin(y(s,0)) 
Put Vs(O) := roax(y(s,0)), sEs. 
* 2: v I 
s 
sES. 
Choose p (OJEP(A ) and cr (OJEP(B ) arbitrarily, sES, T:=O. 
s s s s 
(ii) Take for each sES 
and 
i (s,T)EAs such that y, ( ) (s,T-1) 
J. S,T 
j (s,T)EBs such that x. ( ) (s,T-1) J S 1 T 
(iii) Set for each sES 
roax (y (s, T-1)) 
roin (x (s,T-1)). 
-1 V (T) := roin{roax (T y(s,T-1)), V (T-1)} 
s s 
x(s,T) T · = x ( s, T-1) +e. ( ) . G (V ( T) ) 
i s,T sa 
y(s,T) ·= y(s,T-l)+G (V(T)) .e. ( ) 
sa J s,T 
( T -1 ) . p ( T) +e . ( ) 
PS (T) ·= 
S J. S,T 
T 
(T-1) .cr (T) +e. ( ) 
G (T) ·= S J s, 1 
s 1 
(iv) 1 ·= 1+1 and go to step (ii). 
we next show the following theorems. 
6.2.12. THEOREM. For each sES: 
-1 lim 1 max(y(s,1)) -1 liro 1 min(x(s,1)) 
1-7-00 1-+«> 
liro v (1) 
s 
* v . 
s 
6.2.13. THEOREM. For each sEs let p5 be a limit point of the sequence 
p (1),p (2),p (3), ••• and 0 a limit point of G (1),cr (2),G (3), ••• 
s s s s - s s s 
Then p=(p 1 , ... ,p 2 ) and O=(o 1 , ... ,cr2 ) are optimal stationary strategies 
for player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
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To prove these theorems, we need the following lemma. 
6.2.14. LEMMA. lim V(T) exists. 
T-><x> 
PROOF. By definition of Vs(T), for each sES, the sequence 
Vs(O),Vs(1),Vs(2), ..• is decreasing. Hence, we have only to show 
that the sequence is bounded from below. We prove by induction that for 
each TEJN0 
(6. 2 .12) * V (T) 2 V 
s s 
for each sEs. 
For T=O we have 
v (0) 
s 
* max(y(s,0)) 2 min(y(s,0)) 2 Vs for each sEs. 
* Suppose now that V s ( T )2 V s for all T5k and all sES, where kEJN. Then 
k 
y(s,k) y(s,0) + I: G (V(T)).e.( ) 
T=l SCI. J S,T 
k 
* * 2 V + I: G (V ) • e . ( ) . 
S T=l SCI. J s, T 
For the mixed action crs(k), we have (see also (6.2.2)) 
k 
* * I: G (V ) .e. ( ) 
T=l SCI. J S 1 T 
k. G (V ) • a (k) • 
SCI. S 
Consequently , 
* * max (y (s,k)) 2 V + k max(G (V ).cr (k)); 
S SCI. S 
but the seond term in the right hand side of this inequality is at least 
* k.Vs by theorem 4.2.4. Hence 
v (k+1) 
s 
-1 
min{max((k+l) y(s,k)),V (k)} 2 
s 
for each sES. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
* min{V ,V (k)} 
s s 
[] 
PROOF of theorem 6.2.12.Take sEs. Let V=lim V(T). This limit exists in T-t<>o 
view of lemma 6.2.14. 
For TEN, let [K {T)] be them ,n -matrix game [G (V(T))]. 
S S S SCI. 
Then lim K (T) exists by lemma 6.2.14 and equals K :=G (V). T-t<>o S S SCI. 
It is obvious that <x{s,T) ,y(s,T); TEJN0 > is a vector system for the 
sequence Ks(l),Ks{2),Ks(3), .... Hence by theorem 6.2.8 we have 
-1 lim T max(y(s,T)) 
T-t<>o 
-1 lim T min(x(s,T)) 
T-t<>o 
Val(K). 
s 
Taking the limit in the definition of V (T) and using the above equality 
s 
we obtain 
v 
s 
min{Val(K ),V} or V ~ Val(K) 
s s s s 
Val (G (V)). 
SCI. 
This inequality holds for each sES. From lemma 4.2.3 we then infer that 
- * V~V . Conversely from the proof of lemma 6.2.14, we obtain 
- * - * * V=limT._V(T)2:V . So V=V • This implies by theorem 4.2.4 that Val(Gsa(V ))= 
Val(K )=V*, which proves theorem 6.2.12. 
s s 
PROOF of theorem 6.2.13. By theorem 6.2.9, p and a are optimal mixed 
* s s 
actions in the matrix game [K ]=[G (V )] for player 1 and player 2 
s sa 
respectively. This holds for each sEs. The theorem follows now from 
theorem 4.2.4. 
* 6.2.15. REMARK. The vectors V(T) of the algorithm approximate V from 
above. If one wants also an approximation from below, then one can modify 
the iteration procedure in the following way. Start with vectors x(s,O), 
y(s,O) and V~(O) with 
and define 
V' (0) 
s 
V' (T) 
s 
min (x (s,0)) max(y(s,0)) * ~ v 
s 
-1 
:= max{min(T x(s,T)), V' (T-1) }, 
s 
sES. 
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D 
D 
* Then [v• (T), V (T)] is an estimation interval around Vs whose length shrinks s s 
to zero, when T increases to infinity. 
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6.2.16. REMARK. In section 5.4 we had defined by USG(S,a) the class of 
stochastic games with state space S and interest rate a and for which 
both players have a unique optimal stationary strategy. From theorem 
4.4.11 we have seen that USG(S,a) is an open and dense subset of SG(S,a). 
For games belonging to the class USG(S,a) we can sharpen theorem 6.2.13 
as follows (cf. remark 6.2.10). 
If I'EUSG(S,a), then the sequences p(t)=(pl (t), ••• ,pz(t)) and 
cr(t)=(cr 1 (t), ••• ,crz(t)), t€JN converge to the unique optimal stationary 
strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
6.2.17. REMARK. Consider a stochastic game for which in each state one 
player, say player 2, is a dummy, i.e. B ={1} for each sEs. Then the 
s 
resulting problem constitutes a Markov decision problem. 
Without loss of generality we may suppose that all payoffs are negative. 
m 
Take y(s,O)=Om ElR s and x(s,O)=OElR. 
s 
Then the algorithm yields (T~1): 
where Vt(T) 
This scheme 
-1 Vs(t) = max(t y(s,t-1)) 
-1 1 z 
T yi (s,t) = r(s,i,1) + l+a L p(tjs,i,1).Vt(t), i€{1, ••• ,m} 
t=l s 
-1 T 
T L Vt(k). 
h k=l. 'l . s ows simi arity with the successive approximation method for 
solving Markov decision problems (cf. Howard (1960)), but the convergence 
rate may be slower. 
In Markov decision theory, the following scheme is used: 
V (T) 
s 
-1 T max(y(s,t)) 
-1 
T Yi (s,t) 
z 
r(s,i)+ Lp(tjs,i).V (t-1), iE{1, .•. ,m} 
l+a t=l t s 
which assures a geometric rate of convergence. 
In a similar way as for that algorithm, it can be shown for our algorithm 
when applied on Markov decision problems, that for t sufficiently large 
only actions i(s,t) are chosen for which p(t)=(i(l,1), .•. ,i(z,1)) is an 
optimal stationary strategy. Moreover, if we change our iteration scheme 
somewhat by taking 
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V (T) 
s 
-1 
·=min{max(T y(s,T-1)),V (T-1),max(G (V(T-1)).e.( ))}, 
s sa J s,T 
then, in applications to Markov decision problems our algorithm and the above 
mentioned algorithm for Markov decision problems give the same iteration 
scheme. 
For stochastic games where player 1 has an optimal pure stationary 
strategy, this modification of the iteration scheme also gives an 
improvement of the convergence rate. In that case the convergence rate 
becomes geometric. For general stochastic games no improvement may be 
expected. 
6.2.18. REMARK. Shapiro (1958) obtained an a priori estimate of the 
-1/(m+n+2) 
convergence rate of 0(T ) of the Brown-Robinson scheme for 
solving an m,n-matrix game. 
In a similar way as Shapiro did, we can prove for a stochastic game that 
for each sES 
-1 -1 
max(T y(s,T))-min(T x(s,T)) 
where M =(a+l)a-1 max r (s,i,j). 
a 
s,i,j 
Hence, in spite of the fact, that during the iteration also the limit 
matrix is approximated, the a priori convergence rate is no worse than 
in the Brown-Robinson procedure. This shows that our algorithm may be a 
competitor of the usual successive approximation algorithms (cf. section 
6.1). The next table indicates that the possibilities of our iteration 
scheme are better than the possibilities of the Brown-Robinson procedure 
of being a competitor of linear programming in solving a matrix game. 
Namely our iteration scheme needs z times the number of computations 
of the Brown-Robinson procedure, while the successive approximation method 
needs z times the numberof iterations times the number of computations 
of solving an LP problem. 
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LP/succ.approx. Brown-Robinson/our algorithm 
matrix game to solve at each step to compute the 
1 dual pair of LP maximum of an m-vector 
of size m,n problems and the minimum of an 
of size m,n n-vector 
stochastic game at each step, to solve at each step to compute the 
of size m s'ns a dual pair of LP maximum of an m -vector and s 
in state s, problems the minimum of an n -vector 
s 
sE{1, ... ,z} of size m ,n , 
s s 
for all sE { 1, ... , z}. 
for each sE { 1, .•• , z} 
6.2.19. REMARK. The algorithm can also be applied when we are dealing with a 
stochastic game which is not exactly known in advance, but for which at 
each stage TE:JN an approximation <rT,pT,aT> is given, with 
lim <rT,pT,aT>=<r,p,a>. 
T-+«> 
At stage T the approximation <r1 ,p1 ,aT> should be used. Also in this case 
the algorithm will converge to the value of the game <r,p,ci>. Furthermore, 
taking limits, optimal stationary strategies for both players are obtained. 
The reason why also in this case the algorithm can be applied, is due 
to the fact that the value function on SG(S,a) is a continuous one 
(theorem 4.3.4) and the fact that the multifunctions 01 and 02 are upper 
semi-continuous on SG(S,a) (cf. theorem 4.3.8). 
6.3.3. A FINITE ALGORITHM FOR THE DISCOUNTED SWITCHING CONTROL STOCHASTIC 
GAME. 
In this section we describe an algorithm for the switching control 
stochastic game, i.e. a game for which in each state only one of the players 
governs the transitions, where not necessarily in each state the same player 
governs the transition. This model is an extension of the model of 
Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981). They considered stochastic games for which 
in each state the same player governs the transitions. 
The algorithm presented here, consists of a finite sequence of linear 
progranuning problems. The linear programs involved in each step, correspond 
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to the linear program of algorithm 6. 1. 5 which solves a "one player control" 
stochastic game. 
In proving that this algorithm yields the value and optimal stationary 
strategies for the both players the orderfield property arises in a natural 
way. The validity of the orderfield property for this model is first shown 
by Filar (1981). 
Further, in the proof the matrix lemma of Parthasarathy & Raghavan 
(1981) plays a crucial role. 
6.3.1. DEFINITION. A discounted switching control stochastic game is a game 
r for which in each state sES either 
(1) p(tls,i,j)=p(tls,i,j) for all (j,j)EB XB , all tES and iEA 
s s s 
or 
(2) p(tls,i,j)=p(tls,i,jl for all (i,i)EA xA , all tES and jEB 
s s s 
In case (1) we say that player 1 controls the transitions and in case 
(2) player 2 controls the transitions. 
The transition probabilities for a state s where player 1 (player 2) 
controls them are denoted by p(t ls,i) (p(tls,j)). 
The set of states where player 1 (player 2) controls the transitions 
is denoted by s 1 (S2 ). 
Before we give the algorithm, we investigate what happens if a player 
fixes the part of a stationary strategy corresponding to the states where 
he controls the transitions. 
Let player 1 fix {p IP EP(A ), sEs 1 }. Then associate with s s s 
{p IP EP(A ), sESJ} the game r({p IP EP(A ), sEsl}) in the following way: s s s - s s s 
S:=S; for sEsl, As:={l}, B :=BI r(s,1,j) := L r(s,i,j)p (i)=r(s,p ,j) and 
s s iEA s s 
s 
p(tls,1,j) :=p(tJs,p ) ; for sEs2 , A :=A , :B =B , s s s s s 
p(tls,i,j)=p(tls,j). So f'c{p IP EP(A ), sEs 1 }), s s s 
r ( s ' i , j ) : =r ( s , i , j ) and 
sometimes abbreviated to 
r ( {.}) ' is a "player 2 control" stochastic game as discussed in algorithm 
6.1.5. 
Observe that if, after fixing {p IP EP(A ), sEs1 }, the players play s s s 
the game f({.}), they restrict themselves in their possibilities of choosing 
strategies. Namely their strategies in f({.}) cannot depend on the actual 
outcomes of the chance experiments corresponding to {p IP EP(A ), sES}. 
s s s 
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However, along the same lines as the proof of theorem A.2.3 it can be shown 
that, after fixing {p IP EP(A ), sEs 1 }, neither player 1 nor player 2 can s s s 
do better than concentrating upon f({.}). 
We now state the algorithm and then show that this algorithm solves 
in a finite number of iterations the discounted switching control stochastic 
game. 
6.3.2. ALGORITHM. 
(i) 
(ii) 
Put T=O and choose p (O)EP(A ), sEs 1 as an extreme optimal action s s 
of the matrix game [G (o )] (cf. theorem A.1.9). 
sa z 
Put T:=T+l. 
Solve f({p (T-1) IP (T-l)EP(A ) , sEs 1 }J with the following LP s s s 
problem (variables vs' sES and xs(i), iEAs and sEs 2 J 
z 
max l: v 
s=l s 
subject to 
r(s,ps(T-1),j) + 
l: r(s,i,j)xs(i) 
iEA 
s 
l: 
iEA 
s 
x {i) 
s 
1, 
z 
l+a l: p(tls,p (T-1)) .V ~ v s' t=l s t 
z 
+ -- l: p(tls,j) .vt ~ v s' 1+a 
t=1 
Define v(T) as the optimal value of this program. 
jEB I 
s 
jEBs, 
iEA 
s' 
sEs 1 
s€s2 
sEs2 
(iii) If Val(GsJv(T)))=vs(T) for each sEs 1 , then the algorithm stops; 
else for sEs 1 , choose ps(T) such that ps{T) is an extreme optimal 
action of the matrix game [G (v(T))] for player 1. Return to (ii). 
sa 
We will prove that algorithm 6.3.2 stops after a finite number of 
iterations. For this purpose the following lemma is needed. 
6.3.3. LEMMA. For T=l,2, ••. we have v(T)Sv(T+l) Furthermore, if 
Val(G (v(T)))rv-(T) for some s€S1,then V(T)<v(T+l). sa s 
PROOF. Since the LP problem in step 2 coincides with algorithm 6.1.5 we 
have by the result of Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981) that 
v(T) = Val(f({p (T-1) IP (T-l)EP(A ), s€s 1})), so s s s 
(6.3.1) v (T) = Val (G (v (T))), 
s sa 
and 
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(6.3.2) 
1 z 
v (T) = min {r (s,p (T-1) ,j) + -1- i:: p <tl s,p (T-1)) .vt (T)}, sEs1 
s 'EB s +a t=l s 
J s 
From the definition of ps(T), we get by (6.3.2): 
1 z 
v (T) S min {r(s,p (T),j) + V i:: p(tls,p (T)).vt(T)}, 
s j€B s a t=l s 
s 
(6.3.3) 
Let for s€s2 , ps be optimal in GsJv(T)). Let the stationary strategy p be 
such that ps=ps, sEs2 and ps=ps(T), s€s1 . 
Then from (6.3.1) and (6.3.3) it follows that for every pure stationary 
strategy aP of player 2 we have: 
v(T) $ r(p,aP) + -- .P(p,aP) .v(T) 
l+a 
which by lemma 4.2.3 implies: 
(6.3.4) ~ p V(p,a-) ~ v(T), p all a €PSST2. 
But the 11 s 2-part" of p is a strategy for player 1 in the game 
f'({p (T) IP (T)€P(A ) , sEs1}l, for which moreover (6.3.1) and (6.3.3) hold, s s s 
so 
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v(T+l) va1cf({p (T) 
s 
p ( T) EP (A l , sEs 1 } ) ) 2 inf V (p, v) s s 
vEsT2 
min V(p,crP)~V(T), 
crpEPSST2 
which proves the first part of the lemma. 
If Val(G (v(T)))>v-(T) for some sEs 1, then in (6.3.4) the inequality §a s 
sign holds (also by lemma 4.2.3), so in this case v(T+l)>v(T). 
6.3.4. THEOREM. Algorithm 6.3.2 stops after a finite number of iterations. 
PROOF. If at T the algorithm does not stop, then by lemma 6.3.3 
Valcf({p (TJIP (T)EP(A), sES})) 
s s s l 
V(T+l) > 
v(T) = Val(f({p (T-1) IP (T-l)EP(A), sEs 1})). s s s 
But this implies that for each T ,kEJN.·with T 7 k: 
(6. 3 .5) {p (T) IP (T)EP(A ) , sEs 1} ~ {p (T+k) IP (T+k)EP(A ) , sEs 1}. s s s s s s 
Now we invoke the matrix lemma of Parthasarathy & Raghavan(1981, lemma 
4.1). This lemma says that an extreme optimal action for player 
matrix game of payoff type [r. ,+f.] with pure action sets A and B 
l.J l. 
in a 
respectively, is also an extreme optimal action for player 1 in some 
subgame [r .. ] with pure action sets A and B, with ACA. Application of 
l.J 
the matrix lemma to step (iii) of our algorithm means that for each 
state sES and each TEJN an extreme optimal action will be chosen of some 
matrix subgame [r(s,.,.)] with pure action sets As(T) and Bs respectively, 
where A (T)CA . But, since there are a finite number of different subsets 
s s 
A (T) of A and since a matrix game has a finite number of extreme 
s s 
optimal actions (Shapley & Snow (1950), cf. theorem A.1.9), we see that 
for any sES and T21 the action ps(T) is chosen from the same finite set. 
Combination of this observation with (6.3.5) yields the theorem. 
We now prove that when the algorithm stops, we have a solution of the 
switching control stochastic game. 
D 
0 
6.3.5. THEOREM. If algorithm 6.3.2 stops at the ,-th iteration, then v(T) 
equals the value of the game. 
PROOF. Let the algori tlun stop at the T-th iteration. 
Then from (iii), we derive vs(T)=Val(Gsa(v(T))), sEs 1 . 
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Since from the LP problem corresponding to f({p (T-1) Ip (T-l)EP(A), sEs 1}), s s s 
we already have v s (T) =Val (Gsa(v (T))), sEs 2 , we see that v s (T) ~Val (Gsa(v (T))), 
all sES. Hence by theorem 4.2.4 v(T) equals the value of the game. 
6.3.6. REMARK. Let the algorithm stop at the T-th iteration step, Then 
clearly optimal stationary strategies can be constructed from the matrix 
games [ (T))], sES (cf. theorem 4.2.4). For player 1 an optimal 
stationary strategy can directly be derived from the LP of step (ii) at 
iteratj_on step T. Namely, let (~,v(T)) be an optimal solution of this LP; 
0 
then it follows that the stationary strategy p, defined by (1-1), sEs 1 
and ps= (1) ,... (ms)), sEs 2 , is optimal for player 1, because is an 
optimal action in the matrix game [Gsa(v (T))], sES and v (T) is the value of 
the game. 
6.3.7. REMARK. The orderfield property for the class of discounted switching 
control stochastic games, as shovm by Filar (1981), can be alternatively 
proved by the alc;ori thm. It follows by a result of Weyl ( l 950) that both 
the extreme optimal actions of a matrix game and the va.lue of that game 
are in the same ordered field as the entries of the matrix .. This clearly 
holds also for the solution of a feasible linear programming problem with 
bounded solution. 'rhen we can show by induction, that for each r both 
v(T) and each ps(T), , are in the same ordered field as the parameters 
of the game. Hence by the theorems 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 this results in the 
orderfield property. 
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Part III. Average reward stochastic games. 

7. Introduction and preliminaries. 
7.1. HISTORICAL REVIEW. 
In definition 2.3.2 we defined the two-person zerosum stochastic game 
with the average reward as criterion. The notation introduced in part I 
will again be used. 
In part III we consider only two-person zerosum stochastic games 
with finite state spaces and finite action spaces for the two players, and 
when we speak of a stochastic game we tacitly mean a game of this kind. 
Bewley & Kohlberg (1978) have indicated that there are several ways 
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of defining the average payoff, corresponding to a pair of strategies µ and 
\! and a starting state s. For instance when player 1 takes account of his 
worst case, one could take 
k 
lim inf lE {k1 1 l: r(z' ,x' ,Y' ) } k->oo s + T=O µv µv µ\! 
or 
or 
lim inf lE {-1a l: (-1-) 'r (z' x' y' ) } a-+O s +a T=O l+a µv' µv' µv 
or 
lE {lim inf ~ l: (-1-J'r(z' x' y' )} 
s a-+O l+a -r=O l+a µv' µv' µv 
Obviously there is no reason why lim inf should not be replaced by 
lim sup or any convex combination thereof. Fortunately, Mertens & Neyman 
(1981) have shown that for any stochastic game with finite state and action 
spaces, both players have, for each 8>0, E-optimal strategies with respect 
to each "reasonable" definition of the average reward payoff, including those 
given above. 
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In defining the average payoff, the zerosum aspect of the game should 
not be disturbed, in the sense that if W is defined as the average 
S\J\! 
payoff to player 1, then the payoff to player 2 should be defined as -W 
S\J\! 
This implies that, in general, the definition of the average payoff is 
asymmetric with respect to the players. A symmetric definition may lead to 
the strange situation that both players may profit from cooperating though 
the immediate payoffs are zerosum. For instance, suppose that the following 
matrix game [~ -~J is repeatedly played. Suppose that the players 1 and 2 
respectively play the strategies µ and v which are both defined as: play nn 
times action 1, followed by (n+l)n+l times action 2, etc. Then it can be 
verified that 
and 
k 
lim inf lEs {k!l i:: 
k-t<» T=O 
-1. 
Let r. (ZT ,XT ,YT ) be the stochastic variable denoting the payoff to player J µv µv µv 
j, j€{1,2}, at decision epoch T. Then the use of the symmetric definition 
"lim sup" for both players would lead to: 
w (1) 
sµv 
1 k T T T 
·= lim sup Es{k+l r r 1 (Z ,x ,Y ) } k->a» T=O µv µv µv 
and 
w (2) 
sµv 1. 
This shows firstly that the zerosum property has vanished in the limit case, 
and secondly that both players realise profit in cooperating .. 
As already defined in section 2.3 we adopt the following definition of 
the average reward 
(7 .1.1) 
k 
w ·= lim infE {k\ i:: r(ZT ,XT ,YT )}. 
sµv k->a» s + T=O µv µv µv 
which equals the payoff to player 1. The payoff to player 2 equals by 
definition -W 
S\J\! 
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TWo-person zerosum stochastic games with the average reward as criterion 
(often called undiscounted stochastic games) were introduced by Gillette 
(1957). He considered games with perfect information (in each state one of 
the players has only one action available), and irreducible stochastic 
games (games where for each pair of stationary strategies the associated 
stochastic matrix P(p,cr) has a single ergodic class and no transient states). 
However, Gillette used an incorrect extension of the Hardy-Littlewood 
theorem, in showing that for these models both players possess optimal 
stationary strategies. This was pointed out by Liggett & Lippman (1969). 
Blackwell & Ferguson (1968) used a slightly modified version of an 
example of Gillette to show for undiscounted stochastic games that, in 
general, the players need not possess optimal stationary strategies. What is 
more, for this example called the big match, one of the players has no 
E-optimal strategy within the class of semi-Markov strategies for E>O small 
enough(cf. example 3.3). 
For a long time it was an open question whether average reward 
stochastic games with finite state and action spaces always have a value. 
Only about 1980 this question was answered in the affirmative, independently 
by Monash (1979) and Mertens & Neyman (1981). Before that, results for 
special cases of undiscounted stochastic games were obtained by several 
authors. The emphasis was laid mainly on the existence of optimal stationary 
strategies for the players. Gillette's paper has already been discussed. 
Hoffman & Karp (1966) have also treated irreducible stochastic games. Their 
approach is based on results of Markov decision theory. 
Kohlberg (1974) treated so-called "repeated games with absorbing 
states". These are games where all but one of the states are absorbing, and 
where the remaining state is transient or recurrent, depending on the 
strategies played. The big match (example 3.3) belongs to this class of 
games. Kohlberg showed that these games have a value which can be found by 
considering the T-step game and letting T tend to infinity. It was later 
discovered that this paper of Kohlberg indicated the way in which in the 
general case the existence of the value can be shown. 
Stern (1975) has proved the existence of the value and the existence 
of optimal stationary strategies for both players for games having the 
property that a state sES exists such that for each pair of stationary 
strategies this state can be reached from any other state. Stern also 
considered games for which only one of the players governs the transitions. 
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He was able to prove the existence of the value and of optimal semi-Markov 
strategies. In a nice way this last model is also studied by Parthasarathy 
& Raghavan (1978, 1981). They showed that the value of such a game lies in 
the same Archimedean field as the parameters of the game, and that both 
players have optimal stationary strategies also lying in that field (these 
results do not hold in general). Furthermore the optimal stationary 
strategy of the player controlling the transitions can be chosen in such a 
way that it is also optimal for the discounted stochastic game with 
interest rate a for all values of a sufficiently close to 0. 
A variant of the model of Parthasarathy & Raghavan is studied by 
Filar (1979). He treated the switching control case, i.e. games for which 
in each state one of the players governs the transitions but not 
necessarily the same player has this privilege in every state. Filar 
obtained results analogous to the above mentioned results of Parthasarathy 
& Raghavan. 
Federgruen (1978) has extended methods used in Markov decision theory 
to stochastic games. One class of games he studied is the class of games 
where, for each stationary strategy of one of the players, the other player 
has a stationary strategy such that the associated Markov matrix of one-
step transition probabilities is irreducible. This condition is an extension 
of the communicatingness property as treated in Bather (1973). Another 
class of games considered by Federgruen consists of games where for each 
pair of stationary strategies p and a the associated stochastic matrix 
P(p,o) has the same number of ergodic classes. In both cases he proved 
that the value exists and that both players have optimal stationary 
strategies. He obtained his results by showing that lim a (l+a) -lv exists 
-1 a~o a 
where V 
a 
is the value of the (1+a) -discounted game, and using this fact 
in an appropriate way. In fact Federgruen proved his results for the 
N-person game. Bewley & Kohlberg (1976a, 1976b, 1978) exposed in an elegant 
way some of the relationships between the discounted game, the T-ste~ game 
and the undiscounted game. In the next section we shall explain their use 
of the field of real Puiseux series and mention some of their results, 
which will be used in several sections of part III of this monograph. 
Regarding extensions of the model of the two-person zerosum games to N-
person stochastic games we mention the work of Rogers (1969), Sobel (1971) 
and Federgruen (1978). 
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7.2. THE LIMIT DISCOUNT EQUATION. 
In this section we first introduce the field of real Puiseux series. 
As Bewley & Kohlberg (1976a, 1978) have shown this field appears to be a 
useful tool for analysing stochastic games. 
Formally, let for a positive integer M 
series 
K 
I: ck0k/M I K is an integer, ckEJR and such that the 
k=-oo 
K k/M 
I: ck -r converges for all sufficiently large real 
k=-00 
numbers T}. 
Here 0 represents an arbitrarily large real number. 
Thus the members of FM are power series in 0l/M. 
Addition and multiplication in FM are defined in a way that corresponds to 
the same operations on power series. The ordering on FM reflects the 
notion that 0 represents an arbitrarily large real number. To be more 
specific 
Kl 
I: 
k=-oo 
Kl 
I: 
k=-CO 
K 
I: 
k=-00 
c 0k/M + 
K2 
~0k/M 
max (K1 ,K2 ) 
(ck+~) 0k/M I: l: k k=-oo k=-oo 
ck0k/M. 
K2 
~0k/M 
K1+K2 
c.d .) 0k/M L: I: ( I: 
k=-oo k=-oo i+j=k i J 
C 0k/M 0 . . 0 * k > if and only if ck*> , where k is the largest 
integer k, such that ckfO. 
Once can easily verify by elementary analysis that FM is an ordered 
field. 
Let F:= U F , then F is also an ordered field and F is called the field 
. M=l M . K k/M 
of real Puiseux series. If w= I: c 0 EF, then <jl (w) , for TEJR +, denotes 
K k/M k=-oo k T 
the sum I: ck T • Sometimes we write w (0) for an element of F, in which 
case w (-rf';=epresents <P (w). 
T 
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The following facts are clear: if wEF, then $,(w) is well defined for 
sufficiently large T, and w>O if and only if $,(w)>O for all sufficiently 
large T. 
* k * For wEFM the valuation of w is defined as ~(w) := °M"""' where k is the 
largest integer k such that CkFO. 
The expression o(0y) and 0(0y) will be used to denote an element of F 
of respective valuations less than y and at most y. 
Fz denotes the z-fold Cartesian product of F. 
7.2.1. DEFINITION. For a two-person zerosum stochastic game with finite 
state and action spaces the set of equations 
(7. 2.1) x 
s 
z 
Val(r(s,.,.) + --:y E p(tls,.,.)xt), 
A xB 1+0 t=1 
sEs 
s s 
z 
where x=(x1,x2 , .•• ,xz)EF, is called the limit discount equation. 
Heyl (1950) showed that if the elements of a matrix belong to a certain 
ordered field, then the value of the corresponding matrix game also belongs 
to this field. Hence, if xEFz then the right hand side of (7.2.1) is an 
element of F. The equations (7.2.1) will be abbreviated to 
(7 .2.2) x 
s 
Val (Gs0 (x)), 
A XB 
s s 
sES. 
Note that for 0=T, (7.2.1) represents the optimality equation for the 
discounted stochastic game, with interest rate 1/T. Bewley & Kohlberg 
(1976a) have shown that for a matrix game [h(.,.)] with entries belonging to 
F it holds that 
$ T (Val (h ( • , • ) ) ) Val($,(h(.,.))). 
So a solution to (7.2.1) would solve the discounted stochastic game for all 
sufficiently small interest rates. 
Further one should note that a mixed action for player 1 in an 
m,n-matrix game with entries in F is of the form 
m 0 
E 
k=-"" 
f 0k/M where MElN, k , f 0EP (lNm) , fk E1Rm such that E fk (i) =0 
i=l 
·-kEJN, and for each iEJN and each -KEJN: 
m 
0 
E fk(i)0k/M~O. 
k=K 
for each 
0 
1 . h ld . d . '"' Gk/M 2 Ana ogous properties o for a mixe action ~ gk- of player . 
In the notation Val (h(.,.)), where h(.~".')00has entries in F and A 
A xB 
s s 
s 
and Bs are finite sets, we implicitly assume that the value is taken with 
respect to the Puiseux mixed actions as mentioned above. f will denote 
such an action for player 1 and g for player 2. 
Bewley & Kohlberg ( 1976a) proved the following lemma . 
7.2.2. LEMMA. Equations (7.2.1) have a unique solution x*EFz, where for 
* * * * 
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each sES, <l>(xs)::::l. Furthermore <PT(x ):=(</iT(x 1J, ... ,</iT(xz)) is the value 
of the discounted game with interest rate 1/T for all sufficiently large 
T. If for sES fs is an optimal action for player 1 in the matrix game 
[G 8 cx*J], thenp =(<P (f 1), ... ,q, (f )) is an optimal stationary strategy s- T T T Z 
for player 1 in the discounted game with interest rate 1/T, for all 
sufficiently large T. Similar results hold for player 2. 
For a stochastic game let FV (T) Em.z, with TE:JN, be the value of the 
finite horizon game with D ={0,1, ... ,T-1} as set of decision epochs. As 
T 
Shapley (1953) already remarked, we have 
(7. 2.3) FV (T+l) 
s 
Val 
A XB 
s s 
z 
(r(s,.,.) + i:: p(tls,.,.).FVt(T)) 
t=l 
The matrix game in the right hand side of (7.2.3) will be abbreviated to 
[G (FV(T))]. 
s 
The following result of Bewley & Kohlberg (1976a) is essential in the 
theory of stochastic games. 
-1 * -1 7.2.3. LEMMA. lim T <PT(xs) and lim T FVs(T) exist and are equal for 
all sEs. T-700 T-+<» 
Clearly the limit in the above lemma is an obvious candidate to be the 
value of the average reward game. As already mentioned, Mertens & Neyman 
(1981) proved that indeed this limit equals the value of the average reward 
stochastic game, while Monash (1979) showed this fact for a weaker defini-
tion of the average reward. 
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-1 -1 * 7.2.4. LEMMA. Let gs=lim T FVs(T)=lim T $T(xs). Then g=(g1 , •.• ,gz) equals 
T-+co T-+co 
the value of the average reward stochastic game. 
Using the lemma's 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 Bewley and Kohlberg were able to 
prove nearly all the earlier results for stochastic games. The following 
lemma stands central in their proofs (Bewley & Kohlberg (1978)). 
7.2.5. LEMMA. Let x*EFz be the solution of the limit discount equation. 
If players 1 and 2 both have real actions p EP(A ) and o EP(B ) respectively, 
* 0 s s s s * 
which guarantee them Val(Gs0 (x ))+o(G) in the matrix games [Gs8 (x J], for 
all sES, then the stationary strategies p=(p 1 ,p 2 , ..• ,pz) and o=Co 1 ,o2 , ••• ,oz) 
are optimal in the undiscounted stochastic game. 
* * In part III x or x (8) will always denote the solution of the limit 
discount equation. 
8. Structural properties of undiscounted stochastic games. 
8.1. STOCHASTIC GAMES AND OPTIMAL STATIONARY STRATEGIES. 
In this section we characterize the class of stochastic games where 
both players have optimal stationary strategies for the average reward 
criterion. Most of the results have been derived from Vrieze (1979a, 1981b). 
First we define the Cesaro limit of a stochastic matrix. For a two-
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person zerosum stochastic game with finite state and action spaces, let p 
and a be stationary strategies for the respective players and let P(p,o) 
be the corresponding stochastic matrix. Then the Cesaro limit Q(p,o) of 
P(p,o) is defined as 
k 
(8 .1. 1) Q(p ,a) := T lim 1 l: P ( p , a) , k->«> k+ r=O 
o T T-1 
where P (p,o)=Izz and P (p,o)=P(p,o) (P (p,o)) for r?:l. 
It is well-known (e.g. Kemeny & Snell (1961)) that Q(p,o) exists for 
each pair \p,o), and that Q(p,o) has the following properties: 
(8. 1. 2) Q(p,o) .P(p,o) P(p,o)Q(p,o) Q(p,o) .Q(p,o) Q (p,o). 
Observe that the (s,t)-th element of Q(p,o) equals the mean number of times 
that the system is in state t when state s is the starting state and the 
players choose p and a as their strategies respectively. 
Furthermore, by a suitable renumbering of the states, P(p,o) can be 
written as: 
Pll (p,o) 0 I 0 
I 
I (8. 1. 3) P (p ,o) 0 P (p' o) I 0 yy 
-----------
-~------I 
p 
y+l 1 (p ,o) p y+l Y(p,o) I p y+l y+l (p ,o) 
In (8.1.3) Pnn(p,o), nE{l, ... ,y}, is a square matrix corresponding 
to the n-th ergodic class of the Markov chain associated with P(p,o). 
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The rows below the dotted line correspond to the 
-1 (Iy+l y+l-P y+l y+l (p,cr)) exists 
transient states, and 
T 
and equals L P 1 1 (p,cr), hence this T=O y+ y+ 
matrix has non-negative elements. Then Q(p,cr) has the form: 
Qll (p,cr) 
(8.1. 4) Q (p ,cr) 0 
Qy+l 1 (p ,cr) 
0 
I 
Qy+1 y (p,crl I 
0 
0 
0 
th where Q (p,cr), nE{l,2, ... ,y}, is a square matrix corresponding to then nn 
ergodic class of the Markov chain associated with P(p,cr). Each row of 
Qnn(p,o) is identical and equals the unique invariant distribution of the 
Markov subchain corresponding to it. Further each element of Qnn(p,cr) is 
strictly positive. The rows below the dotted line correspond to the 
transient states. The matrices Q 1 (p,cr), nE{l, ... ,y}, reflect the y+ n 
probabilities with which the system vanishes from the transient states into 
the different states of ergodic class n. 
It is well-known (cf. Kemeny & Snell (1961)) that 
(8.1. 5) Qy+l n (p,cr) 
Observe that the (s,t)-th element of the matrix 
-1 
<\+l y+l-Py+l y+l(p,cr)) .Py+l n(p,cr) equals the probability that, starting 
in the transient state s, the system ever reaches ergodic class n with state 
t as entry state. 
As introduced in section 2.3, we denote the average reward for a pair 
of strategies (µ,v) by Wµv (a z-vector). Clearly, for a pair of stationary 
strategies (p,cr) we have: 
(8.1.6) w pcr 
k 
lim inf 1 L PT(p,cr).r(p,o) 
kc+oo k+l T=O 
Q(p,cr) .r(p,o). 
Observe by 8.1.4. that Wpcr is constant on each ergodic set of P(p,o). 
8. 1. 1. LEMMA. If gE:IR.2 , wE:IR.2 and a pair of stationary strategies are such 
that: 
(8.1. 7) P(p,cr) .g 2 g 
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and for each state s recurrent with respect to P(p,a): 
z 
(8.1.8) r(s,ps,as) + ~ p(tls,p ,a )wt 2 ws+gs 
t=l s s 
then 
(a) In (8.1.7) the equality sign holds in the components corresponding to 
the recurrent states of P(p,a) and g is constant on each ergodic set. 
(b) W 2 g and W = g if and only if P(p,a).g=g and in (8.1.8) for pa pa 
each recurrent state s the equality sign holds. 
The ler.mJa remains true i-rilen all inequality signs are reversed. 
PROOF. (a) Assume that P(p,a) has the form (8.1.3). Then, with respect to 
the n-th ergodic class, (8.1.7) can be written as: 
(8. 1. 9) Pnn (p,a) .g(n) 2 g(n), 
where g(n) equals the part of g corresponding to the states of the n-th 
ergodic class. 
Now suppose that in (8.1.9) the inequality sign holds in at least one 
component. Then after multiplying (8.1.9) by Qnn(p,a) we would obtain 
Qnn(p,a).g(n)>Qnn(p,a).g(n), which obviously is a contradiction. (The 
inequality mentioned before is a consequence of the following arguments: 
Qnn(p,a).Pnn(p,a)=Qnn(p,a), each element of Qnn(p,a) is strictly positive 
and Qnn(p,a) has identical rows.). Hence in (8.1.9) the equality sign holds, 
which proves the first part of (a). 
2 From Pnn(p,a).g(n)=g(n) we deduce Pnn(p,a).g(n)=Pnn(p,a).g(n)=g(n), 
and next P~n(p,a).g(n)=g(n) for each TEN. But then also Qnn(p,a).g(n)=g(n) 
(see (8.1.1)). Since Qnn(p,a) has rowsum 1 and only strictly positive 
elements, it follows from this last equation that g(n) has identical 
components . 
(b) Using part (a) of this lemma we obtain after multiplying (8.1.8) 
with respect to the n-th ergodic class, by Qnn(p,a): 
(8. 1. 10) g(n). 
Here rn(p,a) is the part of r(p,a) corresponding to the n-th ergodic class. 
For the transient states we have (cf. (8.1.S)): 
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(8.1.11) w (y+l) == pa 
y 
I Qy+l n(p,a) .rn(p,a) 
n=l 
y 
-1 
I (I 1 1-P (p,a)) .P n(P,a).Qnn(p,a).rn(p,a) n=l y+ y+ y+l y+l y+l 
-1 y 
2 (I 1 y+l-Py+l y+l (p,a)) . I Py+l n(p,a).g(n) y+ n=l 
2 (Iy+l y+l-Py+l y+l (p,a))-1. <\+1 y+l-Py+l y+l (p,a)) .g(y+l) 
g(y+l). 
In the last step of (8.1.11) we have used the fact that with respect to the 
transient states (8.1.7) can be written as: 
y 
IP 1 (p,a).g(n) 2 (I 1 -P y+l(p,a)).g(y+l). n=l y+ n y+ y+l y+l 
Now (8.1.10) and (8.1.11) show the first part of (b). 
Concerning the second part of (b), suppose Wpa=g. Now, if in (8.1.8) 
the inequality sign holds for some state s belonging to the n-th ergodic 
class then this is also the case in (8.1.10), which is a contradiction. 
Furthermore, from W =Q(p,a).r(p,a), P(p,a).Q(p,a)=Q(p,a) and W =git po po 
follows that P(p,o).g=g. On the other hand, suppose that P(p,a) .g=g and that 
in (8.1.8) the equality sign holds for each recurrent states. Then one can 
verify that in (8.1.10) and (8.1.11) the equality signs also hold. This 
proves part (b) of the lemma. 
8. 1. 2. COROLLARY. If gElR2 and wEJR2 are such that 
(8.1.12) 
and 
(8.1.13) 
Val 
A xB 
s s 
z 
(I p(tls,.,.)gt) 
t=l 
z 
(r(s,.,.)+ I p(tls,.,.)wt) 
t=l 
then for some stationary strategy p of player 1 we have infW~ 2g. 
v pv 
(Here Els is the finite set of extreme optimal actions ot player 1 for 
the matrix game mentioned in (8.1.12) .) 
D 
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~ 
PROOF. Let p be optimal for player 1 in the matrix game 
zS 
[r(s,.,.)+ Z p(tJs,.,.)w] on E1 xB . Let p=(p1 , .•• ,p2 ) and let op be an t=l t s s 
arbitrary pure stationary strategy for player 2. Then lemma 8.1.1. can be 
applied to g, w and (p,op) yielding W ~g. Now corollary 3.5 proves the 
pop 
corollary. 
* M k/M If x (8) = Z ckG is the solution of the limit discount equation, with 
k=-00 
ck=(ckl'ck2 , ... ,ckz)' then in section 7.2 we have seen that cM equals the 
D 
value of the average reward stochastic game. In the sequel this value will 
M 
be denoted by g and the expression z c Gk/M will always denote the solution 
k=-,oo k 
of the limit discount equation. 
z 
[G (v).J with vE.1R2 denotes the matrix game 
s [r(s,.,.)+ l: p(tjs,.,.)v]. t=l t 
The following lemma is well-known (cf. Federgruen (1978)). We give a proof 
without using the Puiseux series expansion of the solution of the limit 
discount equation. 
8.1.3. LEMMA. For a two-person zerosum stochastic game with finite state and 
action spaces the following two assertions are equivalent: 
* * (i) g=g .1 2 , with g EJR, and both players have optimal stationary 
strategies. 
(ii) there exist WiEJR2 and g * ElR, such that 
* ws+g Val (G (w)), 
s A xB 
s s 
sES. 
PROOF. Suppose that (i) is true. Let p be optimal for player 1. Then by the 
theorems 3.4 and A.2.6 it follows that there exists a w(l)EJR2 such that for 
* ~ z I ~ each sES: g +w (l)=min {r(s,p ,j)+ Z p(t s,p ,j)wt(l)}. But then 
s j s t=l s 
* (8.1.14) g +ws(l) 5 Val (G (w(l))). 
s A xB 
s s 
Using an optimal stationary strategy for player 2 gives analogously the 
existence of a vector w (2) ElR2 such that 
* (8.1.15) g +ws(2) ~ Val (G (w(2))). 
s A xB 
s s 
Since also w(l)+o.1 2 , with oEJR, satisfies (8.1.14) we may assume 
w(l)Sw(2). Then for each sES: 
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(8.1.16) 
Since the Val-operator is monotonous and Lipschitz continuous with constant 
1 (cf. Lemma A.1.8) the inequalities (8.1.16) guarantee the existence of a 
vector w with w(l)~w~w(2) such that (ii) holds. 
z 
* I * Now suppose that (ii) holds. Trivially g =Val ( L p(t s,.,.)g) and 
A xB t=l 
s s 
all actions are optimal in this matrix game. Then we may apply corollary 
8.1.2 two times, giving the existence of stationary strategies p and cr such 
that 
Hence theorem 2.3.4 shows that (i) holds. 
We now prove the following lemma. 
8.1.4. LEMMA. 
z 
Val ( l: p(tls,.,.)gt), 
A xB t=1 
s s 
sES. 
PROOF. From the solution of the limit discount equation we derive: 
(8.1.17) M k/M L cks T 
k=-"' 
-1 -1 z M k/M 
Va] (r(s,.,.)+(l+T ) l: p(tls,.,.). l: ckt't ), 
t=l k=-00 
for each sufficiently large T and each sES. 
Dividing both sides of (8.1.17) by T, letting T tend to infinity and using 
the fact that the Val-operator is continuous, we obtain the assertion of 
the lemma. 
In the following 0 , Ji=l,2, will denote the set J1,s z 
for player J1, 
z 
in the matrix game [ l: p(t!s,.,.).g] on 
0 i'= x 
s=l 
t=l t 
ois· It is well-known that OJ1,s is the convex 
of optimal actions 
A xB , and 
s s 
hull of a finite set 
(cf. theorem A.1.9). Eis will denote this finite set of extreme optimal 
actions and En: = X En , Jic{l,2}. 
"' sES ,,s 
D 
D 
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* 8.1.5. LEMMA. If p is an optimal stationary strategy for player 1, then 
* p E01 , sES. Similarly for player 2. s s 
PROOF. By assumption i~f Wp*v=g, then by the theorems 3.4 and A.2.6 we 
obtain: 
z 
E p(tls,p:,j).gt}, 
t=l 
which shows that p*E0 1 • s s 
With a stochastic game r we associate two stochastic games, called 
f(l) and f(2), which are defined by: 
(a) for iE{l,2}, in r(~) the set of states and the set of pure actions for 
player 3- i remain as in r, and the set of pure actions for player i in 
state s equals E iS. 
(bl) for r(l) the immediate payoffs and the transitions are defined for 
each (ps 1 j)EE1sxBs as: 
and 
r 1 (s,p ,j):= E r(s,i,j)ps(i)-gs 
s iEA 
s 
p 1 <tls,p ,j) := E p(tls,i,j) .p (i). 
s iEA s 
s 
(b2) for f(2) the immediate payoffs and the transitions are defined for 
each (i,as)EAsxE2s as: 
and 
r 2 (s,i,a) := E r(s,i,j)as(j)-gs 
s 'EB J s 
p2 CtJs,i,a l := E p(tJs,i,j) .a (j). 
s 'EB s 
J s 
8. 1. 6. THEOREM. If for a stochastic game r both players have optimal 
stationary strategies with respect to the average reward criterion, then 
(a) f(l) and f(2) both have average reward value Oz. 
a 
(b) the sets of optimal stationary strategies for player i coincide for r 
and r ( i) , iE { 1, 2}. 
PROOF. We shall prove only the assertions concerning f(l), since those 
concerning f(2) can be shown in an analogous way. 
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* * Suppose that p and o are optimal for players 1 and 2 respectively in the 
game f. Then by corollary 3.5, the fact that g is the value of the game r, 
and lemma 8.1.5, we have: 
* * * * * * (8.1.17) min Q(p ,o).r(p ,o}=g= max Q(p,o ).r(p,o l=ax Q(p,o ).r(p,o} 
oESST2 pESST1 pE0 1 
A two-fold application of theorem A.2.8 on (8.1.17) gives: 
* * * * min Q(p ,o) (r(p ,o}-g)=O =max Q(p,o } (r(p,o }-g). 
oESsT2 z pE0 1 
(8.1.18) 
Since p*E0 1 (lemma 8.1.5), part (a) of the theorem follows from (8.1.18) as 
* a consequence of corollary 3.5. Furthermore we see from (8.1.18) that p 
* and a are optimal in f(1}, so half of part (b) is proved. 
~ 
Now suppose that p is optimal for player 1 in f(l). Then for each 
stationary strategy o: 
Q(p,o). (r(p,o)-g) :?: oz' or 
(8. 1. 19) Q(p,o} .r(p,o) :<: Q(p,o) .g. 
Since p E0 1 , we have P(p,o).g:<:g and then with induction P'(p,o) .g~g for s s 
all Twhichimplies Q(p,o).g:<:g. Insertion of this result in (8.1.19) shows 
~ 
by the fact that o is arbitrarily chosen and corollary 3.5, that p is also 
optimal in r. 
It is obvious that player 2 may have optimal stationary strategies in 
f(l) which are not optimal in r since such strategies may be beated by a 
strategy of player 1 outside the set 0 1• 
The following theorem is a generalization of theorem 8.1.6, part (a). 
8.1.7. THEOREM. Suppose that for the undiscounted stochastic gamer both 
players have optimal stationary strategies. Then for each z pairs of 
finite sets (A ,B )cP(A )xP(B ), sE{l, ..• ,z}, such that P(A )::::i0 1 and s s s s s s 
~ z P(B J::::i02 , there exists a vElR such that s s 
z 
Val (r(s,.,.)+ l: p(tls,.,.).vt) 
A xB t=l 
s s 
sES. 
D 
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PROOF. Define the game f(3), where the sets of pure actions in states for 
~ 
the players are As and Bs respectively, and where 
and 
l: 
iEA 
s 
l: r(s,i,j).p (i).a (j)-g 
'EB s s s 
J s 
l: 
iEA 
s 
p(tls,i,j) .p (i).a (j) 
s s 
for each (p ,a )EA xB 
s s s s 
Then, analogous to the first part of the proof of theorem 8.1.6 we derive 
that the average reward value of f(3) equals 0 2 and thus the theorem is a 
consequence of lemma 8.1.3. 
Theorem 7.3.3 part (a) of Federgruen (1978) is a special case (namely 
A =E 1 , B =E2 ) of theorem 8.1.7. Federgruen gave a counter example (page s s s s 
174), showing that the existence of a v satisfying 
Val (G s (v)) , 
E1sxE2s 
sEs, 
is not sufficient for the existence of optimal stationary strategies. 
In the next theorem we give a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the existence of optimal stationary strategies. 
8.1.8. THEOREM. For a two-person zerosum undiscounted stochastic game with 
finite state and action spaces, the following two assertions are 
equivalent. 
(i) The value of the game is g and both players have optimal stationary 
strategies. 
(ii) (a) 
(8.1.20) Val 
A XB 
s s 
z 
( l: p(tjs,.,.)gt), 
t=l 
sES 
z z (b) There exist vectors v 1ElR and v2 EJR such that 
(8.1.21) sES 
Cl 
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and 
(8.1.22) sES. 
PROOF. Suppose that (i) is true. Part (a) of (ii) is generally valid and 
has been proved in lemma 8.1.4. 
Consider the game f(l) associated with r, as defined above. Then from 
theorem 8.1.6 part (a) and lemma 8.1.3 the existence of a v 1 satisfying 
(8.1.21) is obvious. Similarly via f (2) the existence of a v2 satisfying 
(8.1.22) follows. 
Now suppose that (ii) is true. 
Then, by corollary 8.1.2 applied to (8.1.20) and (8.1.21) and by the 
player 2 version of corollary 8.1.2 applied to (8.1.20) and (8.1.22), we 
have for some stationary strategies p and a: 
inf w~ 
pv 
v 
Finally by theorem 2.3.4 we obtain the derived result. 
D 
If both players possess optimal stationary strategies, it is generally 
not possible to choose v 1=v2 in theorem 8.1.8, as the following example 
shows. 
2 3 
Here g=(0,1,-1), 011 =E 11 =(!:l,l:i,OJ, 021 =E21 =(l;,l:i,O) and for both players 
* * the respective strategies p and a are the unique optimal strategies if 
* * p 1=a 1=C!:l,l:i,Ol. 
Let v=(v1 ,v2 ,v3J satisfy both (8.1.21) and (8.1.22). Then from (8.1.21) 
we deduce v 1sl:i(v2+v3J-1, while from (8.1.22) we get v 1?:l:i(v2+v3)+1, which 
yields contradiction. 
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In Markov decision problems, once one has a solution to the functional 
equations (cf. theorem A.2.6), there is a clear rule whether a stationary 
strategy is optimal or not. In stochastic games, this problem is much more 
complicated. The next theorem gives a characterization of the optimality 
of a fixed stationary strategy. 
The example thereafter shows that the results for the MDP cannot be 
extended in a straightforward manner to stochastic games, and furthermore 
it can be seen that theorem 8.1.10 can hardly be strengthened. 
8.1.9. REMARK. Along the same lines as the proof of theorem 8.1.8 we can 
show the following: 
Knowing that the value of a stochastic game equals g, the existence 
of a vector v 1 such that 
(8.1.23) sES 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for player 1 to possess an 
optimal stationary strategy. Also the existence of a vector v2 such 
that 
Val (GS (v2) } ' 
ASxE2s 
sES, 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for player 2 to possess an 
optimal stationary strategy. 
The following example shows that the inequality signs in the above 
equations cannot generally be replaced by equality signs. 
2 
Clearly g=(0,0}, E11=A1 , each strategy of player 1 is optimal and player 
2 has no optimal stationary strategy. However for v=(v1 ,v2J we have 
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o:= Val (G1 (v)) =Val[l+vl 
EllxBS V1 
If v2~1+v 1 , then o=l+v1>v1=v1+g1 . 
2 ( 1+v1 ) -v 1 v 2 
If v 2<1+v 1 , then o= v 1+2-v2 > v 1=v1+g1 • 
Hence for each v satisfying (8.1.23) the inequality sign holds for state 1. 
For a stationary strategy p of player 1, we define R(p) :={sjsEs, s is 
recurrent with respect to P(p,cr) for some optimal reply a of player 2 
against p in the stochastic game}. 
8.1.10. THEOREM. For a stochastic game with value g, a stationary strategy 
p for player 1 is optimal if and only if there exists a vEJRz, such 
that: 
(a) p E0 1 , sEs s s 
(G (v)) , 
s 
such that for each state sER(p), the action ps guarantees player 1 
vs+gs in the matrix game [Gs(v)] on E1sxBs. 
~ 
PROOF. Let p be optimal. Part (a) is proved in lemma 8.1.5. 
By looking at the Markov decision situation MDS(p) corresponding to fixing 
p, we may conclude from theorem 3.4 and theorem A.2.6 that there exists a 
vElRz , such that 
z 
min {r(s,p ,j)+ l: p(tJs,p ,j) .vt}, each sES, jEB s t=1 s 
s 
which implies part (b) . 
Now suppose that (a) and (b) of the theorem hold. Let a be an optimal 
reply top. Then we have the following inequalities: 
(8.1.24) g S P(p,o).g 
and 
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z 
(8.1.25) vs+gs s r(s,p ,cr )+ L p(tls,p ,cr ) .vt 
s s t=l s s 
for each states which is recurrent with respect to P(p,cr). 
Inequalities (8.1.24) and (8.1.25) imply by lemma 8.1.1 that 
gSQ(p,cr).r(p,cr). Since a was assumed to be an optimal reply top, this 
shows that p is optimal for player 1 in the stochastic game. 
8.1.11. EXAMPLE. 
3 
2 
The following facts can be derived. 
(a) the value equals (0,0,0); both players have optimal stationary 
strategies. 
(b) g=(0,0,0) and v=(d,d,d) with dEJR are the only solutions to the 
functional equations 
z 
Val(Lp(tls,.,.)g l, 
t=l t 
and 
Val 
ElsxBs 
(Here Els =As, sES) . 
(G (v)l 
s 
sES 
sEs 
* * * * * (c) For the optimal stationary strategy p =(p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3J, with p1=(1,0,0) 
* * and p2=(1,0,0), it holds that p2 is not optimal in the matrix game 
[G (v)] for v=(d,d,d). 
s 
(d) ·. * For p as in (c), the pair g={0,0,0) and v=(d,d-1,d) has the 
properties of theorem 8.1.10. 
D 
3 (e) There exists no pair g=(0,0,0) and vEJR such that, for each optimal 
stationary strategy the properties mentioned in theorem 8.1.10 hold. 
(The optimal stationary strategy p* as in (c) asks for v 1 ~v2+1, 
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while the optimal stationary strategy p with p 1=(0,1,0) and 
p 2=(0,1,0) asks for v2~v1 +1. 
If for each pair of pure stationary strategies (p,a), all states are 
recurrent with respect to P(p,a), then the sets of optimal stationary 
strategies can be fully characterized. We have 
8.1.12. THEOREM. If for a two-person zerosum stochastic game, for each pair 
of stationary strategies (p,a) all states are recurrent with respect to 
P(p,a), then a stationary strategy p is optimal for player 1 if and only 
if 
(a) p E0 1 , s s all sEs. 
(b) for each vElRz, such that 
Val 
Els"Bs 
(G (v)) 
s 
sEs 
the action o is optimal in the matrix game [G (v)]. 
s s 
PROOF. The "sufficiency" follows at once from the recurrency assumption 
and theorem 8.1.10. 
The "necessity" can be shown as follows. 
If p g0 1 for some s, then p cannot be optimal by lemma B.1.5. So we may s s 
assume p E0 1 , each sES. Suppose for some ~ES that p~ is not optimal in s s s 
the matrix game (G~(v)) on E 1~xB~. 'l'hen there exists a a such that s s s 
v+g ~ r(p,o)+P(p,o) .v, 
where the inequality sign holds at least in component s. 
Since each state is recurrent with respect to P(p,o), lemma 8.1.1(b) now 
shows that w~ ~<g. Hence p cannot be optimal. 
Pa 
D 
8.2. THE ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOUR OF IJFV(T)-Tgll . 
In this section we shall study the asymptotic behaviour of 
llFV(T)-•gll • Here FV(T) equals the value of the T-step game and g the 
value of the average reward game. Firstly we shall characterize the 
asymptotic behaviour 11 FV ( T) -•g 11 $ B log T for some BElR and secondly we 
shall analyse the asymptotic behaviour II FV (T) -Tg II $C for some CElR. 
Bewley & Kohlberg (1976b) have shown that, in general, a vector 
K k/K funtion y (T) = L: d1 T , with KEJN, can be constructed such that 
k=1 ~ 
llFV(T)-y(T) II $D log T for some DElR. Furthermore they give an example 
which shows that, in general, an expansion in fractional powers of T, 
which is more precise than the above y(T), need not exist. 
Most of the results of this section can also be found in Vrieze 
* (1979b). As before, x (8) 
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~ ck8k/M denotes the solution of the limit 
k=-00 discount equation and g:=cM equals the value of the average reward game. 
8.2.1. THEOREM. For a stochastic game the following assertions are 
equivalent: 
(i) llFV(T)-Tgll $B log T for each TElN and some BEJR. 
(ii) cM-1=cM-2= ... =c1=0z. 
(iii) there exists a vElRz , such that 
Val 
A XB 
s s 
(iv) there exists a vElRz, such that 
Val 
E1sXE2s 
(G (v)) 
s g +v ' s s sES 
sEs. 
where Eis' 2=1,2, equals the finite set of extreme optimal actions 
z 
of player i in the matrix game [ L: p (t Is,.,.) gt]. 
t=1 
The proof of this theorem will be built up in a number of lemma's, 
which respectively prove: (i)~(ii), (ii)~(iii), (iii)<=>(iv) and (iii)~(i). 
8.2.2. LEMMA. If for some BElR llFV(T)-Tgll :$B log T for all T holds, then 
cM-1=cM-2= •.. =c1=0z· 
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K k/K 
PROOF. Let y(T)= l: <\T and cEllbe such that IJFV(T)-y(T) JI sc log T 
k=l for all T and suppose that y(T) is constructed as indicated by Bewley 
& Kohlberg (1976b, statements 6.9-6.12, page 326). 
Obviously the assumption of the lemma implies: 
g and dK-l dK-2 = ... 0 . z 
However, considering the way in which the vectors dK-l'dK_2 , ... ,d1 are 
constructed in Bewley & Kohlberg (1976b, statement 6.7), it can be seen 
that, if one of the vectors cM-l'cM_2 , ... ,c 1 does notequalOzthenatleast 
oneofthevectorsdK-l'dK_2 , ••• ,a1 doesnotequal02 • This proves the lemma. 
8.2.3. LEMMA. If for the solution of the limit discount equation we have 
cM_ 1=cM_2= ••• =c 1=02 , then there exists a vEJR.z such that 
Val (G (g8+v)) 
A XB s 
s s 
-1 g s ( e+ 1 ) +v s +O ( e ) I sEs . 
PROOF. Take v=c0-g. Since cM_ 1=cM_2= ••. =c 1=02 , we derive from the limit 
discount equation that 
(8. 2. 1) Val 
A xB 
s s 
(GS (g8+v)) sEs. 
Weyl (1950) proved that, if the elements of a matrix game belong to a 
linearly ordered field, then also the value of this game belongs to that 
field. Using this result here implies that Val (Gs(g8+v)) is of the form 
A XB 
s s 
with dksEJR, which combined with (8.2.1) shows the lemma. 
8.2.4. LEMMA. For a stochastic game the following two assertions are 
equivalent: 
(iii) there exist vEJR.z and gEJJl such that 
-1 Val (G (g8+v)) =gs(O+l)+vs+0(8 ) , sES 
A XB s 
s s 
(iv) there exist vEJRz and gEJR2 such that 
D 
D 
and 
Val 
A XB 
s s 
g +v = 
s s 
z 
( r p(tJs,.,.)gt)' 
t=1 
sES. Val (GS (v)), 
ElsXE2s 
sES 
PROOF. Suppose (iii) to be true. Then for some Cs ElR and sufficiently 
large T 
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(8.2.2) -1 z -1 -c T s Val (r(s,.,.)+ L p(tJs,.,.) (g T+v ))-g (T+l)-v SC T . 
S A XB t=l t t s s S 
s s 
Dividing each term of (8.2.2) by T and letting T tend to infinity gives by 
the continuity property of the val-operator: 
(8. 2. 3) Val 
A xB 
s s 
z 
( L p ( t Is, . , . ) gt) 
t=l 
i.e. the first part of (iv). 
Consider now the following limit: 
z 
d :=lim {Val (G (gT+v))- Val ( L p(tJs,.,.)g T)} 
s T-+oo A XB s A xB t=1 t 
s s s s 
z -1 z 
Val ( L p(tJs,.,.)g +G (v).T )- Val ( L p(tJs,.,.)g )} 
A xB t=l t s A xB t=l t 
=lim ~s~-s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~s~-s~~~~~~~~-
-1 
T-7oo T 
Mills (1953) has called such a limit a marginal value, and has shown that 
the limit exists and equals Val 
ElsXE2s 
(G (v)). 
s 
On the other hand, after substitution of the equality in (iii) and of 
(8.2.3) into the definition of d we obtain: 
s 
d 
s 
lim {g (T+l)+v +O(T- 1)-g T} 
s s s 
hence showing that (iii) implies (iv) • 
g +v 
s s 
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Now suppose that (~v) is true. 
In the proof of lemma 8.2.3 we already argued that: 
(8. 2. 4) Val 
A XB 
s s 
(Gs (g0+v)) 
So we need to show d 1s=gs and d05=vs+g5 • 
From (8.2.4) we derive for each T large enough: 
Val 
A XB 
s s 
z 1 
( l: p(tls,.,.)g +G (v).T-) 
t=l t s 
Taking the limit as T-+oo yields 
(8.2.5) 
z 
Val ( l: p(tls,.,.)gt) 
A XB t=l 
s s 
hence d 1s=gs. 
As in the first part of the proof we have 
z 
0 
i:: dk+1 
k=-"' 
Hm {Val (G (gT+v))- Val ( i:: p(tJs,.,.)g T)} 
A xB s A "B t=l t 
s s s s 
k 
T 
s 
(G (v)). 
s 
on the other hand, after substitution of (8.2.4) and (8.2.5), this limit 
equals dos· But, by assumptions, Val (G (v))=g +v, which shows that 
E XE s s s 
dos=gs+vs. 1s 2s 
8. 2. 5. LEMMA. If, for a stochastic game, there exists a vEJRz such that 
-1 Val (Gs (c:j9 +v)) =gs (8+1) +v+o (0 ) , sES, then there exists a BEJR such that 
A XB 
s s 
llFV(T)-TgJJ '.".B log T, all TEJN. 
PROOF. By assumption there exists a CEJRsuch that for large T: 
J Val (G (Tg+v))-g (T+l)-v J 
A XB s s s 
-1 
'.". C. T , sEs. 
s s 
Then 
D 
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(8.2.6) JFV (T+l)-g (T+l)-v l=I Val (G (FV(T)))-g (T+l)-v I 
s s s A XB s s s 
s s 
I Val (G (FV(T)))- Val (G (gT+v))+ Val (G (gT+v))-g (T+l)-v I s s s s s s A XB A XB A XB 
s s s s s s 
I Val (G (FV(T)))- Val (G (gT+v)) J+I Val (G (gT+v))-g (T+l)-v Is s s s s s A xB A xB A XB 
s s s s s s 
jjFV(T)-gT-vll + C.T-l. 
The last inequality follows from the fact that the val-operator is Lipschitz 
continuous with constant 1. By repeated application of (8.2.6) we obtain for 
each T and a fixed K sufficiently large: 
Since 
T 
i.: 
k=l 
T 
-1 
llFV(T+K)-g(T+KJ-vll s llFV(K)-gK-vll +c. i.: (k+K-1) 
k=l 
-1 k =O(log T) for each T, the assertion in the lemma follows. 
Summarizing the lemma's 8.2.2-8.2.5 proves theorem 8.2.1. 
a 
Federgruen {1978) called the set of equations mentioned above in (iv) the 
natural extension to stochastic games of the set of functional equations 
for average reward Markov decision problems (cf. theorem A.2.6). For MDP's 
this set of equations characterizes the optimal gain and the set of optimal 
stationary strategies. In section 8.1 we have seen that it makes more sense 
to regard the set of functional equations mentioned in theorem 8.1.8 (ii) 
as the natural extention. With these equations both the value and the 
existence of optimal stationary strategies can be characterized. However, 
for the set of equations mentioned above in (iv), theorem 8.2.1 leads to 
the following theorem. 
8. 2 .6. THEOREM. If for a stochastic game there exist gEJRz and vEJRz , such 
that 
z 
g =Val ( l.: p(tjs,.,.)gt) 
s A xB t=l 
s s 
and g +v =Val (G {v)), 
s s E XE s 
ls 2s 
then g is uniquely determined, namely g=g=cM. 
sES 
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PROOF. The proof uses some of the arguments of the previous lemma's. From 
(iv) with g instead of g we obtain (iii) with g instead of g (lemma 8.2.4). 
From (iii) with g instead of g we get (i) with g instead of g (lemma 8.2.5). 
But this implies lim FV(T) = g, which by lemma 7.2.4 shows the theorem. 
T-- T 
[J 
we now shall studie conditions under which llFV(T)-gTJI sB for some BEJR. 
For a strategyµ of player 1, we denote by FV112 (T) the minimum expected 
payoff in the T-step game which player 2 can guarantee himself, knowing that 
player 1 plays ].!. Similarly FVvl (T) is defined for a strategy v of player 2. 
Obviously for each µ and v and each TElN: 
(8. 2. 7) FV112 (T) s FV(T) S FVvl (1). 
For a vector wElRz, we shall use Vw: =max w and /',w: =min w . 
s s s s 
By MDP(p) we denote the Markov decision problem that results when player 1 
fixes the stationary strategy p. 
The following lemma will be used. 
8. 2. 7. LEMMA. For a stationary strategy p of player 1, there ex.ists a number 
B such that for each TElN: 
V(FVP 2 (1)-Tg) s B+TV(g(p)-g) s B. 
where g(p) and g equal the average reward value of MDP(p) and of the 
original game respectively. 
PROOF. From theorem 3.4 we know that when player 1 announces that he will 
play the stationary strategy p, then the best player 2 can do is to solve 
MDP(p). For Markov decision problems it is known that the value of the 
T-step problem minus T times the average reward value is uniformly bounded 
in T, cf. Brown (1965). This, applied to MDP(p) yields for some BEJR and 
each TElN: 
11FVp2 ( T) -T . g ( p) 11 s B. 
From this inequality the first inequality of the lemma. can be deduced, 
while the second inequality follows from the fact g(p)sg. 
D 
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A similar lemma can be given for player 2. 
Bewley & Kohlberg (1978) mentioned a strategy µ for player 1 uniformly 
t-stage optimal if V(FV(T)-FVµ2 (T))~B for all T and some number B. 
(Similarly for player 2 with reversal of the inequality sign.) They showed 
that if a player has, for each sES, a real action which guarantees him 
* * 0 in the game [Gs0 (x )] on AsXBs a payoff Val (Gs0 (x ))+o(0), then the 
A XB 
s s 
stationary strategy corresponding to these actions is uniformly T-stage 
optimal. 
The first part of the following theorem is obvious (cf. lemma 7. 2. 4). The 
secondpart is a consequence of lemma 8.2.7. 
8.2.8. THEOREM. A uniformly T-stage optimal stationary strategy is 
optimal with respect to the average reward criterion. For a stochastic 
game where FV(T)-Tg is not bounded from above, player 1 has no stationary 
strategy which is uniformly T-stage optimal. Analogously for player 2. 
The case mentioned in theorem 8.2.8 occurs in the following example. 
8.2.9. EXAMPLE. 
2 
The average payoff value of this game equals (0,0). Player 2 has no 
optimal stationary strategy, while each (stationary) strategy of player 
is optimal. For state 2, FV2 (T)=0 for each T and for state 1: 
FV 1 (T+l) [ 
l+FV l (T) 
Val 
FV l (T) 
2 
1+FV1 (T)] 1 FVl (T) + FV1 (T) 
It can be verified that this relation implies FV1 (T)2T~, and thus 
FV1 (T)-Tg1 is not bounded from above. Therefore, for this game, it may be 
wise for player 1 to play a Markov strategy which is optimal for a T-step 
game for some large T, instead ofplaying an optimal stationary strategy. 
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8.2.10. THEOREM. For a stochastic game where V(FV(T)-Tg)sB for all T and 
some BElR, a stationary strategy p for player 1 is optimal with respect 
to the average payoff if and only if this strategy is uniformly T-stage 
optimal. 
PROOF. Theorem 8.2.8 states that a uniformly T-stage optimal stationary 
strategy is also optimal in the average reward game, which proves the 
sufficiency of the theorem. 
Let p be optimal. Consider MDP(p), then g(p)=g. But since by Brown (1965) 
JJFvp 2 (T)-T .g(p) JI sc for some cEJR and by assumption V (FV(T)-Tg) sB, we 
then have V(FV(T)-FVP 2 (T))sD for some DElR and each TEJN, i.e. p is 
uniformly T-stage optimal. 
An analogous statement can be made for player 2, in which case the 
inequality sign in theorem 8.2.10 must be reversed and V must be replaced 
by b.. 
The following theorem may be of computational importance. 
8.2.11. THEOREM. If both players have optimal stationary strategies, then 
JjFV(T)-TgjJ sB for some BE:IR and each TEJN. 
PROOF. Follows at once from theorem 8.2.10. 
D 
D 
The converse of this theorem is not true. The "big match" of Blackwell 
& Ferguson (1968) (cf. example 3.3) presents a counterexample. Namely 
FV1 (T)=~T=g 1 .T and player 1 possesses no optimal stationary strategy. 
However, for stochastic games, where g does not depend on the initial 
state, the converse of theorem 8.2.11 proves to be true. 
8.2.12. THEOREM. The following two assertions are equivalent: 
(i) 
(ii) 
* g=g .lz and both players have optimal stationary strategies. 
jjFV(T)-TgjJ SB with g=g*.1 and BE:IR. 
z 
PROOF. Theorem 8.2.11 shows that (i) implies (ii). 
Now suppose that (ii) is true. Then theorem 8.2.1 (the equivalence of 
(i) and (iv)) implies that there exists a vEJR such that 
* (8.2.8) g +v 
* 
s Val (GS (v)), 
E1sXE2s 
sES 
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But since g=g .lz it ~an be seen that E1s=As and E2s=Bs, since each entry 
of the matrix game [ 2: p(tjs,.,.)gt] equals g*. Then from lemma 8.1.3 
we may conclude thatt=lboth players possess optimal stationary strategies. 
One may ask under what properties of the game parameters it holds 
that llFV(T)-Tgjj ~B. At this point we wish to express the following 
conjecture. 
8.2.13. CONJECTURE. ljFV(T)-Tgjj ~B for all TE:IN and some BEIR if and only 
if the solution of the limit discount equation can be expressed as a 
. . . * (El) ~ Elk Laurent series expansion, i.e. x - = L ck- • 
k=-"' 
However we have not yet been able to prove this assertion. The following 
theorem gives a sufficient condition. In this theorem we use the limit 
recursion equation, as formulated by Bewley & Kohlberg (1976a). We now 
define this limit recursion equation. To this end let, for 
K(w) be the element of F defined as 
where (El+l)k/M is defined to be 
K k/M 
K (W) := L Ck (8+1) , 
k=-"' 
K k/M 
w= E eke EF, 
k=-00 
(8. 2. 9) (e+llk/M := 8k/M + ~ 8k/M-1 + L ~ c~-iiek/M-2 M < M M + ..• 
As $T(K(w))=$T+l (w), obviously K(w)EF. 
8.2.14. DEFINITION. The following set of equations in the variable 
z 
x=(x1 ,x2 , ... ,xz)EF is referred to as the limit recursion equation: 
(8.2 .10) Val (GS (x) ) , 
A XB 
s s 
sEs. 
Recall that FV (T+l)=Val(G (FV(T))), for each sES. Suppose that xEFz s s 
describes an asymptotic expression for FV(T) in the sense that $T(x)=FV(T) 
for large T. Then $T+l (xs) =Val(Gs($T(x))) for large T. Now the limit 
recursion equation can be seen as the replacement of this sequence of 
equations by a single equation. 
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The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the fact that 
1/(1+0-1)=1-0-1+0-2- .•. and the fact that the solution of the limit discount 
equation has valuation at most 1 (cf. Bewley & Kohlberg (1976a)). 
8.2.15. LEMMA. If x*EF2 solves the limit discount equation, then 
* * -1 y =x /(1+0 ) satisfies: 
* 0 Val {G (y ))+o{0) 
A XB s 
s s 
8.2.16. THEOREM. If for a stochastic game the limit recursion equation has 
a solution y= ~ <\0k/M, with dM_ 1=aM_2= ... =d1=0, then //FV(T)-Tg// :o:B 
for each TEJN k=-"' and some BElR. 
PROOF. From~ 1 {y )=Val {G (~ (y))) for large T, and FV (T+1)= <+ S A XB s T s 
s s 
Val {Gs{FV(T))) for each sand each T, we derive by means of the Lipschitz 
A XB 
s s 
continuity of the val-operator: II~ l(y}-FV(T+1)1/:>I/~ (y)-FV(T)I/ for T+ T 
large T. 'l'hus /l~T+k(y)-FV{T+k) II :o: /l~k(y)-FV(k) II for each TEl'il and each 
kEl'il. This implies that ~T(y)-FV{T) is bounded uniformly in T, which in 
view of lim FV(T) = g leads to y=g.0+d0+o(0°). Hence it follows that T-+<x> T 
/!FV(T)-tgJI is bounded uniformly in T. 
We conclude this section with the following lemma, which might be 
useful in showing the reverse of theorem 8.2.16 which we suspect to be 
true. 
0 z 8.2.17. LEMMA. If y=g0+d0+o(0 JEF is such that 
K(ys) -1 Val (Gs(y))+o(0 ), 
A xB 
each sES, 
s s 
then the limit recursion equation has a solution 
0 z y g0+d0+o{0 )EF . 
PROOF. Suppose that yEF~ is such that 
Let v=D.0-l/M.1 with DElR. 
z 
M+l 
K(ys)= Val {G (y))+o(0 M ). 
A XB s 
s s 
D 
M+l 2M+l 
D 
K(ys+vs)= Val (Gs(ys+vs))+(C+M)O 
A xB 
s s 
M ) , we obtain for each sES : 
M+l M+l 
M + o(G M for some cEJR. 
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Then by choosing D appropriately we see that there exist y and yEF2 , with 
- M 
y<:y_, such that, for each sES: 
(8.2.11) K(y) 2 
s 
Val (G (y)) 2 Val (G (y_)) 2 
A XB S A XB S 
s s s s 
Since both the operator K and the val-operator are monotone and continuous, 
(8.2.11) assures the existence of any, with y<:y<:y_, such that 
K{y )=Val (G (y)), sES. 
s A xB s 
s s 
From the solution of the limit discount equation, we see that if 
* -1/M 
x =g8+c0+o(G ), then 
(8. 2 .12) 
-1 
Val (G (g8+c0 -g ))+o(G J, 
A XB s 
s s 
all sEs, 
which by theorem 8.2.1 proves to be equivalent to l!FV(T)-Tg\1-s;B log T. 
Now the condition of lemma 8.2.17 appears to be the step "one-stronger" 
than (8.2.12). So in view of lemma 8.2.17 we have the feeling that the 
condition of theorem 8.2.16 is also a necessary one for the property 
\IFv'.1)-1gll-s; B. However we have not yet been able to provide either a 
proof or a counterexample of this conjecture. 
8.3. GAMES WITH A VALUE INDEPENDENT OF THE INITIAL STATE. 
In this section we consider the class of stochastic games for which 
the average reward value g has the form g=g*.lz Some of the results of 
this section can also be found in Vrieze (1979a). 
8.3.1. THEOREM. For a two-person zerosum stochastic game with finite state 
and action spaces, the following assertions are equivalent. 
(i} g=g* .1 2 • 
(ii) there exists a g*EJR.such that, for each e:>O, there exists a 
v(e:)(JR.2 with 
D 
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(8. 3 .1) Iv (s)+g*-(Val 
s A xB 
s s 
G (v(s))l I ,; £, 
s 
each sES. 
PROOF. Suppose that (i) is true. From the solution of the limit discount 
equation we derive 
(8.3.2) Val 
A xB 
s s 
By assumption, c =g*.1 . Hence, we see from (8.3.2) that, for fixed s>O, M M z 
v(s)= E c, tk/M, for sufficiently large t, satisfies assertion (ii) of the 
k=O .<. 
theorem. 
Now suppose that (ii) is true. Fix £>0 and let v(£) satisfy (8.3.1). 
Let p (£) be an optimal action for player 1 in the matrix game [G (v(£))] 
s s 
and let p(c) be the stationary strategy p(c)=(p 1 (£), ... ,pz(c)). Then for 
each pure stationary strategy op of player 2: 
(8.3.3) v(c)+g*.1 -£.1 ,; r(p(c),0P)+P(p(£),0P).v(£). 
z z 
Multiplying (8.3.3) from the left by Q(p(c),crp) gives: 
(8.3.4) 
But (8.3.4) implies by corollary 3.5, and the fact that c>O is arbitrary: 
(8.3.5) g*.lz $sup inf Wµv 
µ v 
Similarly we can derive 
(8.3.6) g*.1z ~ inf sup wµv 
v µ 
Since for each function f(µ,v) it holds that inf sup f(µ,v)~sup inf f(µ,v), 
v µ µ v 
the combination of (8.3.5) and (8.3.6) shows that assertion (i) is true. 
8.3.2. THEOREM. If for a stochastic game g=g*.lz' then 
(a) Both players possess £-optimal stationary strategies for each c>O. 
(b) Both players have optimal Markov strategies. 
0 
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PROOF. (a) This follows from the proof of the preceding theorem; especially 
(8.3.4) shows by corollary 3.5 that p(£) is an £-optimal stationary 
strategy. 
Concerning (b) , an optimal Markov strategy can be constructed by making 
FVs(T) 
use of the fact that ~-T~- converges to g* for each state sES (a scheme 
for such a Markov strategy can be found in Bewley & Kohlberg (1978, 
page 117)). 
8.3.3. REMARK. £-optimal stationary strategies can be derived from the 
solution of the limit discount equation. Namely, let ps(T) be an optimal 
action for player 1 in the matrix game [G (x*(T))] which has value x*(T). ST S 
D 
Then the stationary strategy p(T)=(p 1 (T) , ... ,pz(T)), which is optimal for 
the discounted stochastic game with interest rate T- 1 , is, for sufficiently 
large T, £-optimal for the average reward game. This can be shown along the 
same lines as the relations (8.3.2), (8.3.3) and (8.3.4) were established. 
Federgruen has given a characterization for the class of games with a 
value independent of the initial state and for which in addition both 
players possess optimal stationary strategies. In fact his result equals 
lemma 8.1.3. In the next lemma we extend this characterization with three 
further equivalencies. 
8.3.4. LEMMA. The next assertions are equivalent. 
(i) g=g*.lz and both players have optimal stationary strategies. 
(ii) there exist a wEJRz and a g*(JR such that 
Val 
A xB 
s s 
(G (w)), 
s 
each sES. 
* (iii) x*(G) has the property that cM=g .lz and cM_ 1=cM_ 2= ... =c 1=02 • 
(iv) there exists a g*CJR such that n F(£)~0, where F(s) for s>O 
(v) 
equals the set of vectors v(£) 
there exists a g*EJR such that 
and each TUN. 
£>O . f . ( 3 ) satis ying 8. . 1 . 
i[FV(T)-Tg*.l II ::; B, with BEJR 
z 
PROOF. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is already proved in lemma 8.1.3, 
while the equivalence of (ii) and (iii) is a special case of theorem 
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8.2.1 (since g=g*.lz it follows that E1s=As and E2s=Bs). From theorem 
8.3.1 we infer that (ii) and (iv) are equivalent assertions. Finally 
theorem 8.2.12 states the equivalence of (i) and (v). 
D 
In the following theorem we give a sufficient and necessary condition for 
one player to have an optimal stationary strategy (cf. remark 8.1.9). 
8.3.5. THEOREM. For a stochastic game with average payoff value g*.lz' 
player 1 has an optimal stationary strategy if and only if there exists 
a vector vEJRz' such that 
(8.3.7) vs+g*,; Val (Gs(v)), 
A xB 
s s 
each sES. 
PROOF. Suppose that (8.3.7) holds. Let the stationary strategy p be such 
that p :is optimal for player 1 in [G (v)]. Then inequalities (8.3.3) and 
s s 
(8.3.4) hold with £=0 and p(£) replaced by p. Then corollary 3.5 shows that 
p is optimal. 
Now suppose that p* is an optimal stationary strategy for player 1. By 
considering MDP(p*) it follows, from the minimizing version of theorem 
A.2.6, that there exists a ;'EJR2 with 
z 
~ 
vs+g* min 
jEB 
s 
{r(s,p*,j)+ l: p(tls,p*,j).;'t}' 
s t=l s 
sES. 
But since 
z 
min { r ( s, p *, j )+ l: p ( t I s, p *, j) . ~ } ,; 
jEB s t=l s t 
s 
we see that v satisfies (8.3.7). 
Val (G (;')) 
s A l<B 
s s 
Obviously an analogous statement of theorem 8.3.5 can be made 
concerning player 2. Note that, if in (8.3.7) for some v the equality 
sign holds for each sES, then by lemma 8.3.4 also player 2 has an optimal 
stationary strategy. 
We finish this section by demonstrating a curious phenomenon. In lemma 
8.3.4 we have seen that if the solution of the limit discount equation has 
. M-1 k/M 
properties (a) c =g*.1 and (b) l: eke =O, then both players have 
M z k=l z 
D 
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optimal stationary strategies. A stochastic game for which the solution 
of the limit 
M~lc 8k/M20 
k=l k z 
discount equation has the properties (a) above and (b'l 
appears more favourable and easier to play from the viewpoint 
of player 1 than that with properties (a) and (b).Thus one would be 
inclined to believe that (a) and (b') would imply the existence of an 
optimal stationary strategy for player 1. The next example shows that in 
general the above suggestion need not be true. However the converse of 
this statement does hold i.e. 
k/M if player 1 has an optimal stationary strategy, then L eke 20 . 
k=l z Further, this property holds for arbitrary cM. This can be seen by 
M-1 
observing that x*(8)2V *(8), if p* is an optimal stationary strategy where p 
V *(8) equals the solution of the limit discount equation associated with p 
MDP(p*). Since Vp*(8)=cM8+0(8°) the assertion follows. 
8.3.6. EXAMPLE. 
1 
lo-:::71 ~ 
2 3 4 
Let x*=(xi,x2,x3,x4J be the solution of the limit discount equation. The 
states 1 and 2 can be considered apart. 
Solving the limit discount equation for these two states results in 
! -1 
xi=8 (1+8 ) and x2=0, so g 1=0 and g 2=0. Obviously each stationary strategy 
of player 1 is optimal in the states 1 and 2. 
Now consider the states 3 and 4. Define for O<c<l the stationary strategy 
pc as follows: p~ and p~ are arbitrary, p~ and p: both put weight c on 
the first action and weight 1-E on the second. Then for the states 3 and 4, 
PE guarantees player 1 an average payoff -€. On the other hand player 2 can 
assure himself an average payoff 0 for the states 3 and 4 by playing his 
second action in these states. Conclusion: the average reward value of 
this game equals (0,0,0,0). Furthermore it can be 
no optimal stationary strategy. So if we can show 
checked that player 1 
M-1 k, 
that z ckse 1 ~o for 
k=l 
has 
the 
states s=3 and s=4 then we are ready (for s=l and s=2 this inequality 
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* * follows from x1 and x2 ) • 
-1 Consider the game with interest rate t Let p(t) be as follows: 
p 1 (t) and p2 (t) are optimal in the t-1 discounted game, both p 3 (t) and 
p4 (t) are such that the first row is chosen with probability t-~ and the 
-~ -1 
second row with probability 1-t • Let y 3 (t) and y 4 (t) be the t -
discounted expected payoff that the strategy p(t) guarantees player 1 in 
state 3 and state 4 respectively. 
Then by theorem A.2.5: 
(8.3.8) 
and 
(8.3.9) 
-1 
-1 tl (l+t -1) -! (1-t ) ·Y3 (T) 
minh • _1 - (1-T )+ ----_-:1,---
l+T l+t 
t -! l t .y3 (T)-(1-T )y4 (T) 
- T - + --------.,.----} 
l+T -l 
-1 l l(l -1) -! (1-T ).y4 (T) 
minh- .' +T_ 1 - (1-T )+ -----,,.---
l+T i+t-l 
-! -t T . y 3 (T) + ( 1-T ) . y 4 ( T) 
------~1----}. 
l+T 
Suppose in (8.3.8) that the minimum is attained by the first component, 
then: 
or 
(8.3.10) 
-1 (l+T )y3 (T) 
-1 l+T y (T) = --
3 l+T-! 
-t -1 -t T (l+T )+(1-T ).y3 (T), 
Similarly if in (8.3.9) the minimum is attained by the first component, 
then 
(8. 3 .11) 
Now suppose that as well in (8.3.8) as in (8.3.9) the second component 
-~ yields the minimum, then from (8.3.9) we get y 3 (T)=y4 (T) (1+T ). 
Substitution of this relation in (8.3.8) with respect to the second 
component results in: 
or 
(8. 3 .12) 
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The above analysis shows, by (8.3.10), (8.3.11) and (8.3.12) that in both 
(8.3.8) and (8.3.9) the minimum is attained by the second component, and 
* -~ that (8.3.12) represents the solution. Obviously x3 (T)~y 3 (T)=-(1+T ) and 
* x4 (T)~y4 (T)=-1 for sufficiently large T. Hence we may conclude that 
M-1 M-1 
L ckseks~O for s=3 and s=4. In fact L c eks=O for s=3 and s=4. Namely 
k=1 k=l ks 
if in the states 3 and 4 player 2 always chooses his second action, then, 
for each discount factor, this strategy assures him a discounted expected 
payoff of at most 0 for the initial states s=3 or s=4. 
Summarizing, example 
value cM=g*.1 2 , for which 
8.3.6 is a stochastic game with average payoff 
M-1 k/ 
L eke ~Oz, but for which player 1 has no 
k=l 
optimal stationary strategy. 
138 
8.4. ON THE EXISTENCE OF EASY INITIAL STATES. 
* **--In this section we show that there exist non-empty subsets, S , S cS 
such that, at least for the states belonging to s*(s**i, player 1 (player 2) 
can assure himself the average payoff value by choosing an appropriate 
stationary strategy. A state with this property is called an easy initial 
state for player 1 (player 2). 
The results of this section are based on Tijs & Vrieze (1986). 
In section 7.2 we have mentioned the important result of Bewley & Kohlberg, 
that the solution of the limit discount equation is of the form 
(8. 4.1) * x (6) 
* and x 
s 
It follows from a well-known result of Weyl (1950) that, for the matrix game 
z 
l: p(tls,.,.)x~ 
t=l ] 
1+e-1 
on AsxB5 , the players possess 
m 
optimal actions, say f (8j and g (8) respectively, such that f (8)EFMs and 
Ilg s s "' s g5 (8)EFM. From now on we fix such an optimal action f 5 (8), for each sES, 
for player 1. 
lN will denote the set {-1,-2, ••. }. 
We recall that 
(8. 4. 2) f (8) 
s 
where for each sES and each kElN - : 
(8. 4. 3) f EP(A ), l: f (i)=1, E fk (i)=O 
os s iEA os iEA s 
s s 
and where for each sES, iEA5 and kElN-: 
(8.4.4) 
(8.4.5) if 'fis(i)=O, £=k+1,k+2, ••. ,o. 
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Let p be the stationary strategy for player 1 with ps:=f05 • Note that 
p =lim f (T). By lemma 7.2.2 (f1 (T), .•• ,fz(T)) is optimal in the discounted S T-+oo S 
stochastic game with interest rate T-l, hence we see that p can be considered 
as the limit of optimal stationary strategies for player 1 in discounted 
games with interest rate a, for a~O. We shall show in this section that this 
strategy p for player 1 is optimal for all specific plays starting in a non-
* * empty subset S Here S is defined as follows. Let 
(8.4.6) max 
sES 
(the maximum is taken with respect to the order in F; note that ~ is a 
scalar). Then 
M M 
s* := {sEsl E ~ek/M= E cksek/M}. 
k=1 k=1 
(8. 4. 7) 
M k/M * If we call Lk=lckse of expression (8.4.1) the main part of xs' then we 
can say that s* consists precisely of those states in S with maximal main 
part. Observe that E~=lcksek/M corresponds to the positive powers of 8. 
* Theorem 8.4.1 below states that S consists of easy initial states for 
player 1. 
* 8.4.1. THEOREM. The states in S are easy states for player 1. Namely if 
* the initial state s of a specific game belongs to the set S , then 
player 1 can guarantee himself the average payoff value cMs by means of 
the stationary strategy p. 
A similar theorem can be formulated for player 2. The elements of the 
** * set S consisting of those states s for which the main part of xs is 
minimal, are easy states for player 2. 
The proof of theorem 8.4.1 is postponed until we have proved a number 
of preliminary lemma's. 
From now on fix an arbitrarily chosen pure stationary strategy crP, 
which puts weight 1 on some action j EB , sES. Since f (8) is an optimal 
* s s s 
action in the matrix game [Gs8 (x )], we have for each sES: 
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(8.4.8) 
in which 
(8.4.9) 
* -1 -1 * 
-x +R +c1+0 l . r P t(xt) ~ o, 
s s t€s s 
R 
s 
0 
:= r 1\s0k/M 
k=-m 
is the expected immediate reward in state s, and 
(8.4.10) 
0 
Pst := r P 6k/M 
k=-m kst 
can be interpreted as the probability that the system jumps to state t€S, 
if in state s player 1 uses the mixed action f (6) and player 2 chooses j • 
s s 
For the coefficients in (8.4.9) and (8.4.10) we have for all kE{0,-1,-2, ••• } 
and sES: 
(8.4.11) r r(s,i,j )fk (i) 
iEA s s 
s 
and 
(8.4.12) Pk t = r pCtls,i,j )fk Ci). 
s iEA s s 
s 
For further use, we note that in view of (8.4.3), (8.4.4) and (8.4.5) we 
have, for all k€:N-, that: 
(8.4.13) r Post 1, r P = 0 
tES t€S kst 
(8.4.14) Post ~ 0 
(8.4.15) Pkst ~ 0 if PJl,st=O, Jl,=k+1,k+2, ••• ,o. 
Denote the left side of (8.4.8) by the Puiseux series EM v 6k/M Then k=-..,..ks • 
for each k<M: 
(8.4.16) if YJl,s=O, Jl,=k+1,k+2, ••• ,M. 
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In the following, we are especially interested in the expressions for 
the coefficients corresponding to non-negative powers. For them we obtain, 
as a result of (8.4.8), (8.4.9), (8.4.10) and (8.4.1): 
(8.4.17) 
18 .4 .18) 
-c + i.: 
ks tES 
0 
i.: p C I 
2=-(M-k) 2st k-2t 
0 
k=M,M-1, ... , 1 
-c0 +R0 + l: l: P c - l: p c 
s s tES 2=-M 2st -2t tES Ost Mt 
The following subsets of Splay a rule. For kE{M,M-1, ... ,1}, let 
(B.4.19) {sEsly2s=O, 2E{k,k+1, ... ,M}} 
(8.4.20) 
(cf. (8.4.6) for the definition of d 2J. 
The elements of Tk correspond to the set of states s for which the M-k+l 
leading coefficients of the Puiseux series x:=l:~=-oocksek/M are equal to 
h k 1 1 . f . . f h . 1 . ~M d 8k/M t e M- + eading coe ficients o t e maxima main part Lk=l k . 
Furthe~ Sk can be interpreted as the set of states s for which the action 
js of player 2 is a best answer to the optimal action fs(8) of player 1 
in the matrix game [G (8)] with respect to the M-k+l highest powers of 8. s 
Define also SM+l:=S and TM+l:=S. Observe that 
(8 .4. 21) 
(8.4.22) * s 
From (8.4.16) we obtain 
(8.4.23) 2: 0 
(8.4.24) yk-1 s > 0 
and from (8.4.6) 
(8.4.25) 
for kE{M+l,M, ... ,2} 
for kE{M+l,M, ... ,1} and sESk 
for kE{M+l,M, ... ,2} and sESk'Sk-l 
for kE{M+l,M, ... ,2} and sETk 
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(8.4.26) c < k-1 s for kE{M+l,M, •.. ,2} and sETk'Tk-l 
In lemma 8.4.4 we shall show that the following two properties hold 
for each kE{M,M-1, ... ,1}. 
Property (Yk) : Tk C Sk 
Property (Zk): Plst = 0 for all sETk, tE8'Tk-l 
lE{0,-1, ... ,-(M-k)}. 
8.4.2. LEMMA. If property (Zk) holds for some kE{M,M-1, .•• ,2}, then for each 
sETk-l and each lE{-1,-2, ... ,-(M-k+l)}. 
(a) Plst ~ 0, for all tETk-l,Tk-l-l 
(b) I Plst - I Plst 
tETk-l'Tk-1-1 tETk-1-1 
PROOF. By (Zk) and (8.4.21) we have for lE{-1,-2, ... ,-(M-k+l)}, 0 i£>1, and 
tETk-l'Tk-l-l' 11.'st=O, which by (8.4.15) implies part (a) of the lemma. 
Furthermore by (Zk) and (8.4.21) 
Plst 0, 
which in view of (8.4.13) proves part (b) of the lemma. 
Let for fixed kE{M,M-1, ... ,2} 
(8.4.27) 
(8.4.28) I plstck-1-lt' lE{-1,-2, ..• ,-(M-k+l)} 
tES 
Then from the definition of yk-l s (cf. 8.4.17) it follows that 
0 
(8.4.29) yk-1 s = I ~ls" 
1=-(M-k+l) 
a 
8.4.3. LEMMA. If the properties (Yk) and (Zk) hold for some kE{M,M-1, ... ,2}, 
then ukls = 0 for each s E Tk-l and each 1 E {0,-1, ... ,-(M-k+l)}. 
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PROOF. In view of sETk_ 1cTk, (8.4.20), (Zk), (8.4.25) and (8.4.13) we have 
(8.4.30) 1\.os -d + k-1 L P .c 1 5 d. (-1+ L P0 ) = 0 T Ost k- t --k-1 T st t€ k t€ k 
And by (Zk), (8.4.20), lemma 8.4.2(a) and (b) and (8.4.25) we have for 
each iE{-1,-2, ... ,-(M-k+l)} 
(8.4.31) 
Now observe that sETk_ 1cTkcsk (since (Yk) holds) implies with (8.4.23) that 
(8.4.32) 
But then the combination of (8.4.29)-(8.4.32) gives the assertion of the 
lemma. 
D 
8.4.4. LEMMA. The properties (Yk) and (Zk) hold for each kE{M,M-1, ... ,1}. 
PROOF. We prove the lemma by induction with respect to k. For k=M, we 
have by (8.4.16), (8.4.17) and (8.4.25) and sETM: 
0 5 YMs = -c + L p .c 5 dM(-1 + L po ) o. Ms tES 0 st Mt tES st 
Then clearly cMt =dM for t such that Po st>O and this proves both (YM) and 
(ZM). 
Now take kE{M,M-1, ••• ,2}. We shall show that (Yk) and (Zk) imply 
(Yk-l) and (Zk_ 1 ), which terminates the proof of the lemma. If we could 
prove that for each sETk-l the following three statements are true: 
(8.4.33) O, 
(8.4. 34) 0 
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(8.4.35) Ptst = 0 if t€Tk-t'Tk-l-t and t€{-1,-2, ••• ,-(M-k+1)}, 
then we can combine (Yk) and (8.4.33), using (8.4.21) to conclude that 
(Yk-l) holds; and we can combine (Zk), (8.4.34) and (8.4.35) to conclude 
that (Zk-l) holds. 
So the only assertions to prove are (8.4.33)-(8.4.35). 
Fix s€Tk-l" Firstly from (8.4.29) and lemma 8.4.3 we derive (8.4.33). Next 
observe from (8.4.25) and (8.4.26) that ~os=O if and only if (8.4.34) 
holds; hence lemma 8.4.3, taking t=O, shows that (8.4.34) is true. Finally 
from (8.4.31), lemma 8.4.2(a) and (8.4.26) we see that1kts=O if and only 
if (8.4.35) holds, but then lemma 8.4.3, taking successively 
t=-1,-2, ••• ,-(M-k+l), guarantees (8.4.35). 
* 8.4.5. LEMMA. For s€S =T1 we have 
-1 
(a) l: l: Ptst.c-tt :5 0 
t€S t=-M 
(b) l: p Ost cMt = dM • 
t€S 
P.ROOF. From lemma 8.4.4 (property (Zk) for k=l and t=O) and (8.4.20) we 
* infer fer s ES = T1: 
l: p c = l: p c 
t€S Ost Mt t€T Ost Mt 
1 
which proves part (b). 
* Fix s E S "'T1 • 
Take tE{-1,-2, ••• ,-M}. For each 1€{0,-1, ••• ,-t+l} we have in view of 
lemma 8.4.4, taking k=1: 
(8.4.36) 
(8.4. 37) 
But then by (8.4.15) and (8.4.37): 
(8.4.38) ~ 0 
c 
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And by (8.4.13) and (8.4.36): 
E P = - E P . 
tET 'T 2st tET 2st 
1-2 -2 -2 
(8.4. 39) 
Now the combination of (8.4.36), (8.4.6), (8.4.39) and (8.4.38) yields 
for each 2E{-1,-2, ..• ,-M}: 
E P c + E P c $ 
tET 'T 2st -2t tET 2st -2t 
1-2 -2 -2 
E P c + E P d 
tET 'T 2st -2t tET 2st -2 
1-2 -2 -2 
which proves part (a) of the lemma. 
* 8.4.6. LEMMA. For each sES , we have 
(a) 
(b) * for tES'S . 
* PROOF. Since S =T1 , part (b) is already proved in lemma 8.4.4 (property 
(Zk) for k=l and ~=O). 
* Take sES . Then by property (Y1 ) of lemma 8.4.4 we see that sEs 1 . 
Hence by (8.4.23) and (8.4.18): 
0 
(8.4.40) o $ Yos = -c +R + l: l: P" tc-" - E Po t"cMt Os Os tES 2=-M Ns Nt tES s 
Inserting lemma 8.4.S(a) and (b) into (8.4.40) proves the lemma. 
We are now ready to prove theorem 8.4.1. 
PROOF of theorem 8.4.1. 
Suppose that player 1 uses the stationary strategy p and player 2 the pure 
stationary strategy aP. Then by lemma 8.4.6 part (b), we see that the 
* 
0 
Cl 
subset of states S can be treated separately, since the system cannot jump 
* out of S • 
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* * * * Let c0 , P 1 Q and r be the parts of c, P, Q and r respectively that 
* refer to S 
Then lemma 8.4.6(a), written in vector notation, gives (cf. (8.4.11) 
and (8. 4.12)) : 
(8.4.41) 
* ,.., aP Multiplying (8.4.41) by Q (p, ) gives then 
(8.4.42) *,.., p *,.., p Q (p,a ).r (p,a) ?: ~-lls*I" 
* Thus by (8.4.42) we have proved that for the states belonging to S , 
player 1 can assure himself the average reward value by playing p against 
each pure stationary strategy of player 2. But then by corollary 3.5 this 
is also the case against any strategy of player 2, by which theorem 
8.4.1 is proved. 
We conclude this section with two examples. In the first example the 
* ** set of easy initial states of player 1 (player 2) coincides with S (S ) 
and S=s*us** s*ns**=~. In the second example s* (s**> is a proper subset 
of the set of easy initial states of player (player 2) and there is a 
state which is easy for neither player. 
8.4.7. EXAMPLE. 
m~l 0 2 1 0 -1 
2 2 
1 2 
* * * Obviously by symmetry we have x (6)=(x1,-x1), and by solving the limit 
discount equation we obtain x;=~/(26+1)-~. Hence s*={1} and s**~{2}. The 
value of the undiscounted stochastic game is (O,O), and it can be 
verified that only state 1 is easy for player 1 and only state 2 is easy 
for player 2. 
For the strategy p, as defined at the beginning of this section, we have 
c 
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that p prescribes the choice of the first row in both states (p is unique 
in this game). This strategy is optimal for player 1 if the game starts 
in state 1. 
8.4.8. EXAMPLE. 
3 4 
* * * Here x (8)=(x1,0,-x1 ,0), and by solving the limit discount equation we 
obtain 
-1 I (1+8 ) ( (8+1)-1) 
This implies that s*={l}, s**={3} and that the value of the undiscounted 
game is (O,O,O,O). 
State 4 is not easy for either player, and state 1 (state 3) is not an 
easy initial state for player 2 (player 1), while state 2 is easy for 
both players. 
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9. Algorithms for undiscounted stochastic games. 
In section 9.2 we shall show how stochastic games in which one player 
controls the transitions can be solved by a linear programming problem. In 
section 9.3 we consider the switching control stochastic game, by which we 
mean a game such that in each state only one of the players, but not in 
each state necessarily the same one, controls the transitions. It results 
that this class of games can be solved by a finite sequence of linear 
programming problems. 
In section 9.1 we give a review of well-known algorithms for 
undiscounted stochastic games. 
9.1. SOME KNOWN ALGORITHMS. 
The first algorithm we describe is the algorithm of Hoffman & Karp 
(1966). It can be applied to irreducible stochastic games, i.e. games for 
which, for each pair of pure stationary strategies, the corresponding 
stochastic matrix has a single ergodic class and no transient states. In 
part II, algorithm 6.1.2, we have given the discounted version of this 
algorithm. 
9. 1. 1. ALGORITHM (Hoffman & Karp) . 
(i) Choose v0E1Rz such that v~=O; let T :=O. 
(ii) Determine a stationary strategy cr'=(o~, ... ,cr~), such that 
optimal action for player 2 in the matrix game [G (v')]. 
s 
(iii) Solve the Markov decision problem, MDP(cr'), which results 
player 2 fixes cr'. This so~ution corresponds to the unique 
solution of the following set of equations: 
T+l _ Q 
vl - • 
z 
max {r(s,i,cr')+ E p(tls,i,o'J.vT+l}, 
iEA s t=1 s t 
s 
(iv) T:=T+l and go to step (ii). 
sEs 
cr' is an 
s 
when 
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Hoffman & Karp have shown that the sequence (g',v'), T=1,2, ••. has a limit, 
* * say (g ,v ) , for which 
(9.1. 1) * * g +vs Val 
A xB 
s s 
* (GS (v ) ) 1 sES. 
From lemma 8.1.3-we recall that (9.1.1) implies that the value equals 
g*.1z' while optimal actions in [Gs(v*)] for the players provide optimal 
stationary strategies. 
Federgruen (1978) has given two algorithms for undiscounted stochastic 
games. The first one can be applied succesfully whenever the stochastic game 
has the properties (a) both players have optimal stationary strategies, and 
(b) the average payoff value is independent of the initial state. This 
algorithm proceeds as follows. 
9.1.2. ALGORITHM (Federgruen) 
(i) Fix a sequence a,, T=l,2, •.. , which satisfies 
as T-+oo 
(for example the choice a =T-y with O<y~l satisfies these 
T 
relations) 
(ii) Choose v1E:JR.z such that v~=O. 
(iii) Calculate recursively for T=l,2, ..• 
T+l g 
T+l 
v 
s 
Val 
A XB 
s s 
-1 Z T (r(l,.,.)+(l+a) l: p(tj1,.,.)v) 
T t=l t 
-1 Z T T+l (r(s,.,.)+(l+a) l: p(tjs,.,.)v )-g , 
T t=1 t 
In fact this algorithm is an extension of the modified value-
iteration method of Hordijk & Tijms (1975) to stochastic games. 
sES. 
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* The way in which this algorithm approximates the value g . lz of the game and 
produces £-optimal stationary strategies is given by the following 
properties. Let 
Then 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
lim m 
m 
T 
--'[ T->= 
min 
sES 
max 
sES 
lim m 
T->= 
{ T+l T+l (l )-1 T} 
VS +g - +aT VS • 
T * lim g g T T-><o 
* T lim v exists and equals v (say), where 
T->= 
* * * g +v Val (G (v ) ) , sES 
s s A ><B 
s s 
* T 
m '.S g '.S m and m '.S g s m 
--'[ T --'[ T 
(d) If rnT-E.:_T<£, then gT is an £-approximation of g*, and a stationary 
strategy for a player built up from optimal actions of the matrix 
-1 z I T games [r(s,.,.)+(1+a) L p(t s,.,.)vt] is £-optimal for that 
T t=l player. 
The second algorithm of Federgruen (1978) can be applied to stochastic 
games for which for each pair of pure stationary strategies, the 
corresponding Markov chain is unichained (transient states are allowed). In 
addition it is assumed that the data-transformation of Schweitzer (1971) is 
carried out in order to ensure the strong aperiodicity property, i.e. 
p(tjs,i,j)>O for all t,s,i,j. For this class of games the data-
transformation leaves unchanged both the value of the game and the sets of 
optimal stationary strategies of the players. Furthermore the aperiodicity 
T * property ensures the convergence of the sequence of vectors w -T.g .lz, 
T=0,1, ... , where w0 is arbitrary and 
(9. 1. 2) T w 
s 
:= Val 
A xB 
s s 
(G (WT-1)) 
s 
for T2:1 and sES. 
This leads to the following algorithm, which bears a resemblance to 
algori thrn 9. 1. 2 . 
152 
9.1.3. ALGORITHM (Federgruen). 
1 z 1 (i) Choose v EJR , such that v 1=o. 
(ii) Calculate recursively for T=1,2, •.• 
T+1 g 
T+l 
v 
s 
z 
Val ( r (1 , • , • ) + E p ( t I 1 , • , • ) v ~) 
A1xB 1 t=l 
Val 
A xB 
s s 
z I T T+l (r(s,.,.)+ E p(t s,.,.)vtl-g 
t=l 
Federgruen has shown that for this algorithm the same relations hold 
as for algorithm 9.1.2, mentioned under (a)-(d) (now aT=O in the 
definitions of~ and mT).In addition, the convergence of~ and mT is 
monotone. Furthermore the convergence rate is geometric as a consequence 
of the data-transformation. 
Finally we wish to mention some of the results of Van der Wal (1981). 
His algorithm agrees with the standard method of successive approximations, 
which is represented by equation (9.1.2). A scheme which reflects his 
algorithm would be algorithm 9.1.3 above. Van der Wal shows that this 
algorithm can be applied to two classes of stochastic games. 
The first one is the same class as Federgruen treats with algorithm 
9.1.3. Van der Wal obtained similar results as Federgruen. Moreover he 
proved that under the strong aperiodicity assumption it holds that 
T+l T 
w -w 
if T+m, where y is a constant, O<y~l, depending on the transition 
probabilities of the game. 
In the second case Van der Wal (1981) considers the class of games 
for which the set of equations 
Val (G (v)), 
A xB S 
s s 
sES 
has a solution. If in addition the data transformation is carried out, then 
h h th t th f 11 i h ld P tt . T T+l T E ( T , d f' d e s ows a e o ow ng o s. u 1ng gs:=ws -ws, s S w is e ine 
as in (9.1.2)) and m :=max gT and m :=min gT, then both m and m converge 
T sES s ---'! sES s T -T 
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* * monotonically tog , where g .lz is the average payoff value of the game. 
This demonstrates that in this case also the method of standard successive 
approximation yields an £-band around the value of the game and nearly 
optimal stationary strategies for the players. 
9.2. STOCHASTIC GAMES WHERE ONE PLAYER CONTROLS THE TRANSITIONS. 
In this section a linear programming problem is elaborated which 
solves the class of games for which only one of the players governs the 
transitions. A consequence of our analysis is a constructive proof of the 
orderfield property for this class of games (cf. Parthasarathy & Raghavan 
(1981)). 
A stochastic game in which the transition probabilities are 
controlled by one player is a special case of a switching control 
stochastic game as defined in definition 6.3.1. 
9.2.1. DEFINITION. A stochastic game in which player 2 governs the 
transitions is a game for which p(tls,i,j)=p(tls,i,j) for all 
(i,i)EAsxAs' each jEBs and each (s,t)Esxs. This probability is 
abbreviated to p(tls,j). 
Stern (1975) proved that such games have an average payoff value. 
Bewley & Kohlberg (1978) and Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1978) independently 
showed that both players possess optimal stationary strategies. In 
addition Parthasarathy & Raghavan have proved the orderfield property for 
this class of games, i.e. the property that a solution of the game lies 
in the same Archimedean field as its parameters. By a solution we mean the 
value plus optimal stationary strategies. Given this property it was to be 
expected that a solution could be found by a finite procedure. Filar & 
Raghavan (1979) have given such a procedure. However their algorithm is 
rather cumbersome, since many computations have to be done. For instance 
for each pair of pure stationary strategies the average payoff must be 
computed. From these payoffs z matrix games are constructed. The values of 
these matrix games correspond to the value of the stochastic game. 
However to find optimal stationary strategies still further calculations 
must be carried out. 
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Below we will formulate a linear programming problem, whose solution 
gives in one blow the value of the game and optimal stationary strategies 
for both players. The results of this section are deduced from Vrieze 
(1981a). 
Independently Hordijk & Kallenberg (1981b) have proposed a similar 
algorithm. They analysed their linear programming problem in detail and 
have stated some interesting properties of it. 
We first state the algorithm, then show that this linear programming 
problem has'-a solution and lastly prove that this solution corresponds to 
a solution of the stochastic game. 
Consider the following linear programming problem in the variables 
(g1 , ... ,gz), (v 1 , ... ,vz), xs(i), sES, iEAs. 
9.2.2. ALGORITHM. 
LPl: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
z 
max L gs, subject to 
s=l 
z 
g - l: p(tl s,j) .g '50 
s t=l t 
, sES, jEBs 
z 
g +v - l: x (i).r(s,i,j)- l: p(tls,j).v '50 
s s iEA s t=l t 
s 
l: x (i)=l, x (i)::O:O 
iEA s s 
, sES, iEAs. 
s 
The dual linear programming problem in the variables (w1 , .•. ,wz), 
ys(j), zs(j), sES, jEBs is: 
DLPl: 
z 
min L w subject to 
s=l s 
( j) 
( j j) 
(jjj) 
(jv) 
(Here c'J 
st 
z 
l: 
s=l 
z 
l: 
s=l 
L: ( 0 t -p ( t I s I j) J y ( j) + l: z ( j) = 1 
.E s s ·- t J Bs JtBt 
l: ( 0 t -p ( t I s, j) ) z ( j) =0 ' tES 
jEB s s 
s 
- l: z ( j) . r ( s, i, j) +w ::o:o 
jEB s s 
, sES, iEAs 
s 
, sES, jEBs. 
1 if s = t and o 
st Oelse.) 
I tES 
Note that the set X:={xlx:={x (i) ;sES, iEA }, x satisfies (iii)} 
s s 
corresponds to the set of stationary strategies of player 1 in a one to 
one manner in the following way. If xEX, then define 
(9.2 .1) 
which obviously is a stationary strategy for player 1 in view of 
condition (iii). On the other hand for a stationary strategy p define 
(9.2.2) xp by xp (i) :=p (i). 
s s 
p (xp) (px) 
Then x EX and clearly p =p and x =x. 
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Intuitively, for any state s the numbers zs(j), jEBs are proportional 
to the probabilities of player 2 choosing his pure actions at state s. 
9.2.3. LEMMA. Both linear programming problems are feasible and have 
bounded solutions. 
PROOF. Consider the primal problem. Observe that if g = min r(t,i,j), each 
s (t,i,j) 
sES and vs=O, sES and xEX arbitrary, then (g,v,x) satisfies (i)-(iii), and 
thus the primal problem is feasible. 
Now let (g,v,x) be a feasible solution and let op be an arbitrary 
pure stationary strategy of player 2. Then from (i) and (ii) we obtain 
(in vector notation): 
(9.2.3) 
(9.2.4) 
(Since, for a pair of stationary strategies p and a the transition 
probability matrix depends only on a we will write P(o) instead of P(p,o) .) 
From (9.2.3) and (9.2.4) we derive by lemma 8.1.1: 
(9.2.5) 
Now (9.2.5) shows that g is bounded from above (e.g. by 
uniformly in the feasible solutions (g,v,x). 
max r ( s , i, j ) ) 
(s,i,j) 
Hence a finite optimal solution to the primal problem exists. 
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From the duality theorem for linear programming problems it follows that 
the dual problem also is feasible and has a bounded solution. 
9.2.4. LEMMA. Let (g,v,x) be a feasible solution to the primal problem. 
Then 
minWx<!g. 
" p " 
PROOF. This result can be deduced immediately from (9.2.5) by using 
corollary 3.5. 
c 
c 
In the following we will frequently use some properties of the Cesaro 
limit Q of a stochastic matrix P. These properties are outlined in section 
8.1. We recall that if P is a stochastic matrix corresponding to an ergodic 
Markov chain, then Q:=lill\r--(T+1)-lE~=OP' has the properties: (a) each row 
of Q is identical and equal to the law vector q (say), (b) q is the 
invariant distribution of P, i.e. the unique solution to qP=q, E q =1, 
s€S s 
and (c) each component of q is strictly positive. 
Associated with a feasible solution (w,y,z) to the dual program, we 
define a number of quantities: 
(9.2.6) 
(9.2. 7) 
(9.2.8) 
(9.2.9) 
(9.2 .10) 
u := E z (j), 
s 'EB s 
J s 
s0 :={sjsES and us=O} 
'; (j) :=z (j)/u , 
s s s 
sEs--s0 and jEBs 
d := E (y (j) +z (j)), sES 
s jEB s s 
s 
y (j):=(y (j)+z (j))/d, sES, jEBS 
s s s s 
Observe that from condition (j) we have E y t (j) > O if . 1: Zt(j) 
thus ds > 0 for each SES. 
jEBt J€Bt 0 
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~ * Further, stationary strategies a and a for player 2 are defined as: 
(9.2 .11) sES, jEBs 
(9.2.12) 
It will result that a* is optimal for player 2 if it is associated with 
an optimal solution (w,y,z) of DLPl. 
9.2.5. REMARK. Observe from the conditions (j) and (jj) that: 
z 
l: l: (a t-p<tls,j)) (y (j)+z (j))+ l: z (j)=l, tEs 
s=l jEBs s s s jEBt t 
which in view of (9.2.6), (9.2.9) and (9.2.11) is equivalent to 
z 
(9.2.13) d - i: pCtls,cr J .d +ut=1, 
t s=l s s 
tES 
In the following we assume that, for a stationary strategy a of player 
2, after suitable rearranging of the states, P(o) has the form as in 
(8 .1. 3) . So 
P 11 (a) 0 I 0 
I 
I 
I 
P(a) 
0 P (a) I yy I 0 
----- ----------
I 
Py+ll Col P 1 (a) I p y+l y+l (a) y+ y 
Pnn(o) corresponds to the n-th ergodic class of P(o), whose set of 
states is denoted by E (a), nE{l, ... ,y}, and P 1 1 Co) corresponds to the n y+ y+ 
transient states of P(a). This set of transient states is denoted by T(o). 
,....., ,....., * * In the following y corresponds to a and y to a • 
If P=(p(tlsl) corresponds to a stochastic matrix, then for each cEJR2 : 
z z 
(9.2.14) l: (et- l: p(tlslcs)=O 
t=l s=l 
as a consequence of l:~=lp(tjs)=l. 
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* 9.2.6. LEMMA. (a) u=u.P(cr ) • 
* (b) the transient states of P(cr ) are exactly the states s0 • 
PROOF. Part {a) follows immediately after inserting definitions (9.2.6) 
and (9.2.12) into condition (jj). Concerning part (b), note first that 
summing up condition (j) over tES yields 
(9.2 .15) 
z 
E u =z>O 
s=l s 
Now, by (9.2.15) and part (a) of the lemma, it follows from the theory of 
Markov chains that u can be written as a linear combination of the 
* invariant distributions of P(cr ): 
u=\(q1:0: ••• :0)+A.2 {0:q2 :0: .•. :0)+ ..• +A. *(O: .•• :O:q *:0), y y 
* 
with A. ~O, Ey 1:>.. =z and where q equals the unique invariant distribution n n= n n 
of P (a*), nE{l, .•• ,y*}. Note that the vector q is strictly positive. 
nn * n 
Hence if u >O, then sEF.v(cr) for some nE{l, •.• ,y*}, and moreover ut>O for 
s n 
each tE&v(cr*). Therefore, if we wish to show that s0 is exactly the set of 
n * 
transient states of P(cr ), it suffices to show that no ergodic class lies 
entirely within s0 . 
* * Suppose then for some nE{l, ••• ,y} that En(cr )cs0 . 
Summing up (9.2.13) over tEEn(cr*) yields in view of (9.2.14) (here jEnCcr*ll 
equals the number of states of ergodic class n): 
E 
tEE (a*) 
n 
E 
s~E (a*) 
n 
E p(tjs,j) .y (j) 
"EB s J s 
E ea*> I 
n 
As ys(j)~O the left hand side is non-positive, but then we have a 
contradiction since the right hand side is strictly positive. This shows 
* that the assumption En(cr )cs0 is wrong, which proves the lemma. 
9.2.7. COROLLARY. u can be written as 
u=A. 1 (q 1:0: •.. :0)+A.2 (0:q2 :0: •.• :0)+ ..• +A. *(O: .•. :O:q *:O) 
* y y 
with A. >O, nE{l, ... ,y*}, Ly 1:>.. =z, and where q equals the invariant n n= n n 
distribution of P (cr *) • 
nn 
[J 
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9.2.8. COROLLARY. Let pp be a pure stationary strategy for player 1. Then 
for each nE{l, •.. ,y*}: 
(9.2.16) (a) 
(9.2.17) (b) 
z 
l: 
s=l 
l: z (j) .r(s,pP,j) = AW (n) 
'EB s s n ppcr* J s 
* 
l: z (j) .r(s,pP,j) 
'EB s s J s 
y 
l: A .W (n) 
n=l n pPcr* 
(Here W p * (n) equals the expected payoff for the pair of strategies 
* p 0 * (pP,o) when the starting state of the specific play belongs to E (o ); 
n 
remember (cf. (8.1.4) and (8.1.6)) thatW p *isconstantonanergodicset). p 0 
Corollary 9. 2. 8 can be verified by writing z ( j) = ';' ( j ) . u , s € S\S 
s s s 0' 
next inserting the expression for u of corollary 9.2.7 in the left hand 
sides of (9.2.16) and (9.2.17), and by realizing that 
From now on (g,v,x) and (w,y,z) are assumed to correspond to a dual 
pair of optimal solutions. 
9.2.9. LEMMA. (a) ws=O for sEs0 
(b) l: w 
* s sEE (o ) 
n 
PROOF. Part (a) follows directly from us=O, sEs0 , condition (jjj), and 
the fact that the dual LP is a minimization problem. 
Part (b) follows from Corollary 9.2.8 (a). 
9.2.10. LEMMA. P(a*) .g=g and P(O')~g=:=g. 
* PROOF. From P(cr ).g~g (condition (i)) it follows that the equality sign 
holds for the components belonging to the set S'S0 of recurrent states of 
* P(cr) (see lemma 8.1.l(a)). Hence we have for sES and jEBs: 
D 
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(9.2.18) 
From the complementary slackness property we obtain for sES and jEBs: 
(9.2.19) 
(9.2.18) and (9.2.19) together with the definitions of o* and a (see 
(9.2.11) and (9.2.12)) give the lemma. 
a 
9.2.11. COROLLARY. 
(a) For each nE { 1 , ... , y * } , g is constant * on E 
n 
(a ) . 
(b) For each nE{ 1, •.. ,y}, g is constant on E (cr) • 
n 
In the following g(n), for nE{l, ... ,y*}, denotes the constant value 
ofgonE (a*). Similarly fornE{l, ... ,y}. 
n 
"' * 9.2.12. LEMMA. For (n 1 ,n2JE{1, .•. ,y}x{1, .•. ,y } we have either 
* * E (cr)nE (cr) E (cr ), or 
nl n2 n2 
"' * * PROOF. Let sEE (cr)nEn (cr) and let tEEn (cr ). 
nl 2 * 2 
Then sand t communicate under P(a ). But since y (j)=cr (j)>O if 
s s 
"' * zs(j)=crs(j)>O (see 9.2.10), it follows that sand t also communicate under 
P (";;), so tEE (a). 
nl 
a 
Lemma 9.2.12 implies that the following are sensible definitions. 
Let 
';i'E { 1, •.. ,y} 
T;- := En<alnTccr*> , ';i'E{1, ... ,y} 
T := {niTCcrl~E ccr*>} 
n 
"' * TT := T(cr}nT(cr ) 
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Obviously 
(9.2.20) {1, .•. ,y*} 
For a finite set c we mean by lei the number of elements of C. 
9.2.13. LEMMA. For 'il'E{l, ... ,y} we have 
L: u L: A 
tE111(o) t nE°n n 
L: IE (0*) l+IT~I+ L: 
nEDv n n tE&....,(0) 
i:: p<tJs,aJ .d 
~ s 
sET (0) 
n n 
PROOF. The first equality follows from corollary 9.2.7. The second can be 
checked by summing up (9.2.13) over tEEr;(cr) and using 9.2.14 (with 
P=P"-""(cr)). 
nn 
From (9.2.13) we can also infer: 
(9. 2. 21) dt = 1+ i:: p(tls,crJd 
~ s 
sET(0) 
for tETT. 
* And after summing up (9.2.13) over tEEn(0) with nET and using corollary 
9.2.7 we obtain 
(9.2.22) A 
n 
9.2.14. LEMMA. 
i:: p(tls,oJ.d 
~ s 
sET(0) 
nE{ 1, ... , y *} 
CJ 
PROOF. From the duality theorem for linear programs, lemma 9.2.9(a) and (b) 
and (9.2.20) we obtain: 
(9. 2. 23) l: g 
sES s 
y 
L: 
:;;'=1 
L: w 
sES s 
* y 
l: A .max W (n) 
n=l n pP pP0* 
l: A max W (n)+ L: A .max W (n). 
nED-v n pP pP0* nET n pP pP0* 
n 
162 
Now observe that, using Corollary 3.5, lemma 9.2.4, and the fact that W * pa 
is constant on E (a*) for each p: 
n 
(9.2.24) max W (n) 2: W (n) 2: g(n), 
pP pPa* pXa* 
for all n€{1, ••• ,y*}. 
Substituting inequality (9.2.24) into (9.2.23) and recalling that 
g(n)=g(;') for n€D;r yields: 
(9.2.25) 
Inserting the expression for E A of lemma 9.2.13 and also relation 
nEon n (9.2.22) into (9.2.25) leads to: 
(9.2.26) y ..... * y ..... 2: E g(n) E IE (a ) I+ E g(n) l'INI E g 
s€S s ';i°=1 n€0-.. n n'=l n 
..... 
y ..... 
+ E g(n) E 
';i°=1 tEP>---Cal 
n 
n 
E p(tls,o)d + E g(nl.IE ea*> I 
"" s n s€T(a) n€T 
- E g(n) E * dt+ E g(n) E * E ..... pCtls,a)ds 
n€T t€En(a) n€T t€En(a) s€T(a) 
= E gs (the first + the fourth term) 
s€5'So 
+ E ..., gs (the second term) 
s€s0n (5'T(a)) 
+ E ..., gs (extra term added) 
s€s00T(a) 
- E gtd + E E g .p(tls,o).d 
t€TT t t€TT s€T(a) t s 
(in view of (9.2.21), the same extra term subtracted) 
+ E gt E pCtls,o)d (the third and the sixth term) 
t€5'TT s€T (0) s 
- E g(n) E * dt (the fifth term) 
n€TT t€E (a 
n 
= E g + E g E p(tls,a).d - E gtd. 
s€S s t€S ts€T(a) s t€T(a) t 
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But since E p(tls,cr) .gt=g by lemma 9.2.10, it follows that the second and 
tES s 
the third term of the last expression of (9.2.26) sum up to zero. Then 
(9.2.26) results in the inequality: 
l: g 
sES s 
~ E g 
sES s 
Hence in (9.2.25) the equality sign must hold, and since An>O for each 
nE{l, ... ,T*} this implies that the equality sign holds in (9.2.24) also, 
which proves the lemma. 
Now we can state the main 'theorem of this section. 
IJ 
9.2.15. THEOREM. Algorithm 9.2.2 provides a solution method for 
undiscounted stochastic games in which player 2 controls the transitions. 
If (g,v,x) and (w,y,z) is a dual 
program, then g equals the va.lue 
optimal stationary strategy for 
optimal stationary strategy for 
PROOF. From lemma 9.2.14 we obtain 
(9.2.27) max W 
pP 
p * = gs 
sp a 
pair of optimal solutions to this 
of the game, x (cf. (9. 2 .1)) is p an 
* player 1 and a (cf. (9.2.12)) is an 
player 2. 
P(a*) is independent of pP, so for each pp we have the same configuration 
of recurrent and transient states, namely s-..s0 is the set of recurrent 
states and s 0 is the set of transient states (see lemma 9.2.6). 
* By lemma 9.2.10, P(<J )g=g. From this equality and from (9.2.27) we derive 
along the same lines as (8.1.11), with inequality signs replaced by equality 
signs, that 
Thus 
max 
pP 
for sEs0 . 
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But then by corollary 3.5 and lemma 9.2.4 we see that for all strategies 
µ and v 
w 
* µcr 
:;; w 
x * P a 
These inequalities prove theorem 9.2.15 as a consequence of theorem 2.3.4. 
9.2.16. REMARK. If in each state player 1 has only one action, then the 
game reduces to a minimizing Markov decision problem. In this case our 
algorithm results in an algorithm presented by Hordijk & Kallenberg (1979). 
Parts of their proofs could be projected on our problem; in particular the 
* fact that s 0 is exactly the set of transient states for P(cr ) could be 
proved for both cases in an analogous way. The problem of proving the 
* optimality of a is essentially different. Following their line of argument 
lead to the result that o* is "optimal" against all pP, such that 
p zf'V ~ I x p € X A , where A :={i iEA and p (i)>O}. 
s=l s s s s * 
Clearly this is not enough for showing the optimality of a • 
9.2.17. REMARK. For the important case in which, for each pure stationary 
strategy oP, the probability matrix P(aP) has a single ergodic class and no 
transient states, both the algorithm and the proofs can be considerably 
simplified. The algorithm now becomes: 
(i) 
(ii) 
maximize the scalar g, subject to 
z 
g+v - L x (i).r(s,i,j)- E p(tls,j).v :;;o 
s i€A s t=l t 
L 
iEA 
s 
s 
x (i)=l and x (iJ~O 
s s 
,sES, i€As 
The dual of this linear programming problem is: 
(j) 
(jj) 
z 
min L w , 
s=l s 
z 
L L z (j) 
s=l j€Bs s 
z 
subject to 
L L (o t-p(tls,j))z (j) 
s=l j€Bs s s 
0 , t€S. 
sES, j€Bs 
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(jjj) - l: z (j).r(s,i,j)+w :::: 0 
'EB s s 
J s 
, sES, iEAs 
(jv) , sEs, jEBs 
* * In this case the stationary strategy a with a (j)=z (j)/ l: zs(j) for each 
s s 'EB j and sis optimal for player 2 when the z (j)'s belong J s to an optimal 
s 
solution of the dual program. 
In the rest of this section we give some further properties of a 
player 2 control stochastic game. First we obtain two results which will be 
used in the next section. 
For a player 2 control stochastic gamer, R(f) denotes the set of states s 
for which player 2 has an optimal stationary strategy a, such that state s 
is recurrent under P(cr). 
9.2.18. LEMMA. Let g be the value of a player 2 control stochastic gamer. 
Then 
(a) 
z 
g =min l: p(tls,j)gt 
s 'EB t=l J s 
z 
, sES. 
Let E2 ={jijEB and gs= l: p(tjs,j).gt}. 
s s t=l 
(b) If a is optimal for player 2, then 
(c) Let vElRz be such that 
(9.2.28) g +v ~ Val (G (v)), 
s S A xE s 
s 2s 
all sES 
then the equality sign holds in (9.2.28) for each sER(f). 
PROOF. Part (a) holds in view of lemma 8.1.4. Part (b) is proved in a more 
general context in lemma 8.1.5, while the equality g=P(a).g is a consequence 
of part (a) and the definition of E2s. 
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Considering part (c), take ~ER(r) and let a be an optimal stationary 
strategy for player 2 such that state';; is recurrent under P(a). Let E(a) 
be the ergodic set to which';; belongs. Now suppose that the inequality 
(9.2.28) is strict for';;. Then there exists a stationary strategy p for 
player 1 such that 
g+v ::> r(p,a)+P(a) .v, 
with strict inequality at least for component ';;EE(a). Application of the 
second part of lemma 8.1.l(b) shows that a cannot be optimal. Hence we have 
a contradiction and therefore the equality sign holds in (9.2.28) for~-
Note that the existence of a v satisfying (9.2.28) is quaranteed by 
both theorem 8.1.8 and by the existence of an optimal solution (g,v,x) to 
LP1 (cf. theorem 9.2.15). 
a 
With a player 2 control stochastic game we associate another linear 
programming problem, called LP2. Because we use this program for games with 
payoffS Of the type r(S,i,j)=r(s,i,j)-g (g is the average reward Value) I 
s 
it is convenient to incorporate this special form here. 
g1 , ••• ,gz in LP2 are not variables like in LP1, but given numbers. 
Intuitively in this game the average reward value is identical to zero. 
9.2.19. ALGORITHM. 
LP2: variables u= Cu1 , ••• , u ) , x={x (i) I sES, iEA } z s s 
(i) 
(ii) 
max E u , subject to 
sES s 
u - E r(s,i,j).x (i)- E p(tjs,j)ut:>O, 
s iEA s tES 
E 
iEA 
s 
s 
x (i)=1 and x (i)~O 
s s 
, sEs, iEAs. 
The dual LP is: 
sES, jEBs 
DLP2: variables d=(d1 , ••• ,d ), y={y (j) lsES, jEB }. z s s 
min E d , subject to 
sES s 
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(j) L L (6 t-p(tls,j))y (j)=l 
sES jEBs s s 
, tEs 
- L r(s,i,j).y (j)+ d ~ 0, s € S, i E As 
'EB s s J s 
( j j) 
(jjj) for all sEs, jEBs. 
Hordijk & Kallenberg (1981a) have shown that for the transient case 
(i.e. the case where lim P'(crp)=O for all pure stationary strategies op) 
'!'-- zz 
LP2 is feasible. For such games the solution to LP2 corresponds to the 
total payoff value of the game. We need an extension of their result to 
what we call a semi-transient player 2 control stochastic game. This is a 
game for which (a) L p(tls,j)~l, each jEBs, sES, (b) the average payoff 
tEs 
value equals 02 and (c) player 2 has a stationary strategy a such that 
P(cr) is transient. 
9.2.20. LEMMA. For a semi-transient player 2 control stochastic game with 
payoffs of the form r(s,i,j)=r(s,i,j)-g the corresponding linear program 
s * LP2 is feasible and has a bounded optimal solution u for which 
* u 
s 
Val 
A XB 
s s 
z 
(r(s,.,.)-g + L p(tls,.)ut*) 
s t=l 
, sEs 
PROOF. Add a state z+l, where both players have one action denoted by the 
scalar 1 and such that p(z+1Jz+l,1)=1, p(z+lJs,j)=l- L p(tls,j), sES, and 
r(z+l,1,1)=0. Then we obtain a stochastic game with 5~~-stopping 
transition probabilities which obviously has also average payoff value 0. 
But this means (see lemma 8.1.3) that there exists a vector vElRz+l such 
that 
(9.2.29) v 
s 
z+l 
Val ( r ( s , . , . ) -g + r p ( t I s , . ) v ) , 
A XB s t=l t 
sE{l,2, ... ,z+l} 
s s 
As in (9.2.1) and(9.2.2) there exists a one-to-one correspondence 
between the set of stationary strategies for player 1 and the set of all 
x satisfying condition (ii) of LP2. Let p be such that ps is an optimal 
action for player 1 in ( 9. 2. 29) for each sES. Then it can be checked that 
the pair (u,xp) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of LP2, when 
us=vs-vz+l' sES. So LP2 is feasible. 
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Next let (u,x) be an arbitrary feasible pair. Let a be such that P(o) is 
transient. Then condition (i) implies 
z 
(9.2.30) us r(px,o)-g+P(cr).u and also us s Val (r(s,.,.)-gs+ l p(ljs,.)ut) 
AsxBs t=1 
By iterating the first inequality we obtain in view of P(cr) being transient: 
(9.2.31) us E PT(cr)(r(px,cr)-g) s sup 
T=O p 
E PT(cr) (r(p,cr)-g). 
-r=O 
Since P(cr) is transient the right hand side of (9.2.31) is bounded. Hence 
z 
for any feasible solution (u,x) to LP2, E us is uniformly bounded from 
above. This implies that LP2 has a finit~= 1optimal solution. 
* * Now let (u , x ) be any optimal solution of LP2. In view of the second 
inequality of 9.2.30 it remains to show, that for no s € S: 
(9.2.32) 
z 
* ,.... I"' * u.v < Val (r(s,.,.)-~ E p(t s,.)ut). 
s A,,..x&.,. s t=l 
s s 
Let P,:,,. be an optimal action for player 1 for the matrix game in the right hand 
s 
side of (9.2.32). Then, for sufficiently small E>O, it follows that 
,.... ,.... I"' * UNI-£ s min { E (r(s,i,j)-9::').~(i)+ E p(t s,j)ut 
s j iEJ\.v s s tES--{s} 
s 
"'I"' * + p(s s,j) (UN!-E)}. 
s 
This inequality implies that the pair (~ 1 x), with us=us*' xs(i)=x*{i) if 
- s * 
s#s and \i.s=ustE, ~(i)~'S(i), is feasible for LP2 and EsEsus>EsESus. But 
this is in contradiction with the optimality of (u*,x*) for LP2. Hence 
the lemma is proved. 
We conclude this section with a theorem which states that the 
solution of the limit discount equation for games in which one player 
governs the transitions is a rational function of e. 
9.2.21. THEOREM. The solution of the limit discount equation can be 
expressed as a Laurent series expansion if the game is such that one 
player controls the transitions. 
IJ 
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PROOF. Suppose that player 2 governs the transitions. Parthasarathy & 
Raghavan (1981), theorem 4.2, have shown that, for such a game, player 2 
has a stationary strategy which is uniformly discount optimal, i.e. 
optimal for each interest rate close enough to zero. 
Bewley & Kohlberg (1978), theorem 6.1, proved that a stationary strategy a 
is uniformly discount optimal if and only if it is optimal in the limit 
discount equation, i.e. if and only if, for each sEs, the real action 
as is an optimal action in the matrix game 
z 
l: p(sjt,.)<(8) 
s=l ] 
1+8-l 
[r(s,.,.) + 
with entries in the field of real Puiseux series. 
But then, for such an uniformly discount optimal stationary strategy a, the 
solution of the limit discount equation satisfies the following relations: 
x (8) 
s 
max {r(s,i,cr )+ 
iEA s 
s 
z 
l: p(tjs,cr )x (8) 
t=l s t } 
1+8-l 
, sES 
Now this set of equations is nothing else than the limit discount 
equation for MDP(cr), i.e. the Markov decision problem which results 
when player 2 fixes a. And it is well-known that the unique solution of 
the limit discount equation for Markov decision problems has a Laure.nt 
series expansion. 
Observe that the kind of reasoning used in the proof of theorem 
9.2.21 generalizes theorem 6.4 of Bewley & Kohlberg (1978). They state 
* that x (8) is a rational function of 8 if both players have uniformly 
discount optimal stationary strategies, while in our case only one of the 
players possesses such a strategy. 
9.3. A FINITE ALGORITHM FOR THE SWITCHING CONTROL STOCHASTIC GAME. 
In this section we show how the switching control stochastic game can 
be solved with the aid of a finite sequence of linear programming problems. 
A switching control stochastic game has already been defined in section 6. 3, 
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where we gave an algorithm for the discounted version. We adopt the 
notation as introduced there. 
In his Ph.D. dissertation, Filar (1979) proved that for switching 
control Wldiscounted stochastic games the orderfield property holds. This 
indicates that a finite algorithm should exist for this class of games. 
A first attempt to find such an algorithm was made by Filar & Raghavan 
( 1980). 
This section provides an efficient algorithm for finding the solution 
of the undiscounted version of the switching control stochastic game. The 
results of this section are based on Vrieze, Tijs, Raghavan & Filar (1983). 
The part of a stationary 
set s 1 is denoted by pc. Thus 
strategy p of player 1 which refers to the 
pc corresponds to a set {pcJpcEP(A ), sEs 1}. s s s 
As already mentioned in section 6.3, if a particular pc is fixed then the 
remaining game is a player 2 control stochastic game. This game will be 
denoted by f(pc). 
Thus I'(pc}=<S, O\[sE§}, {Bs[sEs}, r, p>, where S=S=S1Us2, where 
for sES1: A :={1}, B :=B , r(s,1,j) := l: r(s,i,j)pc(i), 
s s s iEA s 
p(t[s,j) := l: p(t[s,i)pc(i), and s 
iEA s 
s 
for sES2: A :=A, B =B, r(s,i,j)=r(s,i,j), p(t[s,j):=p(t[s,j). 
s s s s 
The corresponding LP1 of algorithm 9. 2. 2 for this game will be denoted by 
LPl(f(pc)). 
Now fix for a moment a subset s 0cs, vectors g, wEJRz, a particular pc 
and for each sEs0 a non-empty subset E2s of Bs. Then corresponding to r 
and the five parameters s 0 , g, w, pc and {E25 JsEs0 } we introduce the 
following player 2 control stochastic game: 
r (S ,g,w,pc,{E2 [sEso})=<S,{A lsEs}, {B lsEs}, ~. p>, where S=Soandwhere 0 s s s 
for sEsnsl:A :={1}, B :=E2 I r(s,i,j) :=-g + l: (r(s,i,j)+ l: p(t[s,i)wt)pc(i), 
8 8 8 s iEA tEs--s s 
-1 I c - s o p(t s,j) := i: p(t s,i)p (i) for tEs 0=s, and 
iEA s 
s 
for sEsns2: A :=A , B :=E2 I r(s,i,j) :=-g +r(s,i,j)+ l: p(t[s,j)wt 
_ s s s s _ s tEs--s 
and p(tJs,j)=p(t[s,j) for tEs0=s. 0 
It will result that this game is a semi~transient player 2 control 
stochastic game as introduced in the preceding section. 
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The corresponding LP2-program of algorithm 9.2.19 for this game is denoted 
by LP2Crcs0 ,g,w,pc,{E2slsEs0}>>. 
Now we have enough tools to establish our algorithm. 
9.3.1. ALGORITHM. 
Step 1. Take T=O and choose g(O)=(-M, ... ,-M), where M= max Jr(s,i,j) J. 
Choose w(O)=Oz, 8(0)=0 and pc(O) such that for each s,i,j sEs 1 the 
action pc(O) is an extreme optimal action for player 1 in the matrix 
s 
game [r(s,i,j)] on A XB • 
s s 
Step 2. Consider the current value of T and the associated values of the 
entities g(T), w(T), S(T), pc(T). Determine for each sEs 1 : 
·= {iEA I l: p(tjs,i)g (T)= max{l: p(tjs,iJ.gt(T)} 
s tES t iEA tEs 
s 
and for each sEs2 : 
E2s(T+1) := {jEB Ii:: p(tjs,j)gt(T)=g (T)}. 
s tES s 
Proceed to step 3. 
Step 3. Choose pc(T+l) such that, for each sEs 1 , p~(T+l) is an extreme 
optimal action for player 1 in the matrix game 
z 
A1 (1) := [r(s,i,j)+ i:: p(tjs,i)w (1)] 
s t=l t 
However if Car(p~(T))cE 1s(T+l), and if both gs(T)+ws(T)=Val(A1s(T)) and 
p~(T) is an optimal action for player 1 in the game A1s(T), then put 
p C ( T+ 1) : =p C ( T) • 
s s 
Step 4. Obtain g(T+l), v(T+l) by solving LPl (f(pc(T+1))). 
Step 5. If g(T+l)fg(T), then put w(T+1):=v(T+1), S(T+1)=0 and return to 
step 2, taking 1:=1+1. If g(r+l)=g(T), then continue to step 6. 
Step 6. Let 
:= {sEs 1 Jg (T)+w (r)<Val(A1 (1))} s s s 
·= {sEs2Jg (T)+w (T)<Val(A2 (T))} 
s s s 
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z 
where A2 (T):=(r(s,i,j)+ l: p(tjs,j).wt(T)] on AsxE 2s(T+1). s t=1 
Put G(<+l) :=Gl (T+1)UG2 (T+1). 
If G(T+1)=0, then go to step 9. Otherwise put S(-r+1):=G(-r+1)US(-r) and go 
to step 7. 
Step 7. Put E2s(T+1) :=Bs for sES(T+1)0S 1. 
Find u (-r+1) for each sES(-r+1) by solving for a semi-transient player 2 
s 
control stochastic game the LP problem 
LP2(r(S(T+1), g(T+1), w(T), pc(T+1), {E2s(T+1)jsES(T+l)})). 
Step 8. Put ws(T+l):=ws(T) if sltS(1+l) 
w (T+l) :=u (T+1) if sES (T+l). 
s s 
Return to step 2 with T := T + 1. 
Step 9. The algorithm is stopped. The vector g(T) is the value vector for 
* * the undiscounted switching control stochastic game. Moreover p and a 
are optimal stationary strategies if they are chosen as follows: 
* for sEs 1 , p 
* s 
sEs2 , ps and 
* and as are optimal in the matrix game A1s(T) and for 
* as are optimal in the matrix game A2s(T). 
In proving that in step 9 we indeed obtain a solution of the game, we 
show that at each stage T=O, 1, 2,... the properties below are valid. Here 
g(-1) is chosen such that g(-1)<g(0). 
we recall that, for a player 2 control stochastic gamer, R(f) is defined 
as the set of states s for which player 2 has an optimal stationary 
strategy a such that states is recurrent under P(a). 
Consider the following properties. 
z c 
g (T):S: l: p(tjs,p (T))gt(T), 
s t=1 s 
z 
gs(T):S: l: p(tjs,j).gt(T), 
t=l 
z 
g (T)+w (T):S:r(s,pc(T) ,j)+ l: p(tjs,pc(T))w (T), 
s s s t=l s t 
(Although, in step 6, A2s(T) is only defined for the case g(T+l)=g(T) this 
definition is extended to general T.) 
C(T): 
D(T): 
g(T)~g(T-1) 
If g(-r)=g(-r-1), then R(f(pc(T)))cR(f(pc(T-1))) and pc(T)=pc(-r-1) 
s s 
- c for each sER(f (p (<))) n s 1 . 
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E (T): S(T)nR(r(pc(T)))=0 
F(T): If g(T)=g(T-1) and G{T)i0, then W(T)~(T-1), with strict 
inequality in at least one component. 
Since g(-1)<g(O) and by definition S(0)=0, it follows that A1 (0), A2 (0), 
B1 (0), B2 (0), C(O), D(O), E(O) and F(O) hold. By induction on T we wish to 
prove that A1 (T), ... ,F(T) hold for each TE{0,1, ..• }. For this purpose we 
need a string of lemma's. 
z 
9.3.2. LEMMA. Suppose g (T)=max 
c s iEA 
L p(tls,i).gt(T) for some sEs1 . Then 
t=l Car (p s (T) )CE1s (T+l). s 
Furthermore, if property B1 (T) holds for this state sES, then for all 
jEB : 
s 
g (T)+w (T)sr(s,pc(T+l),j)+ L p(tls,pc(T+l)).w (T). 
s s s tEs s t 
z 
PROOF. Condition (i) of LP1(r(pc(T))) yields g (T)S L p(tls,pc{T)).gt(T), 
s s 
which in combination with the assumption in the leiJi~ 1 implies that 
z I ,....., ~ c c g (T)= L p(t s,i) .g (T) for each iECar(p (T)). Hence Car(p (T) )cE1 (T+1). s t=1 t s s s Now this fact in combination with B1 (T) implies 
z 
g (T)+w (T)Smin {r(s,pc(T),j)+ L p(tls,pc(T)).w (T)} s 
s s j s t=l· s t 
z 
s Val(A 1s(T))=mi.n {r(s,pc(T+l),j)+ L p(tls,pc(T+l)).w {T)}. 
J s t=l s t 
9.3.3. LEMMA. Properties A1 (T) and A2 (T) hold for all T~O. 
0 
PROOF. This is an immediate consequence of condition (i) of LP1(r(pc(T+1))). 
9.3.4. LEMMA. Suppose that A1 (T), A2 (T), B1 (T) and B2 (T) hold. Then 
C ( T+ 1 ) holds . 
0 
PROOF. Choose the stationary strategy p for player 1 as follows. If sEs 1 , 
then p 5 :=p~(T+1) and if sEs2 , let ps be an optimal action in the matrix game 
A25 (T). Let crP be an arbitrary pure stationary strategy for player 2. Since 
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Pisa feasible strategy for the game f(pc(T+l)), it is sufficient to show 
that W~ p2g(T). By A1 (T), A2 (T) and the formulae for pc(T+1) we have pcr 
(9.3.1) 
Let R(p ,crP} be the set of recurrent states for P (p ,crP). 'I'hen by lemma 
8.1.1. (a) the equality sign in (9.3.1) holds for each component 
sER(p,crP}. For sER(p,crP)ns 1 this yields 
z 
g (T) = L p(tjs,pc(T+l))g (T)=max 
s t=l s t iEA 
So we may apply lemma 9.3.2, obtaining 
s 
z 
L p(tls,i).gt(T). 
t=l 
(9.3.2) g (T)+w (T)~r(s,ii ,crP)+ L p(tls,ii ) .wt(T). 
s s s tES s 
For sER(p ,crP)ns2 we have by B2 (T), by the choice of p, and by noting that 
Car(crP)cE2 (T+l): s s 
z 
(9. 3. 3) g (T)+w (T)~r(s,p ,crP)+ L p(tls,crP).wt(T). 
s s s t=l s 
Then, by lemma 8.1.l(b), the inequalities (9.3.1), (9.3.2) and (9.3.3) 
imply 
And since crp is arbitrary we obtain: 
g(T+l) = max min W 2g(T), 
P 0 P pap 
where the maximum is taken with respect to e&ch stationary strategy p 
admissible in the game f(pc(T+1)). 
9.3.5. LEMMA. Suppose Al (T), Bl (T) and B2(T) hold. Then D(T+1) holds. 
PROOF. Suppose g(T+l)=g(T}. Observe that in f(pc(T+l)) in the states 
belonging to s 1 player 2 has ~o influence on the transition probabilities. 
Then by lemma 9.2.18: g (<)= L p(tjs,pc(T+l)).g (T) for sEs 1. Since s t=l s t 
pc(T+1)EP(E 1 (T+l)) this implies: s s 
IJ 
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(9. 3.4) g (T) = max 
s iEA 
s 
z 
i:: p ( t Is Ii) gt ( T) I 
t=l 
for all sES 1 . 
Hence by lemma 9.3.2 for all sEs 1 : 
z 
g ( T) +w ( T) ,,;min { r ( s, pc ( T+ 1) , j) + i:: p ( t I s , pc ( T+ 1) ) • wt ( T) }. 
s s jEB s t=i s 
s 
(9. 3. 5) 
Since g(T+l)=g(T) equals the value of f(pc(T+l)), lemma 9.2.18 can be 
applied to (9.3.5) and B2 (T) (which together form the assumption in part 
(c) of lemma 9.2.18). This implies that for sER(f(pc(T+l))) the equality 
sign holds in the respective inequalities. Since Car(pc(T))c:E 1 (T+l) (cf. s s 
- c (9.3.4)) we conclude that, for sER(f(p (T+l)))ns 1 , Val(A 1s(T))=gs+ws. 
c Further, by B1 (T), ps(T) is optimal in A1s(T). So by step 3 of the 
algorithm 
(9. 3.6) - c for all sER(f (p (T+l)) Jns 1 
which proves the second part of D(T+1). 
Fix sER(f(pc(T+l))) and let a be optimal for player 2 in f(pc(T+l)), 
such that states is recurrent under P(o). Then (9.3.6) and g(T+l)=g(T) 
imply that, for the ergodic set to which s belongs, a is also optimal in 
f(pc(T)), and obviously states remains recurrent in f(pc(T)). This shows 
that R ( f (pc ( T + 1 ) ) )C:R cf (pc ( T ) ) ) . 
IJ 
9.3.6. LEMMA. Suppose Ai (T), Bl (T), B2(T) and E(T) hold. Then E(T+l) holds. 
PROOF. If g(T+l)>g(T), then S(T+1)=0 and hence E(T+l) is true. Thus suppose 
- c - c g(T+l)=g(T). From E(T) and R(f(o-(T+l)))c:R(f(o (T))) (lemma 9.3.5) it 
follows that S(T)nR(f(pc(T+l))l=0. In view of the definition of S(T+l) it 
then suffices to show that 
(9. 3. 7) - c G(T+l)nR(f (p (T+l)) )=0. 
In the proof of lemma 9.3.5 it has been shown that 
- c for sER(f (p (T+ll) )ns 1 
and by lemma 9.2.18, 
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- c for sER{f(p (T+1J)Jns2 • 
Hence by these two equations it follows from the definition of G(T+l) in 
step 6 that (9.3.7) holds. 
IJ 
9.3.7. LEMMA. Suppose Al {T), Bl {T), B2(T) and E(T) hold. Then F(T+l) holds. 
PROOF. Suppose g(T+l)=g(T) and G(T+l);i,0. From relation (9.3.5) in the proof 
of lemma 9.3.5 we have that, for sES(T+l)ns 1 , 
z 
(9. 3.8) g (T)+w (T)Smin {r(s,pc(T+l) ,j)+ E p(tls,pc(T+l)).wt(T)}, 
s s jEB s t=l s 
s 
and, for sES(T+1Jns2 , we see from B2 (T) that: 
(9. 3. 9) 
Since the value of f(pc(T+l)) equals g(T+l)=g(T) and since 
S(T+l)nR(r(pc(T+l)))=.0 (lemma 9.3.6) it can be verified that the game 
- c I f(S(T+l),g(T+l),w(T),p {T+1),{E2s(T+1) sES(T+l)}) is a semi-transient 
player 2 control stochastic game. Namely: 
(a) E ~ltls,j)Sl; 
tEs (T+l) 
(b) The S(T+l)-part of an optimal stationary strategy a of player 2 in the 
game f(pc(T+l)) gives, when applied to f(.,.,.,.,.), a transient 
stochastic matrix; and 
(c) the average reward value equals Oz. To see (c), by {b) we have that the 
value is at most Oz and if a is such that some states of S(T+1) are 
recurrent, then a is disadvantageous for player 2 in view of 
S(T+l)nR(f(pc(T+l)))=,0. Hence the best player 2 can do is playing a 
transient stationary strategy, resulting in value Oz. 
Furthermore, putting~ (1)=1 if sEs1ns(T+1) and x (i)=p (i), i EA s s s s 
if sEs2ns(T+1), where ps is optimal for player 1 in A2s(T), it can be seen 
that the pair ({w {TJisES(T+l)}, {x (illsES(T+lJ,iEA }) satisfies 
s s s 
conditions (i) and (ii) of LP2(f (.,.,.,.,.)).But since G(T+l);i,0 in 
(9.3.8) or (9.3.9) at least one strict inequality sign holds. Hence, by 
lemma 9.2.20, we obtain for the solution {u lsES(t+l)} of this LP2 problem 
s 
that us"?:ws(T), all sES(T+l), with the inequality sign holding for at least 
one coordinate. 
0 
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9.3.8. LEMMA. Suppose Al (T), Bl (T), B2(T) and E(T) hold. Then Bl (T+l) and 
B2 (T+l) hold. 
PROOF. If g(T+l)~g(T), then B1 (T+l) and B2 (T+l) follow from condition (ii) 
of LPl(f(pc(T+l))). Suppose now g(T+l)=g(T). From F(T+1) (lemma 9.3.7) we 
obtained ws (T+l) ::OW s (T) for each sES (T+l) . By definition, w s (T+l) =w s (T) for 
each sES'S (T+1). 
In the first part of the proof of lemma 9.3.5 (cf. (9.3.4)), it has been 
shown that the condition of lemma 9.3.2 is satisfied for each sEs 1• So 
using B1 (T), lemma 9.3.2 and B2 (T) we have that B1 (T+l) and B2 (T+l) hold 
for sES'S (T+l). 
Further, by condition (i) of LP2(r(.,.,.,.,.)), it follows that B1 (T+1) and 
B2 (T+1) also hold for sES(T+l). 
D 
Now, combining the lemma's 9.3.3-9.3.8 we conclude that from the 
assumption "A1(T), A2(T), Bl(T), B2(T), C(T), D(T), E(T) and F(T) hold" 
it follows that "A1(T+l), A2(T+l), Bl(T+l), B2(T+l), C(T+l), D(T+l), E(T+l) 
and F (T+l) hold". 
Hence we have proved. 
9.3.9. THEOREM. For each TE{0,1,2, ... } the properties Ai (T), A2(T), Bl (T)' 
B2(T)' C(T), D(T), E(T) and F(t) hold. 
The following is an important theorem. 
9.3.10. THEOREM. Algorithm 9.3.1 stops after a finite number of iterations. 
PROOF. Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981) have shown that an extreme optimal 
action for player 1 in a matrix game of payoff type [f(i,j)+h(i)] on AxB 
is also an extreme optimal action for player 1 in some subgame [f(i,j)] on 
axB with aCA (cf. Parthasarathy & Raghavan (1981), lemma 4.1 p. 381). 
Applied to step 3 of our algorithm, this means that, for each state sEs1 , 
at any stage T an extreme optimal action pc(T) of player 1 for some matrix 
s 
game [r(k,i,j)] on as(T)XBs' with as(T)cAs' is chosen. Shapley & Snow 
(1950) have shown that a matrix game has only a finite number of extreme 
optimal actions. Furthermore, a matrix game has a finite number of 
submatrices. Since there are a finite number of states, this implies that 
(9. 3.10) the set from which pc(T), T~O, is chosen is a finite one. 
178 
It remains to show that no cycles can occur, i.e. that no strategy 
repeats itself infinitely often. 
By the properties C(T) and F(T) we deduce that for each T exactly one 
of the following events occurs: 
Hl: g(T)>g(T-1) 
H2: g(T)=g(T-1), pc(T)fpc(T-1), G(T)f{1l, W(T)>w(T-1) 
H3: g(T) =g(T-1), pc(T)=pc(T-1) I G(T)f{1l, W(T) >w(T-1) 
H4: g(T)=g(T-1), pc(T)=pc(T-1), G(T)={1l. 
Since r (pc (T)) depends only on pc (T) we have in view of C(T): 
(9. 3.11) 
kE{T,T+l, ••• } and lE{T-1,T-2, ..• ,0}. 
Now suppose that, from stage T, H2 repeats itself infinitely often. 
Since Is! is finite we may assume without loss of generality that 
S(T)=S(T+1)=S(T+2)= •... But then observe that the optimal value of 
LP2(f(S(T-1+1) ,g(T-1+1), w(T-2+1). pc(T- Hl), {E2s(T-1+1) /sES(T-1+1)})) in 
step 7 of the algorithm depends only on {pc(T-1+1) lsES(T-1+1)=S(T)}, 
s 
1=1,2, ... , since the other parameters do not change. But since 
w(T-l+l)>w(T-2+1) we find pc(k+l)fpc(k), for 1=1,2, ••. and k=T-1,T,T+1, •.. 
But then in view of (9.3.10) 
(9. 3.12) H2 cannot repeat itself infinitely often. 
Let k be the first time that H2 does not occur. Then either S(k)=!ll, in 
which case Hl occurs, or H4, or possibly H3 occurs. 
If H3 occurs, then, by the construction of G1 (T) and G2 (T), and by the 
equality in the assertion of lemma 9.2.20, we see that G(T)0S(T-1)={1l. Hence 
(9. 3.13) if H3 occurs then S(T) strictly includes S(T-1). 
As final statement we have 
(9. 3.14) if H4 occurs then the algorithm stops. 
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Now by (9.3.12) and (9.3.13) we see, in view of the finite number of 
states, that a sequence in which only the events H2 and H3 occur cannot 
happen. But then in view of (9.3.11) and (9.3.10), H4 must occur within a 
finite number of iterations, which by (9.3.14) proves the theorem. 
9.3.11. THEOREM. Step 9 of the algorithm is reached after a finite number 
of iterations and provides a solution to the game, i.e. g(T) equals the 
* * value of the game and p and a are optimal stationary strategies. 
PROOF. By theorem 9.3.10 step 9 is reached after a finite number of 
iterations. 
From g(T+l)=g(T), pc(T+l)=Pc(T), G(T+l)=~ and the definitions of 
* * * * p and a (observe that psEP(Els(T+l)), for sEs 1 and osEP(E2s(T+l)), for 
sEs2), we conclude that for any two pure stationary strategies pp and op 
(9.3.15) 
(9.3.16) 
(9.3.17) 
Similarly 
(9.3.18) 
(9.3.19) 
(9. 3.20) 
g (T)+w (T) 
s s 
z 
* P I * s r(s,p ,o )+ 2: p(t s,p ) .wt (T) 
s s t=l s 
z 
* p I P g (T)+w (T) s r(s,p ,o )+ 2: p(t s,o ) .w (T). 
s s s s t=l s t 
g (T)+W (T) 
s s 
g (T)+w (T) 
s s 
z 
:?: r(s,pP,o*)+ 2: p(tls,o*) .w (T). 
s s t=l s t 
[J 
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Now (9.3.15)-(9.3.20) imply by lemma 8.1.l(b) that 
* p * p * * * * Q(p ,cr ) .r(p ,cr ) :i!g(T)=Q(p ,a ) .r(p ,cr ) :?! 
By corollary 3.5 and theorem 2.3.4 these inequalities yield the theorem. 
9.3.12. REMARK. For the class of stochastic games for which, for each pair 
of pure stationary strategies (pP,crP), the Markov chain associated with 
P(pP,crP) has no transient states algorithm 9.3.1 can be considerably 
simplified. Only the steps 1-5 are necessary in this case (cf. also remark 
9.2.17). Furthermore, as soon as g(T+l)=g(T) the algorithm can stop since 
the value of the game is reached. These facts follow immediately from the 
properties D(T) and E(T). 
We conclude this section with the observation that our algorithm 
provides a constructive proof of the existence of the value and of optimal 
stationary strategies for both players in the switching control stochastic 
game. Also the result of Filar (1979) that player 1 has an optimal 
* * stationary strategy p such that, for each sEs 1 , ps is an extreme optimal 
action in a matrix game [r(s,i,j)] on asxBs with ascAs, can be derived 
from our algorithm. Similarly for player 2. Furthermore the finiteness of 
the algorithm gives a constructive proof of the ordered field property. 
Cl 
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A.1. MATRIX GAMES. 
In this section we give a number of well-known concepts in matrix game 
theory. Also some results will be mentioned which are used in this 
monograph. 
A.1.1. DEFINITION. A two-person zerosum game in normal form is an ordered 
triplet < A, B, K >, where A and B are non-empty sets and K: AXB+JR is a 
real-valued function on the Cartesian product of A and B. The sets A 
and B are called the action spaces of player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
The elements of A and B are called actions and K is the payoff function. 
A matrix game is a two-person zerosum game in which both A and B are 
finite sets. 
Since we only consider games in normal form, and not games in 
extensive form, we usually omit the qualification "in normal form". 
Such a (non-cooperative) game is played as follows. The players 1 and 
2 choose, independently of one another, an action aEA and an action bEB 
respectively; subsequently player 2 pays player 1 the amount K(a,b). (If 
K(a,b) is negative, then player 2 receives -K(a,b) from player 1). We call 
K(a,b) the payoff of the play. Clearly player 1 wishes to maximize, and 
player 2 to minimize, this payoff. 
According to definition A.1.1 the players are not allowed to 
randomize their actions, i.e. to select a (pure) action with the aid of 
a chance experiment. However in non-cooperative game theory it is the 
custom to permit the players to use lotteries. This results in the mixed 
extension of a game (cf. e.g. Luce & Raiffa (1957)). Since in this 
monograph we only consider games where the players have finite action 
spaces, the next definition is restricted to that case. Such games are called 
matrix games. 
A.1.2. DEFINITION. A mixed extension of a matrix game < A,B,K >is a two-
person zerosum game< P(A),P(B),K >where P(A) is the family of all 
probability measures on the finite set A. If A consists of m elements, 
then A is identified with the set :N : ={ 1, 2, ••• ,m}; so P (A) 
m 
corresponds 
m 
with the (m-1)-dimensional simplex {xlx=(x1 , ••• ,xm), 
Likewise P(B)={yly=(y1, ... ,y ), y.~Oandi:1: 1y.=1} if 
x.~O and 
i 
B has n 
l: x.=1}. 
i=1 i 
elements. 
n i J= J 
Furthermore K(x,y)=l:~ 1 l:~ 1K(i,j) .x .. y. for each (x,yJEP(A)xP(B). i= J= i J 
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When we speak of an action in a matrix game, this action may either 
be pure or mixed. Concerning matrix games, the variable i always denotes 
a pure action for player 1 and j a pure action for player 2. Though it 
might cause ambiguity, we usually write K(x,y) instead of K(x,y). By 
K(x,j) and K(i,y) we mean K(x,ej) and K(ei 1 y), where ej respectively ei 
corresponds to the probability measure that puts weight 1 on action jEB 
and iEA respectively. 
Note that a mixed extension of a matrix game itself is a two-person 
game in normal form. The mixed extension of a game is played as follows. 
The players 1 and 2 choose independently of one another an action 
xEP(A) and yEP(B) respectively; then for each player a chance experiment 
according to the probability measures x and y respectively is carried 
out, in order to select pure actions iEA and jEB respectively. 
Subsequently player 2 pays player 1 the amount K(i,j). Thus, if the 
players play x and y, the expected outcome of the game equals K(x,y). 
In this monograph the mixed extension of a matrix game < A,B,K > 
is abbreviated to [K]. When we speak of a matrix game, the mixed 
version is intended. However, when we speak of a two-person zerosum game 
< A,B,K >, the "pure" version is intended. 
* A.1.3. DEFINITION. A two-person zerosum game is said to have a value V , 
if 
sup inf K(a,b) 
aEA bEB 
inf sup K(a,b) 
bEB aEA 
* v . 
For a game with given value v*, the actions a£ and b£ are called 
£-optimal, with £~0, for player 1 and player 2 respectively, if 
inf K(a£ 1 b) ~ v*-£ and sup K(a,b£) ~ v*+£. 
bEB a EA 
Zero-optimal actions are named optimal. 
For a good understanding of the value concept one should note that when 
playing optimally player 1 (player 2) can guarantee himself a payoff of at least 
(at most) the value of the game, whatever action the other player chooses. 
The value of a two-person zerosum game <A,B,K> is denoted by pVal(K). The 
"p" in pVal reflects the notion that only pure actions are allowed. 
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A.1.4. THEOREM. For a two-person zerosum game < A,B,K > the following 
assertions are equivalent. 
* (ij The game has value V and max inf K(a,bl and min sup K(a,b) exist. 
aEA bEB bEB aEA 
(ii) There exist v*E:m, ~EA and bEB, such that for all (a,blEAxB 
* K(a,b) s K(a,b) V s K(a,b). 
* PROOF. Suppose (i) is true. Let V =max inf K(a,b)=min sup K(a,b) be the 
aEA bEB bEB aEA 
value of the game. Obviously there exist aEA and bEB such that 
~ * inf K(a,b)=V =sup K(a,b). Hence (ii) is true. Suppose (ii) is true. Then 
bEB a EA 
(A.1.1) sup inf K(a,b) ;e: inf 
aEA bEB bEB 
sup K(a,b) ;e: inf sup 
a EA bEB a EA 
But for each (a,b)EAxB we have 
K(a,b) s sup K(a,b). 
a EA 
So for each aEA we have 
K(a,b) 
K(a,b). 
inf K(a,b) s inf sup K(a,b), 
bEB bEB aEA 
which implies 
* 
v 
(A.1.2) sup inf K(a,bl s 
aEA bEB 
inf sup K(a,b). 
bEB aEA 
Now (A.1.2) implies that the equality signs must hold throughout (A.1.1). 
This results in 
max inf K(a,b) 
aEA bEB 
inf K(a,b) 
bEB 
* v sup K(a,b) 
a EA 
min sup K(a,b). 
bEB aEA 
So (i) is true. 
D 
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Note that if a and b obey (ii) of theoremA.1.4, then a is optimal 
for player 1 and b is optimal for player 2. 
The following theorem is well-known (e.g. Tijs (1977)). 
A.1.5. THEOREM. If for a game < A,B,K >, for each E>O, there exists 
(aE,bE)EAxB, such that for each (a,b)EAxB: 
then the value of the game exists and equals lim K(aE,bE). 
EfO 
The class of matrix games with m rows and n columns is denoted by 
M 
mn 
Already J. von Neumann (1928) proved the following theorem concerning 
matrix games. 
A.1.6. THEOREM. For all m,nElNeach matrix game [K]EM has a value and 
mn 
both players possess optimal actions. 
The value of a matrix game [K] is denoted by Val(K). The set of 
£-optimal actions for player t, tE{1,2}, is denoted by O~(K) for E>O and 
by Ot(K) for E=O. 
In the next lemma, three well-known properties of the value operator are 
stated. Here Jmn denotes an m,n-matrix for which each element equals 1. 
A.1.7. LEMMA. If [K1] and [K2]EMmn with K1~K2 and if (x,y)EP(A)xP(B), then 
(a) inf K1 (x,y) = min K1 (x,j) and sup K1 (x,y) 
yEP(B) jEB xEP(A) 
foranycElR. 
max K1 (i,y) 
iEA 
PROOF. (a) We only prove the first equality; the second can be shown 
analogously. Clearly 
(A.1.3) inf Kl (x,y) S min Kl (x,j). 
yEP(B) jEB 
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However, since y (j) 2'.0 and E~ 1y (j) =1, we have for all y: J= 
n n 
. E Kl (x, j) y ( j) <". 
J=1 . 
E y(j) min Kl (x,j) 
j=l jEB 
So in (A.1.3) the equality sign holds. 
(b) 
T Val(K1+cJmn) =sup inf (K1 (x,y)+(x .Jmny) .c) 
x y 
=sup inf K1 (x,y) + c = Val(K1)+c. 
x y 
* (c) Let x EO 1 (K2). Then 
* * Val (K1) <". min K1 (x ,j) <". min K2 (x ,j) = Val(K2). jEB jEB 
min K1 (x,jl. jEB 
The next lemma states the Lipschitz continuity property of the value 
operator. 
PROOF. From K1 -d(K 1 ,K2 )Jmn~K2~K1+d(K1 ,K2 )Jmn' we derive by (b) and (c) of 
lemma A. 1 . 7 : 
This proves the lemma. 
For a matrix game [K]EM it is well-known that the optimal action mn 
spaces 01 (K) and 02 (K) are polytopes (i.e. convex hulls of finite sets). 
[] 
[] 
This fact is stated in the following theorem, due to Shapley & Snow (1950). 
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A.1.9. THEOREM. Let [K]EMmn, x*Eo1 (K) and y*E02(K). Then the following 
two assertions are equivalent. 
* * (i) x is an extreme point of 01 (K) and y is an extreme point of 02 (K). 
* (ii) There exists a square k,k-submatrix K of K, such that 
*k 
x 
Val(K) 
*k y 
* det(K ) 
T * 1k.adj(K) .1k 
adj(K*) .1k 
T * 1k.adj(K) .lk T * lk.adj(K ).lk 
*k *k * * (Here x and y are the vectors obtained from x and y by removing 
* the coordinates, which play no role in K and which are zero). 
The statement in the next theorem is called the dimension relation 
for matrix games and is due to Bohnenblust, Karlin & Shapley (1950). It 
shows the way in which the sets 01 (K) and 02 (K) are topologically related. 
Let A=lNm and B=lNn. Let the polytope E1cP (A) and define car (E 1) as 
Car(E1l :={iEAlthere exists an xEE1 with x(i)>O}. Car(E1) is named the 
carrier of E1• By Unf(E 1J we denote the number of unnatural faces of E1 , 
i.e. faces which are not entirely contained in the relative boundary of 
P(A). Similarly we define Car(E2l and Unf(E2 l for a polytope E2cP(B). 
For a set Ft=.m.k we denote by dim (E) the dimension of E. 
A.1.10. DEFINITION. Let A=lNm and B=:Nn. A pair of polytopes 
(E E )EP(A)xP(B) is said to possess the (m,n)-BKS property if 
1' 2 
(a) I car (E1) l-dim(E 1l \car (E2l l-dim(E2l • 
(b) lcar(E1l j+Unf(E2) ~ m and lcar(E2l l+unf(E 1l ~ n. 
A.1 .11. THEOREM. Let A=lNm and B=JNn • For a pair 
(E1,E2JEP(A1)xP(B) there exists a matrix game 
02 (K)=E2 if and only if (E 1,E2) possesses the 
of polytopes 
[K] E Mmn such that 01 (K) = E1 an 
(m,n)-BKS property. 
A. 1.12. COROLLARY. Let A=lNm and B=:Nn • Let vElR and let the pair of 
polytopes (E 1,E2)EP(A)xP(B) have the (m,n)-BKS property. Then, for each 
e>O, there exists a matrix game [K]EMmn with Val(K)=v, 01 (K)=E1, 
0 (K)=E and such that \K(i,jl-v\<e for all (i,j)EAxB. 2 2 
A 
PROOF. In view of theorem A.1.11 there is a game [K] with solution 
v, E1, E2 . Then for T large enough the matrix game [K] defined as 
K(i,j)=v+T-l(K(i,j)-v) has the desired property. 
189 
0 

191 
A.2. MARKOV DECISION PROBLEMS. 
In this section we give some well-known properties of Markov decision 
problems. 
A.2.1. DEFINITION. A finite (stationary) Markov decision situation is an 
ordered quadruple < S, {A [sES}, r, p >, where the finite set Sis the 
s 
state space, the finite set As the action set in state s, r is the reward 
function and p the transition map. 
The meanings of the parameters of the Markov decision situation are 
the same as in definition 2.1.1 of chapter I for a stochastic game 
situation. Also one should think of a Markov decision situation as a 
dynamic system which may be in certain states. At discrete points in time 
the course of the system can be influenced by selecting an action from a 
set which depends on the current state. This action results in an immediate 
reward and determines the next state according to a chance experiment. This 
chance experiment only depends on the current state and the action 
subsequently chosen. We assume decision epochs T=0,1,2, .... 
A Markov decision situation can be regarded as a stochastic game 
situation with only one player. 
Strategies for Markov decision situations are defined in an analogous 
way as for stochastic game situations (definition 2.2.2). The different 
types of strategy spaces are denoted by ST, SMST, MST, SST and PSST 
respectively. 
Also for Markov decision problems one can differentiate between a 
number of optimality criteria, each of them specifying its own manner of 
evaluating the stream of immediate (expected) rewards. In our definition 
of a Markov decision problem we have implicitly assumed that one wishes 
to maximize the evaluation function over the set of strategies. 
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A.2.2. DEFINITION. A discounted Markov decision problem with interest rate 
aE(0, 00), is a Markov decision situation fox which the stream of payoffs 
is evaluated as 
v 
sµ := 
00 
I: (-1-) T VT 
T=O l+a • sµ· 
Note that, in definition A.2.2, VT equals the expected payoff at 
sµ 
decision epoch T for initial state s and strategy µ. So Vsµ is the total 
discounted expected payoff for starting state s, strategy µ and discount 
factor (1+a} -l. 
A.2.3. DEFINITION. An average reward Markov decision problem is a Markov 
decision situation fox which the stream of payoffs is evaluated as 
k 
W : = lim inf -- I: VT • 
sµ k-+«> k+1 T=O sµ 
T 
In definition A.2.3 V has the same meaning as in definition A.2.2. 
sµ 
So Wsµ equals the average expected reward per unit time for starting state 
s and strategy µ. 
Like in stochastic games obviously V and w exist for each s and µ. 
sµ sµ 
A.2.4. DEFINITION. Let G be the evaluation function fox a Markov 
sµ 
decision problem. A strategy µE is said to be E-optimal, given E~O. 
if fox each sES: 
G ~ sup G -E. 
sµE µEST sµ 
Zero-optimal strategies axe called optimal. 
Markov decision problems are extensively studied in the literature. 
See for example Blackwell (1962, 1965), Derman (1970}, Hordijk (1974} and 
Federgruen (1978). 
We now quote a number of results of Markov decision theory, which are 
referred to in this monograph. The way in which we use these theorems is 
as follows: fix for the two-person zerosum stochastic game a stationary 
strategy for one player; then the other player faces a Markov decision 
problem; apply the results of the Markov decision theory to this problem 
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and then return to the stochastic game. 
In the following theorems r(s,p ) and p(tjs,p ) with p EP(A ) are defined 
s s s s 
as r(s,ps):=EiEA r(s,i).ps(i) andp(tjs,ps):=EiEA p(tls,i).ps(i). 
s s 
A.2.5. THEOREM. For an infinite horizon discounted Markov decision problem, 
the vector v*Emz defined as v* :=sup V for each sES, is the unique 
s sµ 
solution of the following set of f~nctional equations in the variable 
xEmz: 
z 
x = max {r(s,i) + l+a E p(tjs,i) .xt} 
s iEA t=l 
, sEs. 
s 
* * * * A stationary strategy p =Cp 1 ,p 2 , ••• ,pz) is optimal if and only if for 
each sES: 
* v 
s 
* z * * 
r(s,ps) + l+a E p(tls,p ) .vt. 
t=l s 
Also an optimal pure stationary strategy exists. 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Blackwell (1965) and in Derman 
(1970). 
A.2.6. THEOREM. For an infinite horizon average reward Markov decision 
problem let the vector w*Emz be defined as w* :=sup W , for each sES. 
s µEsT sµ 
Consider the following set of functional equations in the variables 
x,yEmz: 
(A.2.1) 
and 
(A.2.2) 
x 
s 
max 
iEA 
s 
z 
E p(tjs,i).xt 
t=l 
z 
, sEs 
xs+ys = max {r(s,i)+ E pCtls,i).yt} 
iEE t=l 
where E 
s 
s 
z 
:= {iEA Ix= E p(tls,i).xt}. 
s s t=l 
, sES, 
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* * Then this set of equations is solvable and for each solution (x ,y we 
* * * * * * have x =W. Furthermore a stationary strategy p =(p 1,p 2 , ... ,pz) is 
optimal if and only if the following holds: (i) p (i)=O for i~E 
* z * * s * * s (hence W = l: p(tjs,p ) .Wt) and (ii) for any solution (W ,y) of the 
s t=l s 
equations (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) it holds that for each state sES which 
* is recurrent with respect to p ** * z I** we have W +y =r(s,p )+l: 1p(t s,p ) .yt. s s s t= s 
Also an optimal pure stationary strategy exists. 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Schweitzer & Federgruen (1978). 
A.2.7. REMARK. If we have to do with a minimizing Markov decision problem, 
then in the theorems A.2.5 and A.2.6 "max" must be replaced by "min". 
we conclude this section with a theorem which is used in chapter III 
of this monograph. 
A.2.8. THEOREM. For an infinite horizon average reward Markov decision 
* problem MD, let the optimal value be W . Let MD be the Markov decision 
problem which only differs from MD by the immediate rewards: 
- * r(s,i)=r(s,i)-Ws. Then the average reivard problemMDhasoptimalvalue Oz. 
* * PROOF. For the problem MD, let (W ,y ) be a solution to (A.2.1) and (A.2.2). 
* As Oz trivially obeys (A.2.1) it follows immediately that (Oz,y ) is a 
solution to (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) for problem MD. Then, by theorem A.2.6, 
Oz is the optimal value of MD. 
D 
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A. 3. RECENT LITERATURE ON STRUCTURED STOCHASTIC GAMES 
The trend to analyse stochastic games with additional structure on the 
game parameters (rewards and transitions) has been continued during the last 
years. One reason is that for the general case computational procedures are 
complex, accentuated by the fact that even in the discounted case the value 
may be irrational while all the data are rational (cf. remark 4.2.5). Another 
reason is that structured stochastic games are often more suitable for prac-
tical applications. 
Independently Sobel (1981) and Parthasarathy, Tijs & Vrieze (1984) con-
sidered SER-SIT stochastic games, i.e. games with separable reward structure 
and state independent transition structure. To be more specific, the reward 
function r is of the form r(s,i,j}"" c(s) +a (i,j) and the transition map p 
is of the. form p ( t ! s, i, j ) = q ( t Ii, j ) . The action spaces are assumed to be 
the same for each. state. Hence the rewards are built up by a term depending on 
the actual state and a term depending on the chosen actions, while the tran-
sitions only depend on the actions. In Sobel (1981) it is outlined how such 
models can be used in inventory problems and in Parthasarathy, e.a. (1984) 
an application to air pollution problems is presented. 
For discounted zero-sum SER-SIT games the following results hold. The 
* value V 
* v 
s 
of the discounted game equals 
-1 -1 z 
= c ( s) + a ( 1 +a) Val [ a (. ,. ) + ( 1 +t'.'t) i:: t= 1 q ( t I . , . ) c ( t) ] . 
AxB 
Both players have optimal myopic stationary strategies. By a myopic strategy 
we mean a strategy that in each state prescribes the same (mixed) action. 
For a SER-SIT game an optimal myopic stationary strategy can be composed by 
an optimal (mixed) action of that player for the matrix game 
[a(.,.)+ (1+a}-l i::~=l q(t I.,.) c(t)]. The above facts can be derived in a 
straight way from theorem 4.2.4. 
For undiscounted zerosum SER-SIT games similar results hold. The value 
of the undiscounted game equals 
Val [a(.,.)+ i::tz=l q(t!.,.)c(t)].1 
AxB Z 
(so state independent) and optimal myopic stationary strategies can be 
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composed from optimal actions of the players in the matrix game 
[a(.,.)+ L~=i q(t!.,.)c(t)]. These ~acts follow at once from lemma 8.1.3 
since w := c and g* :=Val [a(.,.)+ Ltz=l q(t l.,.)c(t)] satisfy the equations AXB 
in (ii) of this lemma. 
In both Sobel (1981) and Parthasarathy, e.a. (1984) also nonzerosum 
SER-SIT games are analysed, resulting in ~yopic equilibrium points. 
Dirven & Vrieze (1986) too studied myopic equilibrium points. They 
showed how stochastic games can be used in analysing advertisement models. 
Their state variable corresponds to the number of customers allied to firm 
1 (player 1), while the rest of the market is attracted to firm 2 (player 2). 
Dirven and Vrieze gave economically interpretable conditions, sufficient for 
the discounted payoff s to be linear in the state variable for each pair of 
myopic stationary strategies. These conditions are (i) r(s,i,j) = f(i,j). s 
z l l 
+g (i,j),for player l = 1,2 and (ii} E(s,i,j) := L t=O p(t!s,i,j) (t-s) 
h(i,j).s+k (i,j). Different properties of the functions f 2 , g 2 , hand k 
appear to correspond to different market behaviour on advertisement budgets 
(the actions). They showed that if f 2(.,.) and h(.,.) are independent of 
i and j 1 then discounted myopic equilibrium points exist. 
Raghavan, Tijs & Vrieze (1985) treated stochastic games with additive 
reward and transition structure, i.e. games for which r(s,i,j) = r 1(s,i) 
and p(tls,i,j:p1Ct!s,i) + p 2(t!s,j). The reward structure can readily be 
interpreted. Concerning the transition structure, let 
q 1(s,i) := L~=l p(tls,i) and q 2 (s,j} := r~=l p(t!s,j). Clearly 
q 1(s,i) +q2 (s,j) = 1. Then it can be seen that the additive transition 
structure can be explained as: when cell (i,j} turns up in states then with 
probability q 1 (s,i) player 1 governs the transitions according to the 
probability vector (p1(1ls,i), p 1 (2js,i), ... ,p 1 (zls,i))q~ 1 (s,i) and with 
probability q 2 (s,j) player 2 governs the transitions according to the 
probability vector (p2 Clls,j}, p 2 C2!s,j), ... ,p2 (zJs,i))q; 1cs,j). 
For AR-AT games, when inserting the structure of the game into the 
discounted optimality equation, it can be seen that the matrix game 
* -[GSa.{V )] (cf. section 4.2) can be decomposed in a part only depending on i 
and a part only depending on j. Hence both players have optimal pure 
stationary strategies. 
When regarding undiscounted games as the limit of discounted games with 
a. tending to 0, then by the above result ( a.nd the finiteness of the action 
sets and the state space), there is a sequence of a.'s tending to 0 for which 
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for both players the same pure stationary strategy is optimal for each a of 
this sequence. It is well-known that uniformly discount optimal stationary 
strategies are optimal for the undiscounted version (cf. lemma 7.2.5 and 
Bewley & Kohlberg (1978)). Thus for AR-AT games both players possess op-
timal pure stationary strategies for the average evaluation criterion. 
For the nonzerosum case, neither for the discounted nor for the un-
discounted version equilibrium points of pure stationary strategies need 
to exist for AR-AT games, as examples in Raghavan, e.a. (1985) show. 
The models so far discussed satisfy the orderfield property (cf. sec-
tion 9. 2), i.e. that the solution (value and optimal stationary strategies 
respectively equilibrium points) lie in the same Archimeadian field as the 
data of the problem. Only for models with this orderfield property a relative 
simple algorithm (like linear programming) might be expected and indeed for 
each of the above models this appears. 
A further model for which the orderf ield property holds is considered 
in Vrieze, Tijs, Parthasarathy & Dirven (1985). They analysed a two-person 
nonzerosum stochastic game with two states and in both states two actions 
of the players. Furthermore the rewards are governed by one player, say 
player 1, i.e. rl(s,i,j) = rl(s,i), l = 1,2 for both states and all actions. 
They showed that for the extreme points of the set of stationary equilibrium 
points the orderfield property holds. 
Finally we like to mention a paper of Raghavan (1984).He surveyed 
nearly all algorithms for as well discounted as undiscounted two-person 
zerosum stochastic games. Moreover he started interrelating the subclasses 
of games determined by the structure on the parameters. Most of these al-
gorithms can also be found in this monograph (cf. chapter 6 and chapter 9). 
DIRVEN, C.A.J.M. & O.J. VRIEZE (1986), Advertisement models, stochastic games 
and myopic strategies, to appear in Operations Research. 
PARTHASARATHY, T., S.H. TIJS & O.J. VRIEZE (1984),Stochastic games with state 
independent transitions and separable rewards. In: Hammer, G. & 
D. Pallaschke (eds.), Selected topics in Operations research and 
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RAGHAVAN, T.E.S. (1984), Algorithms for stochastic games, a survey, Dep. of 
Math., Statistics and Computer Science, University of Illinois at 
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. 
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SYMBOL INDEX 
(Symbols with only local significance are not included). 
Greek English 
C4 11 A 7 
s 
s 26 <A,B,K> 181 
r 27 B 7 
f (pc) 170 Sr ck8k/M 111 
k=-oo 
f(So,g,w,p°,{E2slsESO}) 170 c 60 
ra 
r < {p 1 p EP <A ) , 
s s s 
sEs1 ) 91 CSG(S) 57 
K (w) 129 dCr ,r • l 59 
J\1S (T) 171 e. 84, 186 
l. 
J\2s(T) 172 e. 84, 186 
J 
IJ 9, 10 E.Q, I .Q,=1,2 112 
IJ (ilh ,s ) 9, 10 f* 47 T T T 
µT(sO,sT) 9, 10 f (8) s 138 
IJ (s ) 9, 10 F 103 T T 
\) 9, 10 FM 103 
\) (j I h Is ) 9, 10 FV(T) 105 T T T 
\)T (sO,sT) 9, 10 FVIJ 2 (T) 126 
VT (ST) 9, 10 FVvl (T) 126 
CJl(w) 104 g 121 
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c 170 g (8) 138 p s 
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s 
105, 111 
T 9 [ G (v)] 
sa 28 
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8 103 [Gs8 (x)] 104 
h 9 T 
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HT 9 
i 188 
i 9 T 
j 188 
jT 9 
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K-j 79 R(p) 118 
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s 
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PU 58 v' 11 
sµv 
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NOTATIONS 
JN, lR and lRm are the set of natural numbers, the set of real numbers 
and the m-fold Cartesian product of lR respectively. 
JN := {1,2, ... ,m} and JN := {-1,-2,-3, ... }. 
m 
1 := (1,1, ... ,l)ElRm and 0 := (0,0, ... ,0)ElRm. 
m m 
For x=(xl,x2, ... ,xm)ElRm, llx[J := maxkEJNm [xkl 
For x,yElRm, d(x,y) := [[x-yj[. 
For xElRm, Car(x) := {k[kElN I 
m 
For x,yEJRm, x?y if and only if xk?yk for each kEJNm 
and x>y if and only if x2y and at least for one component k it holds 
that xk>yk. 
xsy and x<y are defined analogously. 
By an mxn-matrix we mean a matrix consisting of m rows and n columns. 
Imm denotes the mxm-matrix with each entry equal to 1. 
If K is an mxn-matrix, KT represents the transpose of K. 
If K1 and K2 are two mxn-matrices, then 
d (K1 ,K2) : =maxmEJN , nEJN I K1 (m,n) -K2 (m,n) [ . 
m n 
The adjoint of an mxm-matrix K is denoted by adj(K) and the determinant 
of K is denoted by det(K). 
A vector is supposed to be a column vector. However, when no confusion 
arises we often write x.K instead of xT.K for xEJRm and Kan mxn-matrix. 
For a finite set S, lsl is the numer of elements of S. 
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